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1. Executive Summary 
 
1.1 Motivation for the study 
The reliance on social media has increased in recent years, with the British Popula-
tion Survey showing that over 50% of consumers used social media in 2015. Whilst 
social media has allowed creative content businesses to be able to engage directly 
with their audience on a commercial and non-commercial basis, there are chal-
lenges. Social media provides an avenue and route for would be consumers to be di-
verted to on-line sites selling infringing content, and evidence from Trading Stand-
ards indicates that social media sites were the second most common ‘location’ for in-
vestigations into counterfeiting. It is clear therefore, that the impact of social media 
on Intellectual Property (IP) has grown, as information and websites on counterfeit 
goods are accessed and shared; yet there is little, if any, research or dependable 
data on this issue. Against this backdrop, the Intellectual Property Office (IPO), re-
sponsible for supporting and understanding IP Enforcement, has wanted to gain an 
accurate picture on the impact that social media is having on IP rights holders and 
consumers of IP.  
1.2 Objectives 
The main objectives of this research were: 
• to assess the role that social media plays in the sale and distribution of coun-
terfeited and pirated physical goods from six representative sectors: alcohol, 
cigarettes, clothing, footwear, perfume and watches.; 
• to estimate recent levels of counterfeiting within the UK; 
• to understand the extent to which this is moving online; and 
• to gauge how it is helped to do so by online social media platforms. 
The study specifically aimed to assess the scale, impact and characteristics of in-
fringements, as well as opportunities for IP infringement.  
1.3 Method 
The project was divided into three distinct phases: 
 
Phase 1: Review of literature, government and industry data 
This phase involved a review of literature; the collation of recent industry and govern-
ment seizure statistics; interviews with key representatives from industry and govern-
ment enforcement agencies; structured surveys with executives from the six key sec-
tors identified as being most impacted by social media; and finally interviews with the 
three main social media platforms: Google, Twitter and Facebook. 
 
Phase 2: Tracker method and consumer survey 
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a) Tracker 
An online tracker of 12 products, two from six chosen sectors (alcohol, cigarettes, 
clothing, footwear, perfume and watches), followed links to determine and assess 
what proportion were directed towards either legitimate or infringing resources. 
The team designed and developed monitoring tools to locate, track and trace the 
possible infringement of physical items on Facebook, Twitter and Google. 
b) Consumer survey 
A 3,000-respondent online survey, complemented by an offline survey focused 
on the proportion of social media-triggered purchases ‘at risk’ of being infringing.  
The survey identified the proportion of those actively engaging with social media; 
and asked whether their last purchase had been prompted by a recommendation 
on social media and how confident they were that the purchase was legitimate. 
 
Phase 3:  Assessing the harm of purchasing counterfeit products using social 
media. 
The industry surveys were designed to: 
• look at the levels of harm from social media-facilitated counterfeiting;  
• assess the damage to high and mid-range products;  
• examine the direct and indirect damage from counterfeiting to industry, gov-
ernment and consumers; and 
• assess the impact of social media and online platforms on the reputations of 
the brand owners;  
As part of this work we also considered the models available for estimating the im-
pact of social media on counterfeiting, particularly in relation to complicit and de-
ceived consumers who typically purchase obvious and non-obvious copies respec-
tively. 
 
1.4 Research Findings  
Phase 1 Research Outcomes  
The literature review, and responses to our survey questionnaires from industry, gov-
ernment enforcement agencies and technology firms, was focused on assessing the 
scale, impact and characteristics of infringements, as well as opportunities for IP in-
fringement. 
Scale of Infringement 
• There were many claims, from industry and government agencies, about the role 
that social media plays in facilitating IPR infringement. The scale and nature of 
the infringement was not clear from the responses we received from industry.  
• The current scaleable official data is based on seizures. This, combined with the 
lack of industry data and unverifiable claims, make it difficult to assess the current 
scale of infringement in general.   
• Limited research has been undertaken to assess the scale of infringement and 
monitor trends, with the key research in this area are the EUIPO’s sectoral re-
ports and the OECD-EUIPO report. 
• The social media platforms provided data on levels of IPR infringement identified 
on their platforms in 2015; notably Twitter’s data indicated a significant decline in 
claims for trademark infringement in the second half of 2015, whilst Google ar-
gued only a small percentage of ‘bad actors’ misused their services. Facebook 
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data showed a clear increase in government data requests, although this was not 
broken down into the types of requests in the research period. 
 
Impact of Infringement 
• Industry and enforcement agency responses indicated varying impact across the 
different sectors, with some firms blaming the rise of social media for an increase 
in levels of counterfeiting and damage to their business. Despite data from 
FACT1, no firm surveyed was able or willing to quantify the actual costs to their 
business. We attribute this lack of data to industry’s reluctance to share confiden-
tial financial information. We also recognise that major brands are commercially 
conflicted in their (often defensive) engagement with social media. 
• The main focus for infringement, according to industry and government agencies, 
is the proliferation of closed groups (i.e. invite-only groups, created on social me-
dia platforms).  The social media platforms resist enforcement agencies and in-
dustry bodies’ pressure to adopt more proactive policies for combating infringe-
ment. This reactive-only policy towards IPR infringement has created a climate of 
distrust and suspicion between the platforms and rights holders, something made 
worse by what industry considers to be the platforms’ cumbersome takedown pol-
icies.  
• The social media firms counter this view by pointing to what in their view is a frag-
mented UK IPR system, which is part of an even more complex system across 
150 other countries. 
 
Characteristics of Infringement 
• Despite claims from industry and government agencies about the flagrancy with 
which IP-infringing content is placed on social media, only one, FACT, provided 
us with actual examples to highlight the characteristics of infringement.  
• Private enforcement agencies detailed how counterfeiters can copy near-identical 
images from legitimate sites to deceive consumers, pricing these products close 
to the authentic article. However, such infringing activity takes place across a 
myriad of online platforms, not just on social media.  
• The increasingly sophisticated tactics adopted by counterfeiters in online com-
merce encompass auction houses, b-2-b marketplaces, social media and, ac-
cording to some, their link with traffic diversion from official websites.   
• We are aware that the use of VPN and the dark net2 means that much of the cur-
rent online illicit activity is beyond oversight and reach. On social media plat-
forms, the increased use of spambots and links to various payment sources off-
site makes it harder than ever to control the full scope of illicit activity. 
 
Opportunities for IPR 
• There was little evidence that social media has been used to promote IPR. How-
ever, Microsoft’s Bing search engine has shown that online technology platforms 
can take an active role in combating IP infringement, as shown in their efforts to 
                                            
1Federation Against Copyright Theft 
2 VPN is a virtual private network which uses a public network such as the internet to connect to a private network such as a company’s intranet. 
The dark net is an overlay network that can only be accessed with specific software, configurations, or authorization, often using non-standard 
communications protocols and ports - Wikipedia. 
5 
alert consumers to the dangers of purchasing medicines online, and the likeli-
hood that these could be both fake and dangerous.  
• Google’s stated zero-tolerance for counterfeits was compelling and there were 
signs of improved cooperation between eBay and rights holders. Recent changes 
to Facebook’s business model suggest there may be opportunities to improve IP 
awareness as the firm become more reliant on advertising from the brands 
whose goods are being infringed within their platforms. Online platforms are most 
likely to act against illicit activity on their sites if their own business interests (such 
as advertising) are under threat.  
• Education and awareness campaigns to date indicate a need to focus on better 
informing consumers, in particular around the impact to consumers on their per-
sonal safety.  
• There is scope for more work and investment by the social media platforms to ac-
tively counter IP infringement. In the absence of greater cooperation from indus-
try in supplying data, the focus of future research should be placed on disrupting 
the current levels of consumer complicity. This is an area where social media 
platforms have a role to play. 
 
1.4.2 Phase 2 Consumer Data Research outcomes 
Summary of consumer data 
• 17.5% of transactions online were found to be of copied products, and 88% of 
these transactions were conducted by consumers who knowingly purchased a 
copied product. 
• Social media was the most distinctive medium for communication on copied goods 
and 24.5% of social grades AB (upper middle class and middle class) acknowl-
edged complicit behaviour, which was significantly more than social grades C 
(skilled class) where 12.7% acknowledged ‘complicit’ behaviour. 
• Online communication of suspect products was highly concentrated within a very 
small proportion of participants, particularly located within Facebook: 
o 72.5% of the suspect communications within open groups were generated 
by 0.78% of promoters. 
o 83.4% of suspect communications within closed groups were generated 
by 6.2% of promoters. 
• Facebook groups represented the most exposed location for suspect communica-
tions, with suspect activity being much more prevalent in closed groups: 
o 8.3% of communications within open Facebook groups were found to be 
suspect. 
o 40.8% (five times more) of communications within closed Facebook 
groups were found to be suspect. 
Scale of infringement 
• The survey and tracker indicated that certain goods (like tobacco and alcohol) 
were less likely to be promoted on social media, but social media can contribute 
to facilitating infringement. 
• We note the high levels of suspect transactions revealed by the tracker, but the 
data needs to be supported by further regular frequent tracking of online con-
sumer behaviour.  
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• The scale of infringing activity indicated by the consumer data bears out many in-
dustry claims. 
Impact of Infringement 
• Despite the positives of social media for consumers, the dark side of internet-
based commerce is shown by the ease with which both websites and social me-
dia pages can be manipulated to deceive consumers. However, our findings, indi-
cate deceived consumers are a small minority of those who use the platforms.  
• Closed groups have a strong influence on infringement with complicit consumers 
five times more likely to shop in closed groups than in open groups.  
Characteristics of Infringement 
• The bulk (88%) of infringing activity tracked in this study involved complicit con-
sumers.  
• The consumer data pointed to deceptive copies as a growing threat, albeit one 
that still represented a smaller (12%) part of total infringing behaviour on social 
media.  
• Deceptive purchases were more likely to occur with products like clothing, but 
were not a characteristic of every impacted sector and product, least of all alcohol 
and tobacco. 
 
1.4.3 Phase 3: Assessing the harm of purchasing counterfeit products using 
social media 
 
When assessing the impact of counterfeit products being sold through social media, 
we have identified that the key stakeholders affected are industry, consumers and 
government, with the extent of the impact dependent on whether the consumer pur-
chased the counterfeit knowingly or unknowingly. Unfortunately, this study was not 
able to conduct a full assessment of the harm arising to the key stakeholders, due to 
the reluctance of industry to share the insight needed. However, from the surveys 
and research undertaken, it has been able to identify the key challenges facing social 
media, which can be developed further in future research.  
 
• Industry and enforcement agencies have claimed that low-quality/high-deception 
goods are likely to be sold on platforms with near-identical, if not cloned, images 
from authentic goods websites; these are used to deceive the consumer into pur-
chasing them. These may just as easily be offered in open groups, which could 
add to the sense of authenticity.  
 
• This may also be true of high-quality/high-deception goods, where the pricing 
may be closer to the authentic price to attract a purchaser looking for an online 
discount. This is typical of certain products where the reproduction of the goods is 
near perfect, such as DVD box sets. Equally, the kinds of goods often being dis-
seminated across closed groups seem to be high-quality/low-price products, 
where damage may be limited.  
 
• The direct and indirect impact on the main three stakeholders – industry, govern-
ment and consumers – from social media can be assessed as follows, although 
further work is needed to be able to quantify the impacts: 
 
• Direct impact-Loss of industry revenue.  
 Industry have noted a loss of revenue because of the potential  
 substitutional impact of counterfeits on authentic goods, particularly 
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 where there is a high degree of deception, although this is lower if the 
 goods are non-deceptive. This represented the most likely impact of 
 social media where the platforms enable the dissemination of  
 deceptive counterfeit goods. 
 
• Indirect impact - Reputation harm to industry 
  Reputational harm from the low-quality/high-price  goods that are 
  common on social media (according to industry and   
  enforcement agencies). 
 
• Indirect impact - loss taxes and the impact on employment  
There is a widespread evidence that much of the activity emanates 
from and profits are made by counterfeiters in China and other South-
east Asian markets, causing UK right holders to lose out. There is also 
the cost to government of having to enforce against IP infringements, 
such as the activities of Trading Standards. 
 
• Indirect impact - welfare benefit for consumers,  
 There may be a welfare benefit (recognised by GAO) for certain types 
 of products (high quality/low price), but for almost all other types of 
 products however the impact is direct. 
 
1.5. Conclusions and recommendations 
From the three phases of work we can conclude that; 
• Industry groups, together with government and private enforcement agencies, 
claimed counterfeiting has moved online. This encompasses a complex eco-sys-
tem involving impersonation, fan pages, social media pages transacting busi-
ness, promotion and the proliferation of websites selling counterfeits and offering 
fake special offers.  
• According to industry and government sources, social media plays a significant 
and growing role in the sale and distribution of counterfeited and pirated goods. 
By providing relative safety within closed groups, as well as the ability to link to 
off-platform sites for payment, it is easy to see why social media can be regarded 
as a critical link in the counterfeiting chain. 
• However, estimates from government and industry sources on recent levels of 
counterfeiting within the UK are inadequate and cannot be scaled to reflect the 
total activity within the market. Our consumer data provides a fresh data point to 
estimate current levels, albeit only based on a 2015 snapshot. 
• Our consumer data reinforces claims made by government enforcement agen-
cies that platforms, such as Facebook, encourage IP infringement and this is par-
ticularly flagrant within closed groups. Counterfeiters see social media as a haven 
and actively use both open and closed group pages, along with ‘likes’ and ‘re-
tweets’, to disseminate their offerings. The social media platforms make it easy to 
move channels by establishing fan pages and making it possible to carry out 
transactions on or off the social media platform. Social media amplifies counter-
feiters’ messages by increasing the connectivity of potential complicit consumers. 
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Crucially, these connections do not have to be strong; as the threshold for con-
nection on social media is low. 
• Despite the emphasis placed on the threats posed by closed groups, opportuni-
ties exist in open groups to secure new users and these represent the greatest 
threat from social media in amplifying the counterfeiters’ messages. Even if the 
open groups are shut down, they can easily be set up again. 
Even though some interesting conclusions have been presented, and the consumer 
data has shown how social media plays a role in facilitating IPR infringement, partic-
ularly in closed groups, the data represents a mere snapshot from the middle of 
2015. The lack of any other comparable data means these cannot be used to provide 
a definitive indication of the development of this phenomenon over time and further 
work is needed to build upon the work completed in this study. We therefore recom-
mend:  
 
• Improved industry cooperation in supplying essential headline data for govern-
ment and policy makers to more easily understand the trend in the market. Indus-
try’s privileged and confidential information is always a more current and accurate 
reflection of the market than the data available from government and official 
sources, which are either out of date or methodologically unsound. This would, in 
particular, allow far deeper analysis into the harm that purchasing counterfeiting 
products has on different stakeholders in particular to industry.  
 
• A methodology that allows an assessment of both stated and revealed prefer-
ences, such as the one we have employed within this study, would be an effec-
tive and reliable measure of illicit activity. The online tracker however, only cap-
tured complicit behaviour. To capture deceived behaviour requires an augmented 
approach, starting with mystery shopping, to identify the relevant links and then 
track them. 
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2.0. Background and objectives 
2.1 Background 
The project’s aim was to research the impact of social media on Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPRs) and specifically to assess the ways in which IPR infringement might be 
being increased through social media platforms. The research was instigated follow-
ing claims from government enforcement agencies3, industry and brands about coun-
terfeiting traffic moving increasingly to online platforms and most notably to social 
media sites. Given the highly complex nature of social media and the interactions of 
the millions of users of such services, we decided to start the research process by fo-
cusing on physical goods, in the belief that this would yield realistic data that might 
be useful in subsequent research on digital goods and related phenomena such as 
user-generated content (UGC). 
2.2 Aims and objectives 
The primary objective of the research was to compare data and experience from in-
dustry, government and consumers to produce a picture of recent levels of counter-
feiting within the UK and the extent to which this kind of illicit behaviour is moving 
online and is being increased through online social media platforms. The study 
aimed to assess the following four themes: 
a) Scale of infringement: an assessment of the extent to which social media is 
used to promote IPR, and the extent to which it is enabling infringement and how 
that infringement is distributed among different sectors, products and types of IP. 
b) Impact of infringement: what are the costs and benefits to IP-intensive busi-
nesses of social media, and how has social media changed how IP is used, pro-
moted and enforced? We intended to explore whether IPRs are being applied in 
new ways or to new types of creative output. A key element was examining the 
impact on the reputations of creators and IP-intensive businesses and on the 
health and safety of consumers. The most important part of this segment, in our 
opinion, was assessing the scale and influence of closed groups (i.e. invite-only 
groups, created on social media platforms) on IPR infringement. 
c) Characteristics of infringement: we wanted to increase our understanding of 
where IP-infringing content (closed groups, adverts on social media pages and 
links to sites/proxies) was being placed. We also wanted to ascertain the types of 
infringing products being provided and the formats they are provided in. 
d) Opportunities for IP: the project explored current initiatives used to counter in-
fringement, enforce rights and promote respect for IP, and assessed the effec-
tiveness of these initiatives. 
 
                                            
3 Notably in the IP Crime reports 2013-15 
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3.  Methods used and structure of research 
 
3.1 Methods 
The research team applied the methods recommended in our 2014 study ‘Measuring 
Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights’, namely collating data from multiple 
sources, including government and industry and gathering fresh data on consumer 
attitudes and behaviours.4 Because of the impact of social media on the distribution 
and sale of counterfeit goods, we prioritised industry and government seizures and 
enforcement data along with the results of consumer surveys. We noted one caveat 
from the 2014 study, namely that in the area of counterfeit and pirated goods there is 
a highly skewed distribution, particularly of the economic impact of infringement, with 
a large proportion of the value being concentrated in a very small proportion of the 
perpetrators. This required a comprehensive study of the infringement enforcement 
data to identify this tiny segment that escapes sampling methods. 
 
2.  Research structure 
The research was divided into three phases: 
Phase 1: Review of literature and data from government and industry 
 
In this phase we aimed to produce a benchmarked summary of the emerging trends 
found through a review of literature, a survey of businesses and the collation of re-
cent industry and government seizure statistics. In addition, we wanted to achieve 
both a top-down and a bottom-up approach to government and industry sources by 
interviewing key representatives in each sector, by attending industry-led confer-
ences and by visiting the IPO Intelligence Hub which provided a three-year analysis 
of Trading Standards data. Our initial aim was to find data sources covering at least 
five to six years to yield a meaningful trend in the data, principally to find out if there 
has been an appreciable increase in counterfeited and pirated goods being sold as a 
direct consequence of consumers and retailers moving online. 
 
Initial contact with the Anti-Counterfeiting Group (ACG), Trading Standards and cer-
tain rights holders5 revealed claims that certain social media platforms were produc-
ing new offerings (‘store’ and ‘buy and sell’) that had the potential to exacerbate the 
phenomenon under investigation. We initially distinguished between online platforms6 
and social media platforms (such as Facebook and Twitter) because of the different 
challenges in monitoring the behaviour of buyers and sellers, especially within 
                                            
4 ‘Measuring Infringement Of Intellectual Property Rights – Executive Summary’, page 3: https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/325020/IP_Measuring_Infringement.pdf 
5 Mainly brands impacted by online platforms, e.g. sports goods, clothing, broadcasters’ merchandise, perfumes. 
6 Here we are mainly referring to Google as the most likely entry point for the discovery of counterfeit or pirated 
goods. 
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‘closed groups’, given the different technologies involved. This was a key issue with a 
direct bearing on the methods used for the Phase 2 tasks. 
 
To provide bottom-up insights alongside the use of top-down government data, we 
conducted structured surveys with a number of ACG members during the project, fo-
cusing on six sectors7 identified from Google search data, ACG’s own information 
and the official data set8 as being most affected by counterfeiting. We also aimed to 
survey the three main technology platforms, Google, Facebook and Twitter, to get 
their responses to the issues raised by industry and government agencies. 
 
Phase 2: Methods of tracking and the consumer survey 
 
Tracking 
For the monitoring process, we tracked six sectors9, with two products within each 
chosen sector, using the above methods, as well as using data from the structured 
business interviews held with organisations from the same sectors. We developed an 
appropriate system for sampling and, at this stage, tracked a bulk process and then 
sampled a proportion of the references, in order to follow links to determine the na-
ture of them and what proportion of links were directed towards either legitimate or 
infringing resources. This enabled us to scale up the sample to the size of the bulk 
processing. We built the infrastructure, tested it during April 2015 and ran the re-
search tracking over May, June and July 2015, for reporting during August. 
 
Tracker tasks 
The team designed and developed monitoring agents to locate, track and trace the 
possible infringement of physical and digital items (this project focused on the physi-
cal products) on Facebook, Twitter and Google.10 The team also designed a data-
base system to support the monitoring agents and their results, as well as developing 
a website on which to configure and monitor the agents and review results. Servers 
were configured to support the system and monitoring agents and an administration 
system was tested and applied in a production environment. The team had to provide 
production support, system monitoring and tuning, to review the results, and to ex-
tract/organise end-of-project data. 
 
The tasks were: first, to develop and implement the sampling structure for assessing 
the types of sources promoted via social media and, second, to analyse and estimate 
the scale of the impact of social media on infringing material. The development, test-
ing and production work was spread over a six-week period. The data captured via 
the software was available to the IPO under an open licence, together with the algo-
rithms used for the analysis. 
 
Consumer survey (3,000 respondents) 
                                            
7 Alcohol, cigarettes, clothing, footwear, perfume and watches. 
8 ‘IP Crime Reports’ for 2014 and 2015. 
9 Alcohol, cigarettes, clothing, footwear, perfume and watches. 
10 For the sake of clarity, Google is included as the most likely entry point for the discovery of counterfeit or pirated 
goods. 
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The nationally representative survey, targeting 3,000 adults, aged 18 and above, was 
conducted online over one month (July 2015) and was complemented by an offline 
survey to fully estimate the scale. 
 
The focus of the survey was on the proportion of social media-triggered purchases 
which were at risk of being infringing. To find this out involved working from the oppo-
site direction, i.e. tracking the proportion of those actively engaging with social media 
to look for recommendations and respond to opportunities. 
 
Once we identified the size of this group, we asked them to recall the last purchase 
they had made that had been prompted by a recommendation on social media and to 
evaluate how confident they were that the purchase was legitimate. If they claimed to 
be confident, we asked what methods they used to achieve that confidence, what led 
them to make the purchase, and how many times they had declined to purchase any-
thing because they thought there was an issue with IPR. 
 
This process involved a series of questions ‘funnelling’ down to an individual influ-
enced by social media when making purchase decisions, and revealed which social 
media platforms they used. Then several questions were asked that covered their ex-
perience of and level of sensitivity to IPR infringement. We aimed to check whether 
the purchase was in one of the targeted sectors within the online tracker. 
 
Phase 3: Assessing the harm of purchasing counterfeit products using social 
media 
 
At the outset, we wanted to understand more fully the expected performance of the 
products being monitored. This would provide an additional counterfactual position 
and enhance analysis of product performance versus expectations; we could then 
compare performance to industry norms or averages. This was, however, not possi-
ble on account of the reluctance of industry to share the insight needed. We were 
also concerned that such an approach could end up repeating the ‘forecasting’ exer-
cise started by Rand in 2012.11 
 
Nonetheless we considered separate interviews with different industry sectors to de-
velop a more nuanced understanding of levels of piracy and counterfeiting around 
‘hit’ and mid-range successful products. We opted eventually to use the industry-
structured survey to provide this insight by including questions relating to the scale of 
IPR infringement and the impact on the brand’s market12. Even so, the nature of the 
products chosen for the tracker and consumer survey meant that an accurate as-
sessment of the impact of social media-driven counterfeiting on ‘hit’ products was too 
cumbersome a process for those firms who responded. 
 
                                            
11 We expressed doubt on whether the Rand Model would meet industry’s needs and expectations as described in 
‘Measuring Infringement Of Intellectual Property Rights’, pages 55–57: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys-
tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/325020/IP_Measuring_Infringement.pdf 
12 e.g. “What, if any, economic impact do you consider social media has on your IPR both in terms of infringement 
and enforcement of your IPR?” 
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The assessment of the challenges thus relied on understanding the direct and indi-
rect economic harm of counterfeiting on industry, government and consumers and 
linking this to the role of social media and other online platforms. The assessment 
provided insights into our research objectives, including the impact of social media 
on producers’ reputations, and identified the characteristics of infringement, such as 
how certain social media channels are used over others and how particular sectors 
or goods are targeted. We estimated the impact of social media on levels of pur-
chase of counterfeit and pirated goods by correlating the Phase 2 consumer data on 
different consumer choices with our analysis of the economic harm from copied prod-
ucts sold in the primary and secondary markets. The primary market is associated 
with non-obvious copies, where consumers typically purchase a counterfeit product 
in the belief that it is a genuine product, and where such deceived consumers would 
want to purchase the genuine product. The secondary market by contrast is linked to 
obvious copies and is where consumers would purchase a counterfeit product know-
ingly and willingly; such complicit consumers would be unlikely to purchase the genu-
ine product. Assessing the proportion of copied products sold via social media chan-
nels to complicit or deceived consumers from the Phase 2 consumer data is essen-
tial for estimating the extent of the economic harm inflicted through social media. 
 
 4.0. Research Outcomes Phase 1 
Introduction: 
We have divided each of the four key research themes into reviews of literature from 
industry (brands and trade bodies), government, academia and the technology indus-
try, followed by the responses to our survey questionnaires from industry, govern-
ment enforcement agencies and technology firms. The full responses to our ques-
tionnaires have been included in Appendices 1 to 3.  
4.1. Scale of infringement 
4.1.1. Literature and media review 
Industry sources 
Bryce and Rutter’s (2005) ‘Fake Nation’13 focused on the demand side of counterfeit-
ing, and their report argued that consumption of fakes was commonplace in the UK. 
Although the authors could not include the impact of the internet at the time, their 
study influenced part of the design of our consumer survey. 
MarkMonitor’s (2012) ‘Shopping Report’14 claimed that 20% of bargain-seeking shop-
                                            
13 Bryce, J. and Rutter, J. (2005) ‘Fake Nation – A Study into Everyday Crime’ [Online]: https://www.aca-
demia.edu/597794/Fake_Nation_A_Study_into_Everyday_Crime 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140603093549/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-fake-2005.pdf 
14 MarkMonitor (2013) ‘Shopping Report 2012’ [Online]: https://www.markmonitor.com/download/report/MarkMoni-
tor_Shopping_Report-2012.pdf 
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pers were deceived into buying fake goods. This is especially relevant to the UK con-
sumer given the much higher level of online purchases in the UK, which are double 
the European average of 22%. MarkMonitor’s more recent ‘Global Consumer Shop-
ping Habits Survey’ (2015)15 indicated that 24% of consumers had (willingly or unin-
tentionally) bought a product online that turned out to be a fake. 
NetNames’ report16 on the cost of counterfeiting described the “extraordinary” growth 
of global counterfeiting and, in common with most private enforcement agencies, 
their assessment relied on official government or industry trade-body estimates.  
A recent industry study from the US Chamber of Commerce (USCC),17 cited the 
headline data from the latest OECD/EUIPO report to highlight their $461 billion esti-
mate of the global counterfeiting market, which is more than double the prior esti-
mate from 2005. The Global Intellectual Property Center (GIPC) for the USCC also 
released a ‘Measuring the Magnitude of Global Counterfeiting’18 report, which ana-
lysed the 38 individual economies that made up 85% of the world’s economy. This 
study claimed that customs authorities were only seizing a tiny fraction of the value of 
the total estimated counterfeits (as little as 2.5%), and pointed to the ‘dearth’ of sei-
zure data,19 arguing that the scale of the global counterfeiting problem has signifi-
cantly increased, “fuelled by the proliferation of Internet use and social media plat-
forms”. The GIPC authors quoted Chaudhry and Zimmerman’s assertion that the ac-
tual scope of counterfeiting is not “fully known”, with current estimates ranging from 
$200 billion to over $1.7 trillion. These differences are apparently attributable to the 
varying approaches to counterfeiting adopted by authorities, as well as the paucity of 
reliable industry data and the diverse methods used to estimate the market. Another 
illustration of the divergent estimates comes from the 2011 US TV programme 
Trademark Counterfeiting,20 which quoted extensively from the International Anti-
Counterfeiting Coalition’s (IACC) ‘Get Real’ campaign, citing the “$600 billion per an-
num” problem. Despite all of the various data sources, including those referred to 
above, we could find no reliable industry sources that estimated the scale of IPR in-
fringement related directly to social media. 
Another, more recent, source21 highlighted problems allegedly affecting Amazon Mar-
ketplace (which accounts for 40% of Amazon’s unit sales), which has “morphed into 
the world’s largest flea market” following the firm’s efforts to “openly court Chinese 
manufacturers”. These efforts led to sales from Chinese-based sellers more than 
doubling in 2015, without, according to the report, the installation of the checks 
                                            
15 MarkMonitor (2015) ‘Global Consumer Shopping Habits Survey’ [Online]: https://www.markmonitor.com/down-
load/report/MarkMonitor_Online_Barometer-2015.pdf 
16 NetNames (2015) ‘Counting the Cost of Counterfeiting – A NetNames Report’ [Online]: https://www.net-
names.com/assets/shared/whitepaper/pdf/NetNames-Counterfeiting-Report-A4-2015.pdf 
17 Elliot, M. (2016) ‘New numbers don’t lie: counterfeits pose a growing threat’. US Chamber of Commerce [Online]: 
https://www.uschamber.com/op-ed/new-numbers-don-t-lie-counterfeits-pose-growing-threat 
18 GIPC/US Chamber of Commerce (2016) ‘Measuring the Magnitude of Global Counterfeiting: Creation of a Con-
temporary Global Measure of Physical Counterfeiting’.[Online] https://www.uschamber.com/report/measuring-the-
magnitude-global-counterfeiting-creation-contemporary-global-measure-physical 
19 Ibid., page 4. 
20 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EnxY0a9Hin8 (25 August 2011) 
21 Levy, A. (2016) ‘Amazon’s Chinese counterfeit problem is getting worse’ [Online]: 
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/08/amazons-chinese-counterfeit-problem-is-getting-worse.html 
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needed to cope with the “influx” of counterfeits. The article suggested that the scale 
of the problem of social media is part of a much greater problem involving wider e-
commerce platforms. This confirms claims made by certain private enforcement 
agencies, like Yellow Brand, about the dangers posed by the largest online market-
places. 
 
Government agencies 
International data 
Over the past five years, the two most widely used estimates of the global value of 
the counterfeit goods trade have been BASCAP (2011)22 and OECD (2009)23, with 
the former heavily reliant on the latter. The US Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) 2010 report 24 noted that several official statistics used in the US were of un-
certain provenance and, in the absence of a single official measurement, there was a 
tendency for global estimates and ‘rules of thumb’ to be employed when trying to as-
sess overall levels of counterfeiting and piracy. Such estimates ranged between 
1.8% (OECD) of legitimate global trade, which was the most frequently quoted meas-
ure, and 7% of legitimate global trade (International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)). 
BASCAP/Frontier 25 argued that the OECD’s 2008–2009 estimate only related to in-
ternational trade and did not include domestically manufactured fakes or digitally pi-
rated goods, the broader economic effects and employment losses. The two other 
segments of the global market and the associated economic losses were integral to 
BASCAP’s projected estimate of the global value of counterfeiting and piracy as 
standing between $1.22 trillion and $1.77 trillion. The higher figure is the one most 
widely cited by industry and the government enforcement community 26. 
The US GAO 2010 study27 identified the different criteria used for almost every sec-
tor, which make it almost impossible to arrive at one single figure to accurately meas-
ure counterfeiting. The GAO study suggested that this explained the reliance on an-
ecdotal measures and ‘rules of thumb’, highlighting the difference between the Inter-
national Trade Council’s (ITC) claims that counterfeiting and piracy accounted for 5% 
to 7% of world trade and the OECD’s 2009 estimate of 1.95%. 
OECD and EUIPO’s recent report, ‘Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping 
the Economic Impact’,28 confirmed our concerns about the limited value of seizure 
data. While confirming the effects of the globalisation of value chains and the rapid 
                                            
22 ICC/BASCAP (2011) ‘Estimating the global economic and social impacts of counterfeiting and piracy’. February 
2011 [Online]: http://www.iccwbo.org/Data/Documents/Bascap/Global-Impacts-Study-Full-Report 
23 OECD (2009) ‘Magnitude of Counterfeiting and Piracy of Tangible Products: An Update’ [Online]: 
http://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/44088872.pdf 
24 US General Accounting Office/GAO (2010) ‘Observations on Efforts to Quantify the Economic Effects of Counter-
feit and Pirated Goods’ [Online]: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-423 
25 ICC/BASCAP (2009) ‘The Impact of Counterfeiting on Governments and Consumers’ [Online]: http://www.ic-
cwbo.org/advocacy-codes-and-rules/bascap/bascap-research/economic-impacts/ 
26 WCO at ACG Conference, October 2015. 
27 US GAO (2010) ‘Observations on Efforts to Quantify the Economic Effects of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods’ 
[Online]: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-423 
28 OECD and EUIPO (2016) Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact. OECD Publish-
ing: Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264252653-en 
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growth of e-commerce in enabling the global distribution and sale of counterfeit 
goods, the authors noted the discrepancies between EU, US and global customs 
data sets and the rapid growth, between 2011 and 2013, of seized postal shipments 
across the globe29 (a result of increased e-commerce). However, the study also ar-
gued that the e-commerce market is ‘nuanced’, dynamic and industry-specific.30 The 
report used seizure data estimating that counterfeit and pirated products accounted 
for $461 billion, or almost 2.5%, of world trade in 2013, but acknowledged that this 
does not include domestically produced and consumed counterfeit and pirated prod-
ucts.31 However, there is little here that provides any reliable indication of the scale of 
social media within this trade. 
 
UK infringement data 
The IPO Crime Report,32 although a highly regarded assessment of counterfeiting 
and piracy, was still not able to provide a single figure to measure the overall market 
given the different methods used to assess impact and value. A significant challenge 
for our study was establishing a meaningful trend from the data made available, as 
much of what was included was based on snapshots (rather than measurements 
over time), or methodological issues undermined the data. With that said, the last two 
versions of the ‘IP Crime Report’ clearly identified the “growing threat from social me-
dia” and indicated that sales of counterfeit goods via social media rose by 15% in 
2013–14. Yet the 2015 report also claimed that: “online sale of counterfeit items re-
mains a significant problem […] [but] it has not increased significantly from 2013/14 
after a significant increase in recent years”. This was a rare example of an estimate 
of the scale of IPR infringement attributable to social media. 
 
The Trading Standards (National Trading Standards Board) annual survey was a po-
tentially useful metric. Its methodological issues, due to the response rates varying 
considerably across the survey since its inception, made meaningful comparisons 
difficult to justify and prevented a clear snapshot of the trend being developed. How-
ever, the survey yielded data on the most investigated products, which we were able 
to compare with Google search terms to support the choice of goods for the con-
sumer survey and tracker parts of this research. 
 
EU infringement data 
The European Commission (EC)’s (2009–2014) ‘Report on EU customs enforcement 
of intellectual property rights – Results at the EU border’ (2008–2013)33 provided de-
tails on the scale of infringement, breaking down data for each member state and en-
abling a view of the trend over time. We established that there had been a noticeable 
recent decline in articles seized (and the domestic retail value of seizures), as well as 
                                            
29 Ibid., page 55. 
30 Ibid., page 57. 
31 Ibid., page 68. 
32 IPO (2015) ‘IP Crime Report 2015’ [Online]: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/461792/ip-crime-report-2014-15.pdf 
33 European Commission (2014) ‘Report on EU customs enforcement of intellectual property rights – Results at the 
EU border (2008–2013)’ [Online]: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/customs/customs_controls/counterfeit_piracy/statis-
tics/2014_ipr_statistics_en.pdf 
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a tapering-off of cases at the EU border when compared to the period from 1999–
2008. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: European Commission Data 
 
 
Figure 1,34 produced by the EC, clearly shows the decline in the number of articles 
since 2007 and the stable number of cases (i.e. customs interventions). The decline 
in articles may have been a result of better enforcement, especially given increased 
cooperation between rights holders and customs authorities over the past 10 years. It 
is just as likely that it could reflect changes in counterfeiting traffic, not least an in-
crease in the domestic manufacture of counterfeit goods. Claims that the decline in 
seizures indicates a drop in counterfeiting traffic are in contrast to assertions made 
by industry about the rise of illicit online traffic. As such, we believe that the decline in 
articles seized points to the limitations of customs seizure levels as a reliable indica-
tion of the trend. 
 
EUIPO reports assessed the impact of counterfeiting across different sectors and re-
cently formed part of a programme developed with the OECD. We had concerns with 
the model adopted for several recent case studies (recorded music, cosmetics and 
clothing) given the reliance on the Rand 2012 method of estimating counterfeits as 
the difference between actual and forecast sales.35 The rest of their procedure ap-
peared strong and used innovative approaches to assess the likelihood of counter-
feits in different industry sectors. Their segmented approach had much to offer and 
echoed comments made by the US GAO report, which holds that “effects vary across 
industries”. Developing a data set that could more accurately assess the impact on 
                                            
34 European Commission (2015) Taxation and Customs Union - IPR Infringements: Facts and figures 
 http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_controls/counterfeit_piracy/statistics/index_en.html 
35 This was extensively reviewed in our 2013 study ‘Measuring Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights’, pages 
55–56. This may also explain our reluctance to employ this type of model in our economic assessment. 
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individual sectors while still using a single process to measure the impact across the 
industry seems to have considerable merit. 
 
Academic 
Bates 36 noted that EU counterfeiting data was limited to details of seizures and 
pointed to the role of compromised and complex supply chains, as well as the inter-
net, in the fake drugs trade. Naim 37 highlighted the growth rate of the trade in fakes 
(eight times the rate of legitimate trade since the early 1990s) and how China has be-
come the leading exporter of counterfeits. Chaudhry and Zimmerman’s 2009 work 
The Economics of Counterfeit Trade 38 criticised official data, tracing estimates of the 
size of the global counterfeit market since the early 1980s to conclude that it was still 
not clear “what the real magnitude is”, noting unclear metrics and data falling short of 
what was required for policy making. They suggested that the total global counterfeit 
market had a collective worth of around $500–600 billion, but argued against the use 
of customs seizures as indicators of counterfeiting levels, claiming that such proxies 
represent (at best) a tiny fraction of illicit activity. Such flaws in the supply-side data 
led Chaudhry et al. to call for more demand-side research, yet there is a paucity of 
such research, with most of the extant work reliant on convenience samples of con-
sumers within single-country markets and few empirical studies being conducted 
across country markets.39 The kind of demand-focused research they envisaged 
would involve investigation of consumer behaviour to understand more easily what 
motivates people to purchase illicit goods (beyond the incentive of a low price). 
 
Academic research on counterfeiting trends carried out at Michigan State University 
A-CAPP (Center for Anti-Counterfeiting and Product Protection) included papers by 
Wilson and Sullivan40 that highlighted the complexity of counterfeiting and the meth-
odological shortcomings of both government and industry estimates. These also 41 
featured comments from brands about the problems of measurement and issues with 
identifying the number of counterfeits. This was much harder for firms “with sectors 
across different parts of the supply chain” and was particularly difficult for multina-
tional companies. Elsewhere,42 the same authors stated that while product counter-
feiting “is a global problem that is a growing concern for consumers, government en-
tities, law enforcement, and businesses”, current assessments of the nature and ex-
tent of the problem are generally unreliable and use processes with significant limita-
tions. 
                                            
36 Bate, R. (2008) Making a Killing: The Deadly implications of the Counterfeit Drug Trade. AEI Press. 
37 Naim, M. (2005) Illicit: how smugglers, traffickers and copycats are hijacking the global economy. IDB Cultural 
Centre, Anchor/Random Books. 
38 Chaudhry, P.E. and Zimmerman, A. (2009) The Economics of Counterfeit Trade: Governments, Consumers, Pi-
rates and Intellectual Property Rights. Springer Verlag: Berlin. 
39 This was, of course, before the more recent OHIM and EC studies on IP rights perceptions. 
40 Wilson, J. and Sullivan, B. (2016) ‘Brand owner approaches to assessing the risk of product counterfeiting’. Jour-
nal of Brand Management, May 2016, Volume 23, Issue 3, pages 327–344. 
41 Wilson, J. and Sullivan, B. (2016) Measuring Product Counterfeiting: Insights from Current Research and Practice. 
Michigan State University A-CAPP (Center for Anti-counterfeiting and Product Protection). 
42 Wilson, J., Sullivan, B. and Hollis, M. (2016) ‘Measuring the “Unmeasurable”: Approaches to Assessing the Nature 
and Extent of Product Counterfeiting’. International Criminal Justice Review. 1057567716644766. 
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Technology literature sources showing reach of social media 
Social media is perceived as the dominant feature of the online world according to 
research showing 3.17 billion internet users and 2.3 billion active social media users 
within 2015’s global population of 7.3 billion42. Most (91%) retail brands use two or 
more social media channels while internet users have an average of 5.54 social me-
dia accounts each. Those aged 55-64 were more than twice as engaged with 
branded content than the 28 or younger age group. The 25–34 demographic was 
most likely to use Facebook and was the most engaged set of social media users. 
Ofcom’s April 2013 report titled ‘Adults Media Literacy’43 identified significant traits, 
such as on-going smartphone growth and older users driving the increase in social 
networking. The regular use of social networking sites was higher in younger age 
groups (such as 16–24), but in terms of socioeconomic categories those in classes 
DE and C1 were more frequent users than those in classes AB and C2. 
 
With somewhere between 30 and 33 million users in the UK, Facebook remained the 
default social networking site for almost all (96%) of the UK adults online.44 Facebook 
now includes WhatsApp (1 billion users), Instagram, Messenger (900 million users) 
and Groups; as such, it now runs four of the six biggest social media platforms. Insta-
gram’s typical user profile was 90% under 35 years old, and it was the favourite plat-
form of 32% of US teens.45 Facebook, in common with Google, has received an in-
creasing number of requests for users’ personal data; according to Titcomb,46 such 
requests were up by 60% in the UK, with the social network fielding 3,384 demands 
in six months in 2015 from government and law-enforcement authorities. Facebook47 
claimed to have received more government requests from the UK than from any 
other countries besides the US and India, and complied with 78% of requests. 
 
4.1.2. Industry and trade bodies’ responses 
An appeal at the ACG’s road shows for ‘real’ rather than anecdotal evidence demon-
strated a fundamental problem facing the various sectors and brands, namely the 
lack of good, current data to illustrate the scale of IPR infringements. The ACG 
aimed to collate brands’ confidential counterfeiting information to share with govern-
ment agencies, and it reaffirmed a major challenge for our study in accessing this 
kind of industry-specific data. Entertainment industry enforcement agency FACT in-
formed us that their current main focus was on dealing with online digital piracy, even 
though they were still active in the physical goods market, which they described as 
increasingly less active. Uniquely among ACG member responses, one firm claimed 
that social media accounted for around a fifth of all their IPR infringement. We gained 
some insight from various presentations from private enforcement agencies, includ-
ing NetNames, which claimed that one in every five websites is fake and as many as 
                                            
43 Ofcom (2013) ‘Adult Media Literacy’ [Online]: http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/media-liter-
acy/adult-media-lit-13/2013_Adult_ML_Tracker.pdf 
44 McGrory, R. (2015) ‘Social Media Statistics for 2015’. Social Media ltd [Online]: 
http://www.rosemcgrory.co.uk/2015/01/06/uk-social-media-statistics-for-2015/ 
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21 
40,000 websites were compromised every week. According to them, this meant that, 
on average, at least 20% of a brand’s online traffic could be diverted away from its 
websites. NetNames also claimed that one in every six products sold online was 
counterfeit and 30% of EU counterfeit seizures were linked to internet distribution 
channels. China expert, Yellow Brand Protection, claimed that the counterfeiting in-
dustry accounted for 8% of China’s GDP. Apart from Alibaba, there are a number of 
Chinese sites, such as Makepolo, with global reach. Online marketplaces were ap-
parently the No1 online sales channels, with more than 700 active online market-
places on the internet and 150 in China alone. However, none of these agencies 
gave specific data on the scale of social media’s role within the fakes market. Their 
focus appeared to be on the wider issues of traffic diversion and website impersona-
tion, where social media is just one aspect of a wider problem. 
 
4.1.3. Government agency responses 
The data available from HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) illustrated the limitations 
of relying on seizures. Despite cooperation with industry and other agencies, HMRC 
had a ‘hit’ rate of 6% on IPR-related consignments and over 50% of these contained 
misleading goods. The targeting of large-scale shipments also suggests that they 
have not been able to deal with the shifting pattern of delivery of counterfeit goods in 
small packages, evident from the EU border results between 2008 and 2014. Our ef-
forts to review the long-term trends from the various ‘IP Crime Reports’ indicated that 
data was not always comparable and the IPO Intelligence Hub confirmed that the 
data set was unlikely to improve in the absence of statutory reporting on IP crime. 
According to the enforcement agencies, rights holders and Trading Standards mem-
bers had complained about the frequency of sales of counterfeit goods on social me-
dia sites. 
 
Trading Standards acknowledged the problem of accurately measuring the scale of 
online illicit activity, not least due to disparate recording of data and intelligence. The 
situation is made worse by the significant under-reporting of illicit activity (only 5–
10%), meaning anecdotal evidence still dominated. They relied on data from the Citi-
zens’ Advice Bureau,48 who handled complaints on ‘scams’ (including counterfeit 
goods), and passed on IPR-relevant cases to Trading Standards. The current data 
showed they have seen a marked increase in the scale of infringement on social me-
dia. Since 2010, there has been a 400% increase in complaints attributable to Face-
book. Recent data from one region indicated that social media-related IPR infringe-
ments far exceeded those of the sale of infringing products on eBay. Intelligence 
data available via Trading Standards suggested that the sale of physical goods was 
a dominant factor on social media, with clothing, fashion accessories and DVDs 
forming the largest categories, accounting for approximately 60% of counterfeit 
sales. The remaining 40% was made up of footwear, electrical products, toys, toilet-
ries and computer software. 
 
4.1.4. Tech firm responses 
Google argued that only a small percentage of ‘bad actors’ misused legitimate online 
                                            
48 Facebook is now second only to eBay in consumer complaints to CA, with trends suggesting that Facebook will 
soon overtake eBay. 
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services to try to sell counterfeit goods. Google’s assertion about the low levels of 
complaints (a small fraction of 1% of advertisers in the past year) was a bold claim 
and one that called for a response from industry and enforcement agencies. At face 
value, it suggested that counterfeiting is not as big an issue for search engines as it 
might be for social media platforms. Twitter referred us to their ‘Transparency Re-
port’, which details the number of requests received by them from government agen-
cies, as well as industry IPR infringement notices. Their ‘Transparency Report’ on 
trademark notices for the six months ending 30 June 2015,49 and also December 
2015,50 indicated that a relatively low proportion (6–11%) of accounts had been af-
fected by alleged trademark violations. They noted in the most recent report that the 
number of trademark notices received for Twitter and Vine had, in fact, declined by 
33% (8,588 versus the 12,911 in the previous January–June 2015 report). 
 
4.2. Impact of Infringement 
4.2.1 Literature and media review 
 
Industry 
The focus of much of the industry literature was on harm to brand integrity and repu-
tation. According to the ACG’s Fighting the Good Fight Report,51 if the products were 
poor or substandard, consumers were likely to “blame the brand”, a description ech-
oed among much of the literature and industry sources. NetNames’ recent report,52 
highlighting the cost of the “extraordinary” growth of global counterfeiting, noted that 
the pharmaceutical sector was most affected. GIPC described the negative economic 
effects on “consumers, trademark owners, companies […] and retailers, as well as 
the economy at large”. The impact of the lower quality ‘fake’ goods was to undermine 
brand integrity, reduce revenue, decrease market share, dilute and damage the 
brand, and require financial investment to cover the costs involved in enforcing their 
IPR.53 Another concern, voiced by MarkMonitor, was that the free speech environ-
ment online allowed for negative experiences to affect brands. The damage and 
harm from these sites came especially from fake special offers that spread very 
quickly and were not easily identified. 
 
                                            
49 Twitter (2015) ‘Trademark Transparency Report’. June 2015 [Online]: https://transparency.twitter.com/trademark-
notices/2015/jan-jun 
50 Twitter (2016) ‘Trademark Transparency Report’. December 2015 [Online]: https://transparency.twitter.com/trade-
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Government agencies 
The US GAO’s 2010 study54 criticised all existing and widely used estimates of eco-
nomic losses that cannot be substantiated, and questioned the assumptions used for 
substitution rates for fake, as opposed to legal, goods. Their report pointed to the 
broad range of effects on consumers, industry, government and the economy, argu-
ing that the potential direct effects varied, with those on consumers being both nega-
tive and positive, whereas for industry the effect was mainly negative and the effects 
on government and the economy were entirely negative. The lack of data hindered 
efforts to quantify the economic impact of counterfeiting and piracy and this resulted 
in the use of assumptions to compensate, with most estimates being highly sensitive 
to the assumptions used (including the substitution rate, the value of fakes and the 
level of deception). The last factor is of real significance to our study as it highlights 
the fight against counterfeits, which involves very different types of quality and levels 
of deception and impact, both on consumers and industry. The GAO claimed that no 
single approach could be used to quantify impact. 
Impact on EU 
An EC assessment in 2011 stated that it was impossible to estimate the impact of 
IPR infringement or to measure trends because of inadequate data. The main effects 
of infringement were seen as reduced investment in innovation and jobs, threats to 
consumer health and safety, serious problems for SMEs and reduced tax revenue. A 
second report in 2015 identified effects as reduced legitimate sales, tax revenue re-
duction, lower employment and the cost of enforcement. Another 2015 study re-
ported that infringing goods accounted for 10% of the EU market, leading to €26bn in 
lost revenue, €17bn in indirect costs and €8bn in lost taxes. A further study, in 2016, 
on music piracy was inconclusive, referring only to production and giving no estimate 
of the impact on distribution or retail. 
 
Academic 
The most significant academic source for understanding the impact of IPR infringe-
ment is Hopkins et al.’s Counterfeiting Exposed,55 which proposed a ‘harm matrix’ en-
compassing four different levels of deception and quality, from high deception/high 
quality (such as grey goods, which are branded goods sold by unlicensed resellers at 
a cheaper price) all the way to low deception/low quality (e.g. cheap Rolex watches). 
It also identified the different ways that counterfeiting affected brands, noting that 
fake luxury goods were common in seasonal fashion markets. The authors raised the 
question of what constituted a counterfeit product if the fake goods were made in the 
same factories as legal offerings, and this raised an important issue for enforcement 
as to whether resources are best deployed in contesting such ‘grey goods’ markets 
or in focusing on those products that are most harmful. In relation to social media of-
ferings, grey goods can involve both high and low deception but are always high 
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quality and as such have a lower impact and level of harm than high-deception/low-
quality goods, which appear to be the goods causing the greatest harm to consumers 
and potentially to industry, given the potential harm to brands’ reputations 
 
4.2.2 Industry responses 
Among ACG members, the impact on brands of fakes sold on auction sites like Ama-
zon and eBay was clear from the poor customer reviews resulting from bad experi-
ences. There were claims that established brands, notably those that have to take 
down hundreds of listings a day, suffer the most. Newly launched goods were 
thought most likely to be affected after a heavy ad campaign for a product launch, 
which would drive factories to make fakes more quickly. There was a clear sense 
that the impact of social media was increasing, with claims of platforms acting as 
shop windows for fakes, with Facebook in particular a favourite for counterfeit sellers. 
None of the firms surveyed were able to articulate the economic damage sustained 
from social media in relation to their IPR, regardless of how critical they had been of 
the social media platforms. The IP Crime Group’s Social Media Group discerned cer-
tain online behavioural changes, with one of these indicating that those buying coun-
terfeits were not able (to afford) to buy the ‘real thing’; this is an issue we picked up 
on in the consumer tracker as typical of complicit consumers, whose purchases are 
of lower economic harm. 
 
4.3. Characteristics of Infringement 
4.3.1 Literature and media review 
 
The amount of information gathered from a literature and media review on the char-
acteristics of infringement on social media was limited. However, a survey of the 
main points shows the following: 
 
Industry 
According to a report by P. Lewis of the ACG, 56 UK consumers were the most regu-
lar online shoppers in the EU, but the market was distorted by the change of distribu-
tion practices and by the impact of social media, where photos of genuine goods 
were used alongside high-quality fake labels and packaging. These methods, com-
bined with prices close to those of the real products, were all used to deceive con-
                                            
56 Lewis, P. (2015) ‘Anti-Counterfeiting Group: fighting the good fight’. Trademarks and Brands Online [Online]: 
http://www.trademarksandbrandsonline.com/article/anti-counterfeiting-group-fighting-the-good-fight 
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sumers. The market has seen a further shift in consumer buying habits towards mo-
bile platforms and smartphones, as noted by MarkMonitor,57 which further enable de-
ceptive purchases. 
Examining different consumer behaviours, Spire (2011) 58 divided counterfeits into 
deceptive, non-deceptive and clones/duplicates, and the types of consumers of 
counterfeit goods into ‘happy purchasers’, ‘struggling consumers’, ‘Robin Hoods’ and 
‘innocent purchasers’. Consumer motivation was also central to the conclusions of 
Bryce and Rutter’s (2005) ‘Fake Nation’59, notably that consumers’ motives for buying 
counterfeits were not solely based around economic costs and consumers readily 
distinguished between different types of products. 
Government agencies 
The 2011 EC impact assessment 60 cited survey data indicating that many EU citi-
zens have knowingly acquired IPR-infringing goods, with 25% believing it acceptable 
to buy counterfeits and one in three feeling justified if the price of the legitimate prod-
uct was too high. The authors noted greater compliance in the UK, Ireland and Den-
mark than in the rest of the EU. However, OHIM’s 2013 ‘EU Citizens and Intellectual 
Property’61 claimed that only 10% of EU citizens openly admitted to IPR infringement 
but 33% tolerated IPR-infringing behaviours. The report saw a disconnect between 
support for IPR and personal choices and listed a number of different reasons for 
this, including limited buying power and protests against the prevailing market econ-
omy or premium brands, but concluded that many see IPR as benefiting business 
elites rather than consumers. 
The EUIPO’s 2016 ‘Intellectual Property and Youth’62 study researched demand for 
IPR-infringing goods, using both qualitative research (28 focus groups with respond-
ents aged between 15 and 24 years old) and quantitative research (online survey 
with 24,295 15–24 year olds from across the EU28). In relation to online purchases 
of physical goods, clothes and accessories (including footwear) were the most com-
mon products. The study claimed that counterfeit goods had a bad image among this 
age group and found marked differences in young consumers’ ability to positively 
                                            
57 MarkMonitor (2015) ‘Global Consumer Shopping Habits Survey’ [Online]: https://www.markmonitor.com/down-
load/report/MarkMonitor_Online_Barometer-2015.pdf 
58 ACC/Spire Research and Consulting (2011) ‘Counterfeits: Measuring it, Fighting It’ [Online]: 
http://www.slideshare.net/spireresearch/010216the-american-chamber-of-commercecounterfeit-measuring-it-fighting-
it 
59 Bryce, J. and Rutter, J. (2005) ‘Fake Nation – A Study into Everyday Crime’ [Online]: https://www.aca-
demia.edu/597794/Fake_Nation_A_Study_into_Everyday_Crime 
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60 European Commission (2011) ‘Commission Staff Working Paper: Impact Assessment on Proposal Regarding 
OHIM and European Observatory on Counterfeiting and Piracy’ [Online]: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ipren-
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61 OHIM (2013) ‘European Citizens and Intellectual Property: Perceptions, Awareness and Behaviour’ [Online]: 
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https://oami.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/web/observatory/ip_perception 
62 European Union Intellectual Property Office (2016) ‘Intellectual Property and Youth Scoreboard 2016’ [Online]: 
https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/web/observatory/ip-youth-scoreboard?platform=hootsuite 
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identify websites offering counterfeit goods. Significant differences were detected be-
tween markets, with the UK very close to the EU average in most metrics, with only 
10% intentionally purchasing counterfeit goods, 12% doing so unintentionally and the 
remaining 78% either not buying or not knowingly buying.63 
 
Academic 
Stroppa et al.’s ‘Social media and luxury goods counterfeit’64 study claimed that so-
cial media was an important part of the counterfeiting market, enabling illicit transac-
tions off platform via online payment sites. The study identified how brands’ invest-
ment in Instagram to raise the profile of their products had created a ‘promo-friendly 
environment’ that attracted counterfeiters. The methods used by the counterfeiters 
on Instagram include the use of spambots, which enable them to manage thousands 
of accounts at the same time, as well as automatic account creation and postings of 
images that cannot be detected by Instagram’s systems. 
 
Stroppa et al. warned that this global trend has grown since their previous research 
paper, ‘Online Advertising Techniques for Counterfeit Goods and Illicit Sales’,65 which 
focused on counterfeited clothing sold through Facebook-sponsored ads. They ar-
gued that creative selling practices, such as those detailed in a 2015 overview by 
Bloomberg’s Roberts,66 showed counterfeiters targeting the same customers as the 
authentic brands with high-quality (and comparatively high-priced) deceptive and 
grey goods rather than focusing on low-price fakes. This is a finding that chimes with 
claims made by MarkMonitor and NetNames. Stroppa et al. also noted that Google 
claimed to be cracking down on fraudulent bots that can be costly to advertisers, who 
pay Google for clicks on their ads. They cite a December 2015 poll, which revealed: 
“millions of online shoppers are being duped into buying counterfeit products with 
one in four being ripped-off”. Their June 2015 research (‘Instagram spam-bots and 
social media popularity’) claimed that Instagram is “infested with millions of spam-
bots and fake accounts”67. 
Technology industry sources 
 
Facebook’s closed groups were the focus of concerns from Chivers68; a particular is-
sue was the use of closed and secret groups on Facebook to host online arms ba-
zaars, which is in contravention of Facebook’s policies. Facebook’s response was to 
describe their policies as evolutionary, reflecting shifts in their social media ecosys-
tem. They acknowledged that they allowed users to process payments through the 
Messenger service, as well as providing other features to aid sales. 
                                            
63 These figures are similar to the results of our consumer data (see section 5.5 of the main report) 
64 Stroppa, A., di Stefano, D. and Parrella, B. (2016) ‘Social media and luxury goods counterfeit: a growing concern 
for government, industry and consumers worldwide’. [Online]: https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/files/2016/05/IG_A2016_ST2.pdf?tid=a_inl 
65 Their paper was cited extensively in Lepido, D. (2014) ‘Fakebook: Site Touts Luxury Goods That May Not Be 
What They Seem’. Bloomberg [Online]: www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-11-13/fake-out-many-luxury-items-adver-
tised-on-facebook-are-phony-researchers-say.html 
66 Roberts, A. (2015) ‘Luxury Firms Fight Online Fraudsters Over Expensive Fakes’. Bloomberg [Online]: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-27/fakes-at-7-800-send-luxury-companies-online-to-fight-fraudsters 
67 Seetharaman, D. (2015) ‘Fake Accounts Still Plague Instagram Despite Purge, Study Finds. Wall Street Journal 
[Online]: http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/06/30/fake-accounts-still-plague-instagram-despite-purge-study-finds/ 
68 Chivers, C.J. (2016) ‘Facebook Groups Act as Weapons Bazaars for Militias’. New York Times, 6 April 2016 
[Online]: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/world/middleeast/facebook-weapons-syria-libya-iraq.html?_r=0 
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4.3.2 Industry and trade bodies’ responses 
China was identified as the origin of most counterfeit manufacture; many products 
were shipped outside their central distribution network and/or shipped in plain pack-
aging. Clothing and licensed products were most likely to be counterfeited, as was 
anything in loose packaging. Meeting the problem of counterfeiting required a closed 
manufacture and distribution network. 
 
FACT noted that technology has changed the physical goods market and social net-
working websites are now an integral part of modern life, with Facebook increasingly 
used as an online platform for DVD sales. Social media, together with direct sale 
websites, online marketplaces and auction websites, is replacing ‘traditional’ hard 
goods sales methods. Social media has an influence on almost every type of copy-
right infringement that FACT investigates, and many ‘pirate’ websites have Facebook 
or Twitter accounts. ‘Open’ groups are used to attract online users and social net-
working accounts are employed to promote, advertise and directly link to the ‘pirate’ 
website. Since the advent of UK website blocking orders, FACT has seen discus-
sions on Facebook of workarounds and suggestions of ways to circumvent blocks. 
Twitter is used in a similar way, as users tweet and share links to content. 
Social media has played a crucial role in assisting IP infringement in the vast majority 
of FACT’s investigations. The use of social media by individuals and groups infring-
ing member content is continually rising and enhancing existing illegal services 
(hosted on third-party, infringing websites) by keeping users updated with new con-
tent and news. Social networking websites are now integral to modern life, and the 
global reach of the platforms provides the perfect opportunity for criminals to direct 
the public to infringing content hosted on other websites, to advertise and sell infring-
ing products, and provide on-going ‘customer support’. FACT also identified prob-
lems with fake/hidden website registration details and overseas servers. 
Among the surveyed ACG firms, the key problems in dealing with Facebook resulted 
from the platform’s refusal to close down a ‘counterfeiter’s’ customer profile unless it 
breached their terms and conditions. There was no clear trend in counterfeiting of 
new as opposed to old products and purchasers of counterfeits were seen as people 
seeking ‘cheap’ products and generally willing to ‘delude’ themselves into thinking 
they had got a cheap deal rather than a fake. The key social media-related issue was 
that “the main sales happen in closed groups, which cannot be scanned easily” and 
there were problems locating infringing content on social media because of re-
strictions on Facebook searches. Facebook, and to a much lesser degree Instagram 
and Twitter, are being used to sell counterfeit products in local selling groups. One 
respondent claimed that Facebook has taken over from eBay and Gumtree as the 
major area of concern. Selling pages and closed groups were the main problems for 
most respondents, even though one saw Amazon and eBay as causing the most 
damage in the UK. Infringing content was difficult to locate because it appeared in 
closed selling groups or hidden profiles, unavailable to the average user. Closed 
groups are often characterised by the use of fake posts and pages, making it harder 
than ever to catch them without investing a lot of time and resources. What the vari-
ous ACG members’ responses illustrate is the divergence of social media’s effects 
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on brands, with some able to identify a clear link to Facebook (and, to a lesser de-
gree, Instagram and Twitter) and the role of closed groups and diversion tactics, 
whereas others still see eBay and Amazon as the main sources of concern. 
 
There were far more detailed explanations of the characteristics of infringement 
available from the three main private enforcement agencies. MarkMonitor described 
the chief online issues impacting brands as impersonation, fan pages, social media 
pages transacting business, promotion and the proliferation of websites selling coun-
terfeits and offering fake special offers. Counterfeiters see social media as a haven 
and actively use both open and closed group pages, along with ‘likes’ and ‘retweets’, 
to disseminate their offerings. The social media platforms make it easy to move 
channels by establishing fan pages and making it possible to carry out transactions 
on or off the social media platform. MarkMonitor also drew attention to the ease with 
which counterfeiters could clone brand pages on social media, with some brand-im-
personating pages having more likes than the corresponding genuine brand pages. 
 
NetNames described fake web-shops as those with high visibility and traffic that sell 
counterfeits by using images of authentic brands and logos and working as part of a 
network. NetNames focused on the whole online, e-commerce landscape, of which 
social media was just a part. They noted that brand owners were increasingly con-
fronting anonymous online counterfeit and grey market sellers using rogue e-com-
merce websites and online marketplaces. NetNames saw the B2B marketplaces as 
the most important, because these were the primary platforms for selling and ship-
ping large volumes of counterfeit and grey market products directly to customers. 
 
They had on-going problems with auction sites, but for them mobile apps were the 
fastest-growing online channel for counterfeit goods. They also mentioned the dan-
gers of traffic diversion, which involves cyber-squatting and the manipulation of 
search engine optimisation, as well as the use of social networking sites, blog entries 
and review sites to divert consumers to rogue e-commerce websites. For NetNames 
social media was part of a range of online tools used by counterfeiters to divert traffic 
away from legitimate websites. 
 
Yellow Brand argued that social media channels are increasingly popular targets for 
counterfeiters, with fake goods being sold on both global and local channels, particu-
larly in China and Russia, as well as via high-volume platforms like Facebook, Twitter 
and Instagram. Counterfeiters’ tactics for avoiding detection include securing content 
in closed groups. They also had difficulties identifying infringing content such as ads 
for counterfeits that omit a brand’s name and so do not show up in online searches, 
as well as the dominance of online sales by marketplaces that source stock for many 
web stores and carry out business in business-to-business and consumer-to-con-
sumer online marketplaces. 
 
4.3.3 Government agency responses 
Trading Standards have encountered Facebook-based traders selling counterfeits in 
‘closed groups’ and the ‘buy and sell’ function for different towns and cities now 
shows Facebook competing directly with eBay. Trading Standards’ greatest concern 
was the flagrancy of sellers taking photos of their goods ‘in situ’ and posting them to 
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Facebook who, because of the lack of intelligence and data, simply ignore the prob-
lem. Trading Standards also claimed that “sellers enjoy […] ever-greater access to 
new customers via closed social media groups”. They believed that social media was 
particularly attractive to users when ‘advertising’ IPR-infringing products because 
there were no fees or costs yet they were still able to find buyers and sellers in the 
local area; this made social media an attractive proposition when compared to more 
traditional online marketplaces such as eBay, Amazon and Gumtree. 
 
IPO’s Intelligence Hub described social media as the retail end of counterfeit goods, 
with Facebook seen as presenting the biggest challenge, since its scale and reach 
make it impossible to police: enforcement agencies need Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act (RIPA) powers to investigate. It was also claimed that Facebook was not 
a selling platform, meaning selling goods on the platform could breach their terms 
and conditions. Social media, it was argued, provided a relatively safe way for mem-
bers of the public to trade in these goods and the majority of the public in the UK saw 
counterfeit goods as socially acceptable. Indeed, there were sectors of society that 
actively sought out counterfeit goods that looked like luxury goods but were more af-
fordable. The public’s tolerance of counterfeits, the ease of ordering via the internet, 
and the relative security of anonymous online entities have created a safe haven for 
people to trade in counterfeit goods. 
 
4.4. Opportunities for IP 
4.4.1 Enforcement activities identified from literature and media review 
Industry 
Enforcement strategies aimed at purchasers of counterfeits should take account of 
consumers’ greater readiness to listen to victims and experts than authority figures69. 
There is evidence of improving awareness of IPR and increasing consumer 
knowledge of counterfeits through TV programmes. The BBC’s Fake Britain (2014–
2015) series stands out, as it explained the danger to consumers as follows: “easily 
set up dodgy websites and fake identities causing problems – in this case, with life-
threatening consequences”70. 
Government 
The National Trading Standards Board (NTSB) in the UK has called for a single 
agency in the UK to improve IPR enforcement like the creation in the US of a new 
National Intellectual Property Coordination Center.71 This initiative brought 23 partner 
agencies together as a taskforce using the resources, skills and authorities of each 
                                            
69 ACC/Spire Research and Consulting (2011) ‘Counterfeits: Measuring it, Fighting It’ [Online]: 
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70 BBC (2013) Fake Britain [Online]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ezrVVtx9uU (16 May 2013) 
71 IPR Center (2016) ‘About us’ [Online]: https://www.iprcenter.gov/about-us 
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partner to provide a comprehensive response to IP theft. The EUIPO’s 2016 study In-
tellectual Property and Youth72 claimed that arguments relating to personal safety ra-
ther than moral values were better suited to convincing young people to think twice 
about buying counterfeit goods. 
Academic 
Chaudhry and Zimmerman criticised the current tone of anti-counterfeiting messages 
and questioned whether firms (and government) actually test their advertisements to 
assess the influence of such messages on their target audience. Prabhakar73 argued 
that online enforcement has been made much harder due to the lack of policing 
within e-commerce sites and this is made worse by a lack of cooperation and infor-
mation sharing unless pressed by brands and enforcement agencies. Phillips74 de-
scribed the historical problems eBay encountered in dealing with counterfeit goods 
on their platform and argued that while eBay still has a less-than-perfect takedown 
system, it is clear that the relationship between certain online platforms and brand 
owners has improved. In 2005, he also suggested that the UK’s Trading Standards 
was unable to cope with offline counterfeits because of its limited powers and re-
sources; this still seems to be the key problem for enforcement 10 years on. 
Technology industry sources 
There were concerns about the use of online platforms’ terms and conditions, as ac-
ceptance of these rarely meant more than a tick-box exercise for users. A more re-
cent UK parliamentary select committee report75 strongly criticised the length and 
complexity of the terms and conditions used by social media firms. Even the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation admitted76 that the terms are “one-sided in the service pro-
vider’s favor […] often designed to be beyond any judicial scrutiny […] most users 
never even bother to read let alone understand these agreements filled as they are 
with confusing legalese”. 
 
Stuart Dredge’s analysis of Facebook’s Rights Manager tool, their equivalent of 
YouTube’s Content ID system, emphasised its role in managing copyrighted content 
uploaded to the social network and tackling infringement.77 This demonstrated the 
platform’s ability to come up with IPR solutions when it was in their business interests 
to do so. Facebook’s sophisticated technologies, like their DeepText AI,78 permit the 
platform; “to sieve through and understand several thousand posts per second 
across 20 languages” and enable Facebook to ‘decode’ messages, comments and 
posts and make recommendations for individual users. This tool could also be em-
ployed to search for illicit behaviour. 
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4.4.2 Industry and trade bodies’ responses 
The clearest description of ways to bolster enforcement of IPR came from a review of 
cross-sector best practices by BASCAP’s Oldknow, who called for new industry 
standards, to include the use of automated tools to identify transaction patterns, and 
the adoption of automation tools, as well as improvement to the transparency of noti-
fication, takedown and redress systems. This would require better coordination be-
tween intermediaries, government agencies and rights holders, as well as the adop-
tion of preventative tools such as content filtering, verification, track and trace, and 
the improvement of the security of the global supply chain. 
 
FACT argued that online behaviours demanded a wide variety of methods to deal 
with infringing websites, such as website closures, detection and removal of infring-
ing content through takedown notices, and the use of auction website listing removal 
tools. The focus for social media was on reducing illicit websites’ popularity through 
search engine delisting and the removal of the offending pages on Facebook and 
Twitter, with the ultimate goal of restricting infringing websites’ revenues. FACT had 
a more positive view of the media platforms takedown policies’ than we encountered 
with individual firms, highlighting their procedures with eBay, Twitter and Facebook. 
The last had an online reporting facility for rights holders and members of the public 
to report violations, including copyright and trademark issues. FACT had incorpo-
rated this procedure into their alternative to a prosecution strategy, with some suc-
cess. They noted that Facebook would remove specific posts rather than the whole 
profile or community page, but would occasionally remove entire groups if repeat in-
fringement could be shown. 
 
The ACG member rights holders we surveyed monitored domains and social media 
online and then took enforcement action against sellers and/or sites selling counter-
feit versions of their products or using their imagery. Some used external private en-
forcement agencies, like MarkMonitor, but others made direct contact with the plat-
forms to lodge complaints. Overall, firms used all the options open to them to enforce 
their rights online and offline. Some manually collected data from online listings and 
requested information from marketplaces such as eBay for their records, which they 
regarded as confidential information, while others relied on their external agents. The 
perceived resistance from social media platforms involved a time-consuming process 
of finding, reporting and taking down infringing posts, along with a reliance on images 
used by sellers in the absence of test purchases. Concerns were expressed about 
Chinese B2B sites and problems investigating the supply chain, as well as determin-
ing the source of the counterfeits. There was less confidence in the current online en-
forcement process because “criminals are light years ahead of law enforcement” and 
because of the “high costs of maintaining and enforcing rights” and the “lack of coop-
eration from online platforms”. 
 
The IP Crime Group’s Social Media Group claimed that social media platforms were 
not subject to the RIPA 2000 Part III79 and that any compliance by them with the 
RIPA was voluntary. They argued that, despite some successes with Facebook tak-
ing down pages on sites identified by The Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit 
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(PIPCU), closed groups had become the most challenging aspect of dealing with Fa-
cebook, requiring enforcement agencies to go undercover. In their experience, illicit 
offerings were made across various platforms, with clear links between the social 
media platforms and online marketplaces. A key insight was the emergence of Twit-
ter as a new threat for digital media rights holders because of the speed with which 
infringers can publish infringing content, which serves as an illustration of the speed 
of change within fast-moving markets; even so, there was little sense that Twitter had 
increased the threat in terms of ‘hard’ goods. 
 
Facebook’s purely voluntary compliance with the RIPA made enforcement hard, as 
the platform required individual URLs to be forwarded for takedown. This time-con-
suming and resource-intensive process was the result of the platform’s concerns 
about personal images being included in the takedown and meant that they were un-
willing to take down whole albums of photographs. The group pointed to the process 
where Trading Standards’ forensics team monitored fake traders’ uploads, but 
brands were only able to report images impacting their own product. Since not every 
brand was a member of the ACG, this meant counterfeits of products from non-ACG 
members could still be offered. At the time, it was assumed that Facebook was not a 
selling platform, meaning counterfeiters could be in breach of the platform’s terms 
and conditions, which offered an easier tool for disruption than claiming IPR infringe-
ments. The main issues for industry were the platform’s refusal to accept bulk re-
quests and establishing a more streamlined, coordinated approach to removing in-
fringing content from the platform. 
 
4.4.3 Government agency responses 
The existing complex and fragmented80 enforcement approaches seemed to partly 
explain the technology firms’ current cautious and limited cooperation, but effective 
IPR enforcement has been further hampered because while the nature of online IPR 
infringement crime was global, enforcement was local. The apparent lack of inte-
grated approaches meant a need for greater coordination between stakeholders. 
Only multinational firms could truly adopt a multi-territorial approach, although Euro-
pol and Interpol could be part of the solution. Trading Standards issued a call for a 
single national body for IP crime that could be part of one of the existing agencies 
(such as immigration, customs or Trading Standards), and this recommendation had 
real resonance within the UK enforcement environment and chimed with recent 
changes in IPR enforcement in the US. 
 
The NTSB’s and Trading Standards’ current ‘IP drive’ focuses on Facebook and 
eBay and their national control strategy is about prevention, intelligence and enforce-
ment, although this relies on cooperation with other agencies. Their interactions with 
Facebook had been difficult given the problems of substantiating the scale of illicit 
activity and this has remained their biggest challenge in relation to social media. 
Their reduced and limited resources mean they need more help, especially given the 
broad scope and scale of their work, with 12,500 feeding investigations, at a time 
when the local authority Trading Standards model is no longer fit for purpose. Trad-
ing Standards proposed a more regional approach as part of the efforts to “join all 
                                            
80 Seventeen different UK agencies are involved in IPR enforcement. 
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this up”, and this meant being intelligence-led and required greater cooperation from 
brands, industry bodies and the IPO to tackle IPR infringement on social media. They 
admitted that their response to IPR infringement on social media platforms had been 
patchy across the UK and any good practice and active enforcement work was lim-
ited in scale. They had encountered problems with identifying the ‘owners’ of social 
media profiles, with social media platform operators providing very little (if any) infor-
mation to enable successful identification and location of offenders. They noted that 
there was no straightforward mechanism to identify potential IPR infringement on so-
cial media, but they had agreed a formal procedure with Facebook after extensive 
consultation between the NTSB’s eCrime Team and Facebook. 
 
The IPO’s Intel and Enforcement hub pointed to new initiatives aimed at joining up 
the current different approaches to reap the benefits of cooperation between industry 
and IPO/Trading Standards, such as the National Markets group and the Real Deal 
campaign. 
 
The establishment of the National Trading Standards Board in 2012 was supposed to 
have created a network of intelligence analysts and a national intelligence hub, but 
this has not been effective thus far. The current economic climate has resulted in a 
number of partnerships of necessity, but there has been little coordinated work un-
dertaken in respect of social media due to the stance taken by the NTSB. According 
to the enforcement agencies, the way the social media groups were constructed re-
quired a surveillance authority under the RIPA 2000 to view any infringing goods. 
4.4.4 Tech firm responses 
Google provided two key documents (How Google fights the advertisement of coun-
terfeit goods and Google’s AdWords trademark policies) that set out their stance in 
relation to AdWords and counterfeited products. There was a clear line in their Ad-
Words policy allowing trademarks to be used as keyword triggers in AdWords, and 
they claim to be unable to “arbitrate trademark disputes all over the world”. Google 
argued that determining infringement was a matter for the courts, especially as trade-
marks were territorial and applied to certain goods or services. They said they would, 
“as a courtesy to brand holders”, investigate reasonable claims about trademark vio-
lations in their ads and pointed us to their specific region/country policies and their 
“easy-to-use complaint form”. By contrast, Google’s stated policy on counterfeits had 
a very different tone and the firm claimed to have a zero-tolerance policy in relation 
to the advertisement of counterfeit goods. They claimed that ads on searches for 
trademarked terms were not confusing as the ads were very clearly delineated as 
‘sponsored links’ and ads that were actually deceptive would violate their Terms of 
Service. Google argued that the internet had created new complexities and many 
stakeholders had a role to play in resolving this issue. More significantly, they 
claimed that brand owners and law enforcement must tackle counterfeiting at its 
source. However, they also clearly set out the limits of how online services could help 
given that they “are in no position to determine the authenticity of the millions of ad-
vertised goods, as they never even take possession of them, and fraudsters are al-
ways coming up with more sophisticated ways to game the system”. 
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Facebook encounter a diverse range of crimes on their platform that affect public 
safety, but their priorities were whatever affected the safety of consumers, including 
combating child exploitation and terrorism. Any criminal activity was against their 
Terms of Service and they were able to ‘join the dots’ when law enforcement was 
looking for evidence of criminality. Their real-name policy meant that account holders 
had to use their full legal name, and this caused the platform problems with enforce-
ment agencies, as they were aware that law enforcement had set up fake accounts, 
which Facebook could and would close down. In relation to rights holders, they had 
to accommodate all the various different laws and this required individual notice pro-
cedures. Because of this, they were unable to assess bulk processing. That said, 
they were able to ‘whitelist’ trade-body reporting for members divided between copy-
right and trademark infringements, claiming their response turnaround time was 
within two hours. They had little contact with UK law enforcement apart from Trading 
Standards and did not encounter many affected stakeholders, but the UK situation 
was apparently complicated. Facebook’s reaction to allegations of infringement was 
to produce a standard set of questions, as they occasionally received multiple re-
quests. With multi-brand counterfeiters, these were often subject to Proceeds of 
Crime orders and on-going criminal investigations. There were many existing 
takedown requests that featured duplicates from rights holders and Trading Stand-
ards, usually involving test purchases. Facebook claimed that rights holders could re-
port albums of photos of infringing content. 
 
Facebook is primarily a communication platform, so they are not involved with the 
online transactions and this is the chief reason for their need to establish the exact 
nature of any alleged infringement. Facebook had agreements in place with the 
Home Office and the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) to meet data requests, 
including supplying basic subscriber info. This had to come from their Dublin office, 
although they approved 75% of such data requests. As a US firm subject to US laws 
on divulging data, it could take six months to get the content of subscriber accounts, 
although they could volunteer subscriber information if there was a clear justification. 
They could provide the same information for Instagram where they saw certain levels 
of infringement. Facebook’s lawyers were perceived as risk averse and had difficul-
ties understanding and managing the existing fragmented approach to the enforce-
ment and diversity of stakeholders. Suggested efforts to streamline enforcement that 
might improve the process still have to satisfy Facebook’s requirement for proof. In 
their formal processes, Facebook claimed, according to their ‘Statement of Rights 
and Responsibilities’,81 that their users were prohibited from posting content that vio-
lated another party’s IPR. Additionally, they said that they offered tools to report po-
tentially infringing content posted by users on their service. Their online reporting tool 
could be used to report both copyright and trademark infringements, and they 
pointed us to the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) 2014 report entitled ‘Who has 
your back?’ 82, in which the EFF argues that technology firms need to defend them-
                                            
81 Facebook (2015) ‘Statement of Rights and Responsibilities’ [Online]: https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms 
82 Electronic Frontier Foundation (2014) ‘Who has your back? Protecting your speech from copyright and trademark 
bullies’ [Online]: https://www.eff.org/pages/who-has-your-back-copyright-trademark-2014 
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selves against government requests for data. Apart from acknowledging that law-en-
forcement agencies could request data relating to a criminal investigation, Facebook 
only disclosed account records in accordance with its Terms of Service and applica-
ble law. As with both other technology firms, the platform published statistics83 on 
government requests for data and content removal. 
 
Twitter’s specific policy relating to trademark infringement covered anything consid-
ered a trademark policy violation and detailed their response to reports of trademark 
policy violations from holders of federal or international trademark registrations. 
When satisfied that there was a clear intent to mislead others through the unauthor-
ised use of a trademark, Twitter would suspend the user account and notify the ac-
count holder. They distinguished between such accounts and those they determine 
are accounts that are confusing other users but “not purposefully passing itself off as 
the trademarked good or service” – in this scenario, they give the account holder an 
opportunity to clear up any potential confusion. They listed in detail how their coun-
terfeit goods policy prohibited user attempts to pass themselves off as products of 
the brand owner. They noted how violations could be reported and, if their rules are 
broken, how such a violation will trigger “appropriate action”. Unsurprisingly, they as-
serted the following: “as is standard industry practice, we do not proactively monitor 
the content user’s post to Twitter”. 
  
                                            
83 Facebook (2016) ‘United Kingdom Requests for Data July–December 2015’ [Online]: https://govtrequests.face-
book.com/country/United%20Kingdom/ 
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5.0 Phase 2: Consumer tracker and survey results 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The consumer data was based on the results of a three-month online tracker and 
consumer survey looking at Google/Facebook/Twitter/eBay. The data revealed differ-
ent types of online consumer behaviour that can be segmented as: 
 
• complicit consumers – actively seek out ‘copied’ goods 
• compliant consumers – avoid copied goods 
• deceived consumers – mistake copied goods for the real thing 
• unexposed consumers – only find genuine goods 
 
The research team cross-referenced the consumer data with customs seizures data, 
as these were the most consistent data available relating to the volumes of seizures, 
even if they were only available for intermittent, very high-level information. The gov-
ernment seizure data showed a jump in reported volumes from 2005–2008 to 2010–
2013, but within each group of data the trend was negative. The seizure data gener-
ally focused on high-volume opportunities, with each case covered during the initial 
period (2005–2008) referring to over 2,000 items on average. However, during the 
second reporting period (2010–2013), the average had declined to just over 270 
items. 
 
We focused on six consumer sectors84, but the specific sector data was only publicly 
available at an EU-wide level and volumes of seizures differed widely between the 
different sectors, even though normalised trends indicated that, at the EU level, the 
trends in seizures were downwards. There are a number of alternative reasons for 
this including: 
 
• Actual non-compliant behaviour might have been declining within these sectors in 
line with the overall reduction in seizures in the UK. 
• Reductions in seizure activity might have been a result of changes in public policy 
and/or cuts in enforcement spending. This seemed unlikely as regards the UK, 
where seizure cases had increased but the average volume of items in a case 
had dramatically fallen. 
• A more likely interpretation was that non-compliant activity had become more dif-
fuse and difficult to detect and capture. 
• It can also be argued that the distribution of non-compliant products was being 
handled at a more granular level, which more easily evaded existing government 
enforcement activity. 
 
Connecting with government and sector-derived statistics 
The predominant trends in the available government and industry information are 
open to several interpretations, notably within individual sectors and official seizure 
levels. We therefore sought to complement these top-down data sets with bottom-up 
data. The approach to the latter started from the perspective of purchasing and coun-
terfeiting online, as experienced by individual consumers. We sought to include both 
                                            
84 Alcohol, cigarettes, clothing, footwear, perfume and watches 
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explicit experiences, as divulged through a consumer survey, and compare and con-
trast these with the consumer behaviours captured within the social media tracking 
study. 
 
Limitations in the approach 
In reviewing the current estimates that are based on this bottom-up approach, it is 
important to keep in mind that there are a number of limitations. 
 
First and foremost, because of the focus on consumer-derived data and the deliber-
ate use of ‘naïve’ researchers, this study focused on counterfeit goods that, at some 
stage in the buying cycle, became explicit. In the tracking study, the researchers 
were not even in a position to assess the actual products delivered by a service, but 
rather assessed them according to the nature of the online endpoints85. Further track-
ing studies would be required that completed the buying cycle and used detailed ex-
pert examination to identify the veracity of the products delivered before this would 
have a direct link to all counterfeit activity. Furthermore, in the case of the consumer 
survey, while there was an informal assessment of the products received, this was 
based upon consumer perceptions, which may well wrongly attribute products. Both 
options are possible, as properly licensed goods may, on receipt, be erroneously 
considered substandard or even counterfeit. 
 
Second, this initial investigation was designed as a proof-of-concept ‘existence’ test, 
to validate whether these consumer-based approaches could, at viable levels, actu-
ally detect significant levels of activity. As such, they were designed to give the activ-
ity the best options for detection. This was done by selecting sectors where counter-
feiting was, elsewhere, known to be prevalent. Then, within each sector, there was a 
focus on brands that had high levels of online search activity. This made sense for 
this stage of a study, but it should be remembered whenever there is an attempt to 
extrapolate estimates from within the study to more general cases. In this report, the 
general estimates have been given as a sense of the potential order of magnitude of 
any impact and also as a demonstration of the types of methods that could be used 
in further studies, where more wide-ranging sampling methods are deployed. 
 
Third, these initial investigations accepted the challenges involved in building a rep-
resentative sample of consumers. As we were focusing on online purchase activity, 
we felt comfortable using online survey methods, and we added some methods of 
weighting to mitigate any potential for the behavioural characteristics of the study to 
be preferentially chosen within the sample. We also sought to design the survey as 
carefully as possible to reduce response bias. However, none of these effects can be 
reduced to zero and, at some stage, it may be possible to generate complementary 
studies via different routes that allow for an unbiased estimate of these side effects. 
 
While there are clear extensions to the current method that can mitigate, to various 
degrees, the limitations outlined, the most straightforward approach is to introduce a 
regular sequence of similar studies. This requires a long-term commitment to the ap-
proaches but allows the information provided to move from being a snapshot in time, 
                                            
85 namely the sites that facilitate actual transactions 
38 
with an ill-defined baseline, to provide a rigorous method that can detect changes. 
Once stable time series are derived, a series of tools can be used to begin to exam-
ine the correlation, lead, lag and impact of different characteristics, in particular, the 
rise, fall and influence of social media on counterfeiting, as well as assess counter-
feiting levels in general. This would be a similar approach to the differences found 
between the UK national crime survey and those statistics that are linked to police-
reported crime. 
 
5.2 Trends in consumers’ online behaviour 
The longitudinal research on online behaviour conducted by the British Population 
Survey (BPS)86 demonstrates a consistent trend of increasing rates of online pur-
chase of non-groceries and alongside it the steady increase in engagement with so-
cial media. This is consistent across social grades (Figure 2) and age groups (Figure 
3) with anticipated differences between each segment. It is unsurprising that those 
over 50 lag significantly behind younger groups in the uptake of online purchasing, 
but it is anticipated that this difference will disappear as those younger groups age. 
There are obvious financial constraints that explain the difference in purchasing lev-
els between social grades AB and DE87. 
 
At the same time, as more transactions are being conducted online, there has been 
an even more dramatic uptake of social media over the years since 2008 (Figures 4 
and 5). While the young adopt social media first, at the end of the research period 
this appeared to have reached a plateau; it is possible that these sectors are moving 
their behaviour into private messaging services like WhatsApp. There is seen to be 
much less discrimination in social media use between social grades AB to DE; in-
deed, social grade C1, by the end of the data, shows the highest amount of use (Fig-
ure 4).  
 
The data on trends in consumer behaviour online, demonstrates the plausibility of an 
increased use of digital transactions that are potentially less amenable to existing 
methods of enforcement and monitoring of infringement. Furthermore, the BPS has 
also tracked, since 2010, changes in the claimed influences on buying decisions. The 
data indicates the overriding influence of both past experience and advice from 
friends and family. These measures have remained relatively stable throughout the 
whole research period, with around 70% of consumers claiming that these are influ-
ential. In contrast, a small (~5%) but gradually increasing proportion of consumers 
are being influenced by social media recommendations and also by the presence of 
brands on social media. It is important to recognise that these are conscious claims, 
rather than resilient measures of specific influence on research participants, so there 
is likely to be a level of confirmation bias and wish fulfilment in the responses. 
 
Suffice to say that, at this stage, the trends indicate that should social media have 
any particular influence on the propagation of financial harm through the promotion of 
                                            
86 The data has been sourced from BPS’ British Consumer Index and is available, for a subscription here: 
http://www.bcindex.co.uk/channel-trends-special-offer/4584147934 Data can be made available upon request. 
87 Social grades AB (managerial and professional) and DE (semi-skilled manual workers and the unemployed) 
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counterfeit products, it is likely to be confined to a relatively small proportion of the 
population. 
 
 
Figure 2: Long-term trends in consumer online purchasing of non-groceries by social 
grade 
Source: British Population Survey 
 
Figure 3: Long-term trends in consumer online purchasing of non-groceries by age 
band 
Source: British Population Survey 
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Figure 4: Long-term trends in consumer use of social media by social grade 
Source: British Population Survey 
 
Figure 5: Long-term trends in consumer use of social media by age band 
Source: British Population Survey 
 
5.3. Tracking online promotion of brands 
The study aimed to establish the potential relationship between physical goods and 
social media. It was recognised that a lot of non-compliant behaviour could be at-
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tributed to the ease of passing off grey goods (which are branded goods sold by unli-
censed resellers at a cheaper price) or near-perfect fakes in online environments. 
We again segmented the respondents according to their behaviours (i.e. complicit, 
deceived, compliant and unexposed - see 5.1 above). Definitions for certain key 
terms used within the following analysis (website end-points, suspect behaviour, 
communications and Gini curve) are located in Appendix 4.1. 
 
Initially we looked at the levels of exposure to suspect communications, as repre-
sented by the four different digital channels we tracked: Google, eBay, Facebook 
groups (both ‘closed’ and ‘open’), and Twitter. On each of these sources there were 
initially short lines of text designed to attract interest when a consumer progressed 
their search for a particular product. We focused our research tracking on six repre-
sentative sectors: alcohol, cigarettes, clothing, footwear, perfume and watches. 
Within each sector we tracked two brands, selected on the basis of the levels of 
search requests as provided by Google Trends in March 201588. This study was ini-
tially structured as a proof of concept, as there was little consistent published quanti-
tative material. This made it difficult to extrapolate reliably from the initial results to 
generate an overall estimate of impact. Instead, the structure was designed to give 
the maximum opportunity for the detection of interaction effects between social me-
dia and counterfeit purchasing. Using these initial estimates further tracking could 
then be designed. After initial periods of experimental tracking, the study systemati-
cally queried the different sectors once an hour over a period of three months, cover-
ing June to August 2015. Search results were then manually reviewed and character-
ised based upon the content of the initial return and the destination of any links within 
the initial result. 
 
Over the three-month period, we reviewed the regular stream of search results. The 
volume of items is shown in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1: Volume of media items captured and manually reviewed during the social me-
dia tracking project 
 
Volumes of search quantities were dependent on the search algorithms within the 
platforms themselves; it was appropriate to test this as it reflected the experience of 
the normal users of each platform. The volumes were considerably larger in social 
media channels like Facebook and Twitter, due to the availability of automated Appli-
cation Program Interface (API) connections89. Due to the highly concentrated nature 
of suspect behaviour within different social media channels, it was feasible to auto-
mate the classification of the links not reviewed manually based upon the risk that 
                                            
88 We also cross-referenced with Trading Standards data available from the latest ‘IP Crime Report’, as well as ACG 
suggestions on key sectors and products. 
89 An application that can access features or data of another operating system.  
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these connections were attached to other entities that had already been shown to 
contain suspect content. 
 
 
Table 2: Volume of media items captured during the social media tracking project by 
brand search term 
 
As can be seen in Table 2 the volumes of search results differed considerably across 
the different search terms. At first sight the data suggested that a greater volume of 
searches for the products under review took place on Google, eBay and Twitter and 
that Facebook, while the largest group overall, was actually one of the smallest plat-
forms for these products, possibly indicating it was not used as much for the kind of 
goods we tracked. In addition, the Facebook closed group volume seemed noticea-
bly smaller, even though this was to prove, as we will see, the source of the most fla-
grant illicit activity. In fact, this showed that flagrant behaviour only occurred in a very 
small proportion of the population. This apparent disconnect can be explained be-
cause the sampling process within Facebook differed to that used for the other plat-
forms. Within Facebook we had to join a collection of groups, both open and closed, 
approximately 90 in total, and then capture all the messages within those groups 
over the tracking period, although we were unable to capture the total reach of these 
Facebook groups. Therefore, instead of highlighting the discrepancies in volumes be-
tween the different platforms, the research focus was on the penetration of suspect 
activities within each different source. 
 
Google was the most stable platform, as the nature of its content is intentionally less 
dynamic than other platforms. We can see that the largest group of individual com-
munications was driven by the search terms on Nike within the footwear sector 
(15,375 searches). Perhaps this reflected the ease of distribution of (relatively small, 
dry and popular) products by post. By contrast, alcohol had a relatively low presence, 
was completely undetected within Facebook, and had negligible content within eBay. 
Smoking promotion was similarly low, perhaps reflecting eBay’s terms and conditions 
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of use90. The exception to this volume was the results for the brand Lambert & Butler 
within Twitter; this was likely to be the result of particular public and press interest in 
a Liverpool football player called Ricky Lambert. Indeed, applying a very strict filter to 
the results yielded only seven results for the full brand name. Strictly speaking, any 
promotion of cigarettes is banned within the UK, so all of these promotions would 
have been suspect and anyone actively seeking these search terms was in some 
sense complicit. However, for the purpose of this particular study we classified the 
links according to whether they directed the user towards what looked like genuinely 
branded locations or other suspect locations. 
 
As already indicated, within the UK any promotion of cigarettes is legally suspect and 
this is corroborated by the low volumes of links within searches on this brand that re-
sulted in a link to a genuinely branded website. Where the link appeared genuine, the 
branded content was predominantly hosted by supermarkets, and the cigarette 
brands themselves appeared to have removed all links. This discrepancy in behav-
iour was particularly noticeable within the results for Google (Figure 6): suspect links 
were particularly rare in all instances, other than for Marlboro. The other notable fea-
ture was the prevalence of suspect links for Nike footwear within eBay (Figure 7). 
This stood out in terms of the volume of suspect links but, as will be shown, this par-
ticular market in Nike-branded footwear appears to behave idiosyncratically and may 
have been a transient behaviour during the period of the trial. 
 
   
Figure 6: Proportion of suspect links identified within the items tracked from Google  
 
 
Figure 7: Proportion of suspect links identified within the items tracked from eBay 
 
                                            
90 http://pages.ebay.co.uk/help/policies/tobacco.html “You're not allowed to sell tobacco products on eBay, including 
collectable packaging that contains tobacco, because of strict government regulations” 
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Figure 8: Proportion of suspect links identified within the items tracked from Twitter 
 
 
Figure 9: Proportion of suspect links identified within the items tracked from Facebook 
groups, open and closed 
 
When reviewing the distribution of the sources of suspect links (Figures 6 to 9), it 
was clear that different channels attracted attention from different communities of in-
terest as the proportions changed markedly, although we were unable to say how 
transient this phenomenon was. Given the types of behaviour shown elsewhere in 
this report, it was likely that this fluctuates widely as various ‘herd’ characteristics dic-
tate variations. It was also plain to see that the proportion of suspect classifications 
was much larger within the Facebook platform, within both open and closed groups. 
However, this may well simply reflect our concentration on popular brand names 
within each of the consumer sectors. Due to the nature of the API process, and the 
concentration on Facebook groups, the study was able to capture reference data for 
additional brands within the groups tracked in the research. This comparison demon-
strated that, in this instance, the scale of suspect behaviour outside the target brands 
was at a significantly lower rate, at suspect link rates of 14.7% and 1.6% within 
‘closed’ groups and ‘open’ groups respectively. While the overall rate was reduced, 
the enhanced exposure to suspect material was still high (over 500%) when compar-
ing closed groups to open groups. 
 
Different online entities 
 
Website endpoints 
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As well as the classification of overall exposure above, it is insightful to delve be-
neath the surface and characterise the structure of the behaviour behind these top-
line figures. It quickly became apparent that a number of different entities were trace-
able. The first entity relevant to the search was the final endpoint of the information. 
In each platform, this was: 
 
(a) the live link that is presented within the Google search; 
(b) the end of a chain of links within Twitter, which would often begin with a ran-
dom short code; 
(c) the conclusion of a chain of items within Facebook. 
The nature of eBay meant it led to minimal external references. In the manually as-
sessed records, these links were followed to an online location that was either availa-
ble for a product sale or ended in some other non-transactional information (for ex-
ample, a short review like a blog). Root sites are the hosting part of each address 
URL, and have been classified as follows: 
 
(a) ‘genuine’ referred to those root sites that represented a supplier website or a 
branded distribution site (or the products were pre-owned or found at some 
other legitimate but non-core source); 
(b) ‘suspect’ where a significant proportion of products were identified by some 
form of misrepresentation, most often by offering very high discounts (for ex-
ample, 10–20% of normal pricing); 
(c) ‘other’ is the classification of links that go to known product purchase loca-
tions (e.g. information or other branded materials). 
Across all the analysis conducted, a total of 1,354 different root sites were identified, 
and the behaviour within these different endpoints was strikingly different (Figure 10). 
High proportions of the non-transactional communications self-referenced Facebook 
and Twitter, amounting to 97.7% of the ‘other’ classification (Figure 11). Transac-
tional endpoints were dominated by eBay, which was the location of 17.6% of genu-
ine transactions. A small proportion (0.2%) of suspect links appeared to fraudulently 
make use of website root names that included branded names; these were clearly 
traps set for the ‘deceived’. Further to this, it is seen below that 68.7% of all suspect 
links were located in just three distinct host web locations. 
 
This was the first indication of the highly skewed nature of the online behaviour. This 
presented a sampling challenge, and meant that initial volume estimates were sub-
ject to high degrees of risk. Over 80% of all three classifications of root types (‘genu-
ine’, ‘suspect’ and ‘other’) occurred within just 114 different locations. On the basis of 
this structure, it appeared manageable to close down the vast majority of suspect be-
haviour by blocking a few locations; however, while this type of suspect behaviour 
was narrowly defined, it was also found to be highly mobile. 
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Figure 10:  Proportion of End-points by type of link and host 
 
Figure 11: Proportion of suspect links identified within the items tracked from Google 
 
Online initiators 
As has been shown, the endpoints for all types of behaviour, in particular suspect be-
haviour, were highly concentrated. By examining the nature of the links, it was possi-
ble to examine the unique origin of behaviour. This can be assessed by tracking the 
usernames for each type of behaviour. We defined three different properties of infor-
mation: 
 
1) The first is the initiator – this is the reference that is unique across (poten-
tially) a number of different posts. 
2) The second is each individual post – this is a unique communication present 
in one or more search results. 
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3) The third is the post lifetime – this is defined as the length of time between 
the first search when a particular post was identified and the last search when 
the same post was recognised. 
We then added together the lifetime of each individual-selected post by initiators to 
generate overall estimates of exposure. With these definitions it was instructive to 
compare the different behaviours that are shown (Table 3) across the platforms ex-
amined.
 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics, by online platform, for items broadcast 
 
Google clearly showed a more stable setup, with far fewer (2,755) different initiators 
than the other platforms, which provided a significantly higher number of posts. In 
this instance, a ‘post’ describes when a particular linked web location remains identi-
cal to those before, based upon a hash of the webpage content, between one search 
and the next. So, each individual initiator had a presence across nearly half (43.8 
days) of the survey period of 92 days. By contrast, Twitter presented a highly dy-
namic environment, with a substantial number (23,881) of initiators, with a very short 
average exposure of 1.8 days. The highest level of exposure tracked by the study oc-
curred within open Facebook groups, and this platform contained the highest number 
(35,267) of initiators; however, these open groups had a relatively short level of ex-
posure (4.98 days). 
 
 
Table 4: The proportion of suspect initiators and posts by online platform 
 
Comparing the distributions of the suspect behaviour in the table above (Table 4) 
demonstrated that, while the lowest proportion (0.3%) of suspect behaviour occurred 
within Twitter, an even smaller proportion (0.1%) of suspect initiators perpetrated this 
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behaviour. Those who appeared to conduct suspect communications were three 
times more active than the average participant on Twitter. This behaviour contrasted 
with Google, where suspect sources were less active than average participants, as 
1.5% of exposure was linked to 1.9% of initiators. This suppressed behaviour was 
further replicated within eBay, where a high proportion (9.9%) of suspect initiators 
only distributed a small proportion (0.6%) of exposure. It is tempting to explain this 
distribution as a hangover from anecdotal suggestions that eBay used to be the loca-
tion of much suspect activity, but the platform is now better able to suppress this non-
compliant behaviour. In contrast to eBay, within Facebook there was again a ten-
dency for suspect initiators to be more active than other participants, so 8.3% and 
40.1% of exposure were delivered by 3.9% and 30.8% of initiators, for closed and 
open groups respectively. While the uplift in suspect exposure was over 100% within 
open groups, within closed groups the scope for uplift (~33%) in exposure from sus-
pect initiators was suppressed because the populations of the closed groups were so 
heavily dominated by this suspect behaviour. 
 
These characteristics suggested very different behaviour between the different plat-
forms, which have been further demonstrated by detailed examination of the distribu-
tion of exposure through the use of Gini Curves - see Appendix 4.2. These very dif-
ferent distributions (Table 5) point to quite different approaches to resolving the situa-
tion. It is suggestive that this approach is focused on the current ability of individual 
initiators to inject high volumes of communications into a platform. Google and eBay 
represent more mature platforms although they have had phases when they were 
susceptible to various forms of spamming, which previously occurred within email. 
There have been many attempts to game PageRank91 algorithms within Google to 
raise items up Google search results, but these possibilities look to have been suc-
cessfully suppressed, at least in these searches. The results suggested that eBay is 
also reaching this level of maturity too. Suspect behaviour appears to be the most 
straightforward type to intensify within the social media context, with a high volume 
within Facebook. In particular, over a period of development, non-compliant behav-
iour could begin to damage reputations; however, sophisticated filtering and detec-
tion methods may help to suppress suspect activity. 
 
 
Table 5: The proportion of exposure within each online platform by content type, from 
the most prolific 10% of initiators 
 
5.4 Consumer survey 
                                            
91 An algorithm used by Google Search to rank websites in their search engine results. 
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Having explored in detail the digital promotion of products, we now turn our attention 
to the experience of consumers who look to make purchases online. This should 
complement the perspective provided in the previous section. In conducting this 
study, we first have to address three challenges: online sampling selection, verifica-
tion of suspect online personas, and handling the highly skewed nature of typical dig-
ital behaviour. The approach that we took to address these challenges has been de-
tailed in Appendix 4.3.  
 
The questionnaire was conducted in July 2015 and 3,000 consumers were inter-
viewed. The data was indicative of a certain type of behaviour in relation to popular 
brands, and the test was designed to identify the most likely locations for copied 
products so as to assess the impact of social media. The test was about searches for 
particular popular brands, rather than being a representation of general online pur-
chasing behaviour. Nonetheless, the data shows a pattern that further surveys and 
tracked research could build on. 
 
There are further caveats about those who take part in online surveys, as well as the 
use of the term ‘copied’ products within the survey, which has a broader scope than 
‘infringing’ or ‘fraudulent’ products. Even though these findings have to be properly 
contextualised, it is clear that this data supports many industry and government 
agencies’ claims about the roles that the internet and social media have in enabling 
counterfeited products to be made available and purchased. We were concerned 
about the credibility of claims of high levels of complicit behaviour, but the study was 
designed to focus on areas where complicit behaviour was more likely, giving us the 
chance to distinguish the specific role of social media. Contrary to our own assump-
tions before the study, this appeared to be considerable. 
 
The project’s aim was to demonstrate, through research, that social media and online 
sites increased the scale and impact of counterfeiting and piracy. The resulting data 
indicated how much easier it was to consume and supply fake goods through web-
based marketplaces and social media, which is hardly surprising given the impact of 
social media and the internet on modern life. The counterfeit trade may well be little 
different from any other activity, but the change this data points to is one of scale. 
The key results from our consumer survey are:  
 
• 17.5% of transactions online were found to be of copied products: 
o Of this, 15.4% of online transactions were conducted by a ‘complicit’ seg-
ment of consumers who willingly participated. 
o Only 2.1% of online transactions were accidental purchases by individuals 
who were ‘deceived’ and only found this out on receipt of the goods. 
 
• Social media was the most distinctive medium for communication on copied 
goods: 
o 46.1% of ‘complicit’ purchases involved social media. 
o In contrast, only 4.1% of ‘unexposed’ purchases involved social media. 
 
• Social grades AB were significantly involved in ‘complicit’ behaviour: 
o 24.5% of social grades AB acknowledged ‘complicit’ behaviour. 
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o In contrast, only 12.7% of social grade C2 acknowledged ‘complicit’ be-
haviour. 
 
• Online communication of suspect products was highly concentrated within a very 
small proportion of participants, currently particularly located within Facebook: 
o 72.5% of the suspect communications within open groups were generated 
by 0.78% of promoters. 
o 83.4% of suspect communications within closed groups were generated 
by 6.2% of promoters. 
 
• Facebook groups represented the most exposed location for suspect communica-
tions, with suspect activity being much more prevalent in closed groups: 
o 8.3% of communications within open Facebook groups were found to be 
suspect. 
o 40.8% (five times more) of communications within closed Facebook 
groups were found to be suspect. 
 
Overall, these figures made an impact and there are clear implications to be drawn 
from this data. The 17.5% of transactions online found to be copied products, is al-
most double the highest modelled estimates from EUIPO on levels of counterfeited 
products within the clothing (the most pirated) sector. The estimates also support the 
general thread of the major brands’ arguments that the web has accelerated levels of 
and opportunities for counterfeiting, but until now there has been no way of calculat-
ing this. Given the paucity of offline data from government in relation to social me-
dia and the attendant reliance on anecdotal or ‘rule of thumb’ evidence, this data 
marks the first time we have become aware of the estimated levels of counterfeiting 
and piracy activity, not through forecast models but through tracked behaviour and 
surveyed attitudes. 
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6.0 Phase 3 Assessing the harm of purchasing counterfeit products 
using social media 
 
6.1 Assessing harm and impact 
This section relates to the impact of IPR infringement, as well as the characteristics 
of infringement, notably the consumer behaviour involved. There were a number of 
different methods considered to assess the impact of counterfeiting and the harm 
stemming from it, including the OECD’s primary-versus-secondary market segmenta-
tion, which was adopted by BASCAP to describe non-obvious-versus-obvious cop-
ies, Hopkins et al.’s ‘harm matrix’ and various studies from GAO and, more recently, 
OHIM (now EUIPO)92. These were all helpful in identifying the different effects, in-
cluding damage and harm (direct and indirect) to different stakeholders. 
 
Stakeholders 
When addressing the issue of the economic impact of counterfeiting activity, there 
were four basic parties to be considered: 
 
a) Industry/manufacturers. These are the different sectors involved, including luxury 
brands, fashion goods, and alcohol and tobacco (both of which are impacted by 
high UK duties). 
b) Consumers. These are our complicit, compliant, deceived and unexposed con-
sumers of the products. 
c) The social media sector. These are all those firms involved in the online world. 
This sector mainly covers Facebook and Twitter, but also includes online market-
places like eBay/Amazon and search engines like Google and Bing. 
d) Government. This is affected in terms of both its tax revenues and consumer in-
terests. 
 
Harm 
Through the examination of the literature the following key elements should be used 
to assess the harm from counterfeiting: 
 
a) Brand reputation. This is the extent to which, where the degree of deception is 
high, counterfeiting can cause harm to the manufacturer of the authentic product. 
According to our interviews with industry, this was a key concern, particularly as 
deception online was much easier to achieve than deception offline. It also fea-
tured as a concern in the private enforcement agencies’ reports. 
b) Primary versus secondary/non-obvious versus obvious. This illustrates the differ-
ent impacts on consumers and is crucial to distinguishing the different types of 
consumer behaviour involved. Here, the damage or harm relates directly to the 
consumer. According to the consumer tracker and survey, the number of con-
sumers who were deceived was far lower than the number of consumers who 
were complicit, but MarkMonitor and others have suggested that the proportion of 
those who were deceived in online purchases is growing. 
                                            
92 Other sources are identified in the literature reviews summarised in the various stages of Phase 1 of the research 
outcomes. Appendix 5 also provides an assessment of behavioural economic approaches and two mathematical 
models, one on the economic impact on industry and the other on the drivers of complicit behaviour.  
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c) The harm matrix. Hopkins et al.’s typology of harm expands on the above pri-
mary-versus-secondary market distinction and categorises ranges of harm as fol-
lows: high quality/high deception, high quality/low deception, low quality/high de-
ception and, finally, low quality/low deception. 
For our purposes, we must assume that the greatest harm and damage to both 
consumers and brands is concentrated in low-quality/high-deception goods, with 
the consumer left feeling cheated and the brand, according to industry sources, 
being blamed. There is also the potential harm to the consumer with goods such 
as fake hairdryers, where there are clear health and safety issues. This typically 
occurs when the goods are sold in near-perfect packaging while the goods them-
selves are inferior and unsatisfactory, thus representing the greatest level of de-
ception. 
We believe that high-quality/high-deception goods would have the greatest finan-
cial impact on brands, as these would most likely represent lost sales to the 
brand. High quality/low deception may be of most benefit to consumers and is 
most likely to appeal to complicit consumers; these are arguably (at least accord-
ing to some) not lost sales for the brands, as these consumers would not have 
purchased the authentic goods at the authentic price in the first place. 
What is clear is that high levels of deception, rather than high levels of quality, 
are the cause of the greatest harm, with high-quality deceptive purchases being 
harmful to industry, and low-quality deceptive purchases being harmful to both in-
dustry and the consumer. 
d) Price. Morales93 notes the impact of price, as well as quality differences when 
purchasing counterfeits, with consumers more likely to buy counterfeit products 
when the price of the original is significantly higher than that of the counterfeit 
and when the quality of the counterfeit is sufficient. He also suggests that the 
consumer’s feelings about the company making the original product are im-
portant. 
This means that, as the difference in price between the original and the counter-
feit product increases, this will increase consumers’ readiness to buy the counter-
feit. By contrast, as the difference in quality between the original and the counter-
feit product decreases, this will also increase the likelihood of consumers buying 
the counterfeit. Morales also claims that the difference in quality moderates the 
effect of the difference in price on the consumer’s purchase intentions. In our 
view, the price consideration may apply mainly to complicit consumers, but in e-
commerce, where consumers are looking for if not expecting an online discount, 
there is clearly scope for them to be deceived by clever pricing. 
 
In terms of relating this to social media, it could be argued that low-quality/high-de-
ception goods are the ones industry and enforcement agencies have claimed are 
likely to be sold on platforms with near-identical, if not cloned, images from authentic 
goods websites; these are used to deceive the consumer into purchasing them. 
These may just as easily be offered in open groups, which could add to the sense of 
authenticity. This may also be true of high-quality/high-deception goods, where the 
pricing may be closer to the authentic price to attract a purchaser looking for an 
                                            
93 Morales, A.C. (2005). ‘Giving firms an “E” for effort: consumer responses to high-effort firms’. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 2005, 31, pages 806–12. 
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online discount. This is typical of certain products where the reproduction of the 
goods is near perfect, such as DVD box sets. Equally, the kinds of goods often being 
disseminated across closed groups seem to be high-quality/low-price products, 
where damage may be limited. The direct and indirect impact on the main three 
stakeholders – industry, government and consumers – from social media can be as-
sessed as follows: 
 
• Direct impact. Industry has been seeing a loss of revenue because of the po-
tential substitutional impact of counterfeits on authentic goods, particularly 
where there is a high degree of deception, although this is lower if the goods 
are non-deceptive. This represented the most likely impact of social media 
where the platforms enable the dissemination of deceptive counterfeit goods. 
• Indirect impact. For industry, this is the result of reputational harm from the 
low-quality/high-price goods that are common on social media (according to 
industry and enforcement agencies). 
• Indirect impact. This is the impact on government due to the loss of employee 
and corporate taxes and the impact on employment. There is a widespread 
belief that much of the activity emanates from and profits are made by coun-
terfeiters in China and other Southeast Asian markets. There is also the cost 
to government of having to enforce IP infringements, such as the activities of 
Trading Standards. 
Indirect impact. For consumers, there may well be a welfare benefit (recognised by 
GAO) for certain types of products (high quality/low price), but for almost all other 
types of products however the impact is direct. 
 
6.2 Overview 
According to our tracker and survey data, social media affected the sales volume of 
counterfeit goods, and there could be little doubt that social media was having a sub-
stantial social impact and changing the way consumers interacted with suppliers. 
That there is evidence that social media increases the likelihood of the acquisition of 
counterfeit goods should not be surprising. 
 
Restricting the supply of ‘grey goods’, combined with ensuring that consumers can 
make an informed choice, are two key steps towards limiting the negative impacts of 
counterfeit goods. This should form part of any education and awareness campaign 
and illustrates the need to inform consumers more effectively. It also supports our 
conclusion that more resources are needed on the demand side of this issue to un-
derstand consumers’ motives and attitudes more easily.  
 
We also aimed to provide insight on other research objectives, including the impact 
of social media on producers’ reputations (see Appendix 5). However, this was not 
clearly demonstrable from the research despite claims made by industry (notably pri-
vate enforcement agencies) about the damage caused by fake websites, including 
social media pages, on brands’ reputations. In relation to opportunities for countering 
infringement, we felt that this requires a great deal more work, not least in improving 
education and awareness, as well as in terms of social media platforms investing in 
efforts to actively counter IP infringement. The avowed zero-tolerance attitude of 
Google to trademark infringement and the anti-fake drugs campaign by Microsoft’s 
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Bing platform have shown what can be done to help industry and government coun-
ter infringement. Trading Standards provided a unique perspective on why particular 
social media channels are used over others (essentially, it was a matter of cost), and 
the consumer survey data highlighted how and why particular sectors of goods were 
targeted. 
 
7.0 Summary, Recommendations and Conclusions 
 
7.1 Research outcomes summary 
 
Scale of infringement 
Even though search engine Bing showed that there is a role for educating consumers 
about the dangers of counterfeit goods, there was little evidence that social media 
has been used to promote IPR. By contrast, there were many claims, from both in-
dustry and government agencies, about its role in facilitating IPR infringement, some-
times flagrantly. How infringement was distributed between the different sectors, 
products and types of IP was not always clear, but the survey and tracker indicated 
that certain goods (like tobacco and alcohol) were less likely to be promoted on so-
cial media. However, views expressed in the industry survey and road shows indi-
cated that almost every ACG sector was impacted, just to varying degrees. The pau-
city of current scaleable official data, combined with the lack of current industry data 
and unverifiable industry claims, made it difficult to reliably assess the scale of in-
fringement. This means we had to rely on data from the consumer survey and tracker 
to reveal how social media can contribute to facilitating infringement. We note the 
high levels of suspect transactions revealed by the tracker, but this data needs to be 
supported by further regular frequent tracking of online consumer behaviour. None-
theless, the scale of infringing activity indicated by the consumer data bears out 
many industry claims. 
 
Impact of infringement 
We explicitly included this issue within our questionnaire and the responses indicated 
that the impact varied across the different sectors, with some firms blaming the rise 
of social media for an increase in levels of counterfeiting and thus damage to their 
business. None of the firms surveyed were able to specify the actual costs to their 
business, and we attributed this to industry’s historical reluctance to share confiden-
tial financial information and a recognition that major brands readily engage with so-
cial media for sound commercial reasons, albeit sometimes as a defensive measure. 
It was clear that the social media platforms use similar ‘safe harbour’ defences to re-
sist attempts by industry to get them to adopt more proactive policies for combating 
infringement. This reactive attitude has created a climate of distrust and suspicion 
between these platforms and rights holders, which is made worse by what are seen 
as cumbersome takedown policies. The social media platforms argued that the IPR 
system within the UK is very fragmented and is part of an even more complex sys-
tem across 150 other countries. While consumers who use social media are able to 
enjoy many positives, the dark side of internet-based commerce is shown by the 
ease with which both websites and social media pages can be manipulated to de-
ceive consumers (although, from our findings, we still regard such deceived consum-
ers as a small minority of those who use the platforms). The main focus for blatant 
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infringement, according to industry and government agencies, is the proliferation of 
closed groups (i.e. invite-only groups, created on social media platforms). These 
groups clearly have a strong influence on infringement and this belief is borne out by 
our consumer research data, which indicates that IPR infringement is five times more 
likely in closed groups than in open groups. We consider this the most important find-
ing of the project. 
 
Characteristics of infringement 
There were claims from industry and government agencies about the flagrancy with 
which IP-infringing content is placed on social media, although only FACT provided 
us with meaningful examples. We relied on explanations from the private enforce-
ment agencies as to how counterfeiters were able to copy near-identical images from 
legitimate sites to deceive consumers. In certain cases, this involved near-perfect 
copies of certain products being priced close to the authentic article, completely by-
passing the legitimate brand owners’ distribution and retail system. This infringing ac-
tivity took place across myriad online platforms, not just on social media. The con-
sumer data provided by us pointed to these deceptive copies as a growing threat, al-
beit one that still represented a small part of total infringing behaviour on social me-
dia. Deceptive purchases were more likely to occur with products like clothing, but 
were not characteristic of every impacted sector and product, least of all alcohol and 
tobacco. The bulk of infringing activity tracked in this study involved complicit con-
sumers. However, we are aware that the use of VPN and the dark net94 means that 
much of the current online illicit activity is beyond oversight and reach. On social me-
dia platforms, the increased use of spambots and links to various payment sources 
off-site makes it harder than ever to control the full scope of illicit activity. 
 
Opportunities for IP 
Microsoft’s Bing search engine has shown that online technology platforms can take 
an active role in combating IP infringement; in their case, this related to the offering 
of counterfeited drugs online. Google’s statement in relation to trademark infringe-
ment was compelling given its avowed zero tolerance for counterfeits, and we note 
the improved cooperation between eBay and rights holders. Recent changes to Fa-
cebook’s business model suggest that there may yet be opportunities to improve IP 
awareness, especially as they become more reliant on advertising from the brands 
whose goods are infringed within their platforms. It was evident that the online plat-
forms are most likely to act against illicit activity on their sites if their own business in-
terests are under threat. Education and awareness campaigns to date have illus-
trated the need to better inform consumers, but in relation to opportunities for coun-
tering infringement this area still required much more work and greater investment by 
the social media platforms in efforts to actively counter IP infringement. In the ab-
sence of greater cooperation from industry in supplying data, the focus of future re-
search should be placed on disrupting the current levels of consumer complicity and 
this is one area where the social media platforms could have a role to play. 
 
7.2. Conclusion and recommendations 
                                            
94 VPN is a virtual private network which uses a public network such as the internet to connect to a private network 
such as a company’s intranet. The dark net is an overlay network that can only be accessed with specific software, 
configurations, or authorization, often using non-standard communications protocols and ports - Wikepedia. 
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Efforts to benchmark and compare data from the three key sources (government, in-
dustry and consumer) have only been partially successful. The methodological prob-
lems that beset most official data and estimates, as well as industry’s reluctance to 
share confidential and often real-time information, render these first two data sources 
as inadequate measures of illicit activity in this market. None of the three main pri-
vate enforcement agencies contacted were willing to supply us with more than head-
line data, even in anonymised form, that would have provided current insights on the 
scale of illicit activity on social media and other web platforms. This meant we had to 
rely on unverifiable assertions and claims made by these firms at conferences and 
within their published reports. That said, these ‘private’ enforcement agencies were 
better informed about current online (including social media) infringements of IPR 
and seemed best placed to provide current updates on their work. We recommend 
increased industry cooperation in supplying essential headline data for government 
and policy makers to understand more easily the trend in the market. This privileged 
and confidential information is always a more current and accurate reflection of the 
market than the data available from government and official sources, which are either 
out of date or methodologically unsound. Nonetheless, our tracker and consumer 
survey data provide meaningful, current (albeit snapshot) data, notably on segments 
such as levels of deception in online purchases and the ‘generation’ gap in online 
consumer attitudes and behaviours. There is also a strong argument for making 
more out of existing as well as new data sources and the technologies for capturing 
digital activities. This is a point made by Coyle 95 in citing a key finding of the interim 
report of Sir Charles Bean’s Review of Economic Statistics.96, 97 
 
Conclusive findings from our consumer data are somewhat restricted as the online 
tracker only captures complicit behaviour. Capturing deceived behaviour would re-
quire an augmented approach, starting with mystery shopping, to identify the relevant 
links and then track them. However the data shows that; 
 
a. Online groups are self-organising, involving herding. This is comparable, 
from an enforcement viewpoint, to activities within terrorist cells. 
b. Despite the emphasis placed on the threats posed by closed groups, op-
portunities exist in open groups to secure new users and these represent 
the greatest threat from social media in amplifying the counterfeiters’ mes-
sages. Even if the open groups are shut down, they can easily be set up 
again. 
c. Social media amplifies the counterfeiters’ messages by increasing the 
connectivity of potential complicit consumers. Crucially, these connections 
do not have to be strong; as can be seen from network effect sources, the 
threshold for connection on social media is low. 
 
                                            
95 Coyle, D. (2016) ‘The Sharing Economy in the UK’ [Online]: http://www.sharingeconomyuk.com/perch/re-
sources/210116thesharingeconomyintheuktpdc.docx1111.docx-2.pdf 
96 UK Government (2016) ‘Press notice: “Take economic statistics back to the future,” says Charlie Bean’ [Online]: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/independent-review-of-uk-economic-statistics-final-report/press-notice-
take-economic-statistics-back-to-the-future-says-charlie-bean 
97 Bean, C. (2016) Independent Review of UK Economic Statistics [Online]https://www.gov.uk/government/publica-
tions/independent-review-of-uk-economic-statistics-final-report 
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More reliable and meaningful insights can be gained from consumer data such as 
ours and there should, in the future, be a much greater focus on researching the de-
mand rather than the supply side of counterfeiting. The consumer data presented in 
this study have shown how social media plays a role in facilitating IPR infringement, 
particularly in closed groups, but the data presented represent a mere snapshot from 
the middle of 2015. The lack of any other comparable data means these cannot be 
used to provide a definitive indication of the development of this phenomenon over 
time. A methodology that allows an assessment of both stated and revealed prefer-
ences, such as the one we have employed within this study, is, we believe, desirable 
as a more effective and reliable measure of illicit activity. 
 
We also believe that there is a need for a single methodology for more frequent, 
longer-term research (comparable with the Ofcom/Kantar survey for online copyright 
infringement) to provide a unique data set as the basis of an official national meas-
urement. We would argue that developing a greater understanding of consumer moti-
vation for purchasing counterfeit goods is pivotal at this time. 
 
Our findings suggest that consumer behaviour is nuanced and encompasses com-
plicit behaviour (favouring non-obvious copied goods), which has a lower economic 
impact, and deceived behaviour. It tends to involve high-quality/high-priced goods 
and represents a greater potential threat to brands in the future (even though, at pre-
sent, these deceived consumers make up a small proportion of the total consumers 
impacted by counterfeit goods, online and through social media). 
 
The full extent of the challenge from social media may not be entirely clear from this 
study, but from industry sources we believe that it is growing and will include more 
deceived consumers as the sophisticated tactics from the counterfeiters become 
ever more elaborate. We considered other challenges that may yet exceed those 
posed by social media, and these include: the arrival of messaging platforms suitable 
for mobile use, where it is harder to track illicit behaviour, given their embedded en-
cryption technology; blockchain technology, which may enable counterfeiters to fur-
ther hide the financial benefits of their activities; and 3D printing, where the potential 
exists to considerably increase infringement across all the main IPR. Most of this ac-
tivity could occur outside any kind of scrutiny. 
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8.0 Appendices 
Contents 
Appendix 1: Industry Survey Responses 
This contains the verbatim responses from FACT and various ACG members (in 
anonymised form) to our questionnaire. 
 
Appendix 2: Enforcement Agency Survey Responses 
This represents the verbatim responses from the IPO Intelligence Hub and Trading 
Standards’ eCrime unit to our questionnaire. The Trading Standards response is 
prefaced by a summary of a telephone interview. 
 
Appendix 3: Technology Firms’ Survey Responses 
This includes a summary of our interactions along with the verbatim responses from 
the three technology firms we approached. Rather than respond to our questionnaire, 
each firm supplied its own set of terms and policies used in relation to trademark and 
(in the case of Twitter) copyright infringements. 
 
Appendix 4: Consumer Tracker and Consumer Survey Results and Analysis 
This includes:  
 Appendix 4.1: Key definitions used 
 Appendix 4.2: Gini curves of the distribution of exposure for the different  
 search engines 
 Appendix 4.3: Consumer survey methodology 
 Appendix 4.4: Behavioural analysis from social media 
 
Appendix 5: Economic Models and Approaches 
This includes an assessment of behavioural economic approaches and two mathe-
matical models, one on the economic impact on industry and the other on the drivers 
of complicit behaviour. 
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8.1 Appendix 1: Industry Survey Responses 
 
8.1.1 FACT survey response 
Q1. How do you enforce your intellectual property rights (IPR) online and of-
fline? 
Online 
FACT uses a wide variety of methods to deal with copyright-infringing websites. 
Some of these methods are: 
I. Closing the website via: 
a. Domain sign overs 
b. Liaison with hosting providers 
c. Liaison with domain name registries 
II. Detection: 
a. Scanning systems to detect member content online 
III. Removing infringing content: 
a. Takedown notices (DMCA notices) 
b. Auction website removal tools (e.g. eBay’s VeRO program) 
IV. Reducing website popularity: 
a. Website blockings 
b. Search engine delisting 
c. Social media page removals (Facebook and Twitter) 
V. Restrict website revenue: 
a. Remove payment providers (e.g. Visa, PayPal, etc.) 
b. Remove advertising (via liaison with brands/ad networks) 
Offline 
FACT targets those who seek to acquire content at UK cinemas by recording films. 
The increasing use of the Intelligence Unit and Internet Investigation Team, along-
side the Theatrical Investigator, has led to a multifaceted approach to tackle this. 
FACT now identifies and develops intelligence in-house, which culminates in opera-
tions to successfully arrest or deter web-cammers. The Theatrical Investigator has a 
preventative mandate, educating cinema employees through training programmes 
and rewarding them via incentives. This work is funded by the Film Distributors’ As-
sociation (FDA), which is the trade body for theatrical film distributors in the UK. 
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FACT assists the UK Border Agency with a variety of customs seizures. Large sei-
zures of High Quality Pressed Discs (HQPDs) of all the latest television and film box-
sets are frequently intercepted on their way into the UK. Invariably, these shipments 
have originated from China or Hong Kong. FACT frequently examines a small sam-
ple of each seizure to confirm that the product is counterfeit. 
 
Large-scale shipments of Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) boxes are also fre-
quently intercepted. These devices are usually illegally preconfigured with software 
that enables them to unlawfully access television, film and live sports content via the 
internet, free of charge. 
 
Customs intelligence is collated by FACT to identify the large-scale suppliers in the 
UK and the common overseas sources of the counterfeit product. Often, links be-
tween large shipments and online suppliers can be found, which assist with the pro-
gression of FACT’s cases. 
Q2. Are your strategies for online and offline commerce interlinked, e.g. do you 
treat the internet as a shop window for physical goods? 
Yes. FACT’s role in successfully detecting and targeting those involved in such 
crimes requires the ability to foresee and react to developments in technology. Crimi-
nals are often the pioneers of these developments and are quick to take advantage 
of the ever-changing landscape to create methods to profit from delivering stolen 
content to a wider global audience. 
 
FACT’s work in protecting its members’ intellectual property now focuses predomi-
nantly on illegally acquired content, accessed via websites that offer direct down-
loads, file sharing or streaming. 
 
Even the dwindling hard goods market has been altered by technological advance-
ments. Social networking websites are now an integral part of modern life. Currently, 
there are over 1.49 billion active users on Facebook and it is increasingly being used 
as an online platform for DVD sales. This is in addition to direct sale websites, online 
marketplaces and auction websites like eBay. These methods are replacing the ‘tra-
ditional’ hard goods sales methods (i.e. street sellers, markets and car boot sales). 
 
Q3. How do you collect data on infringement of your IPR for your internal pur-
poses and, where appropriate, for presentation to policy makers (if there is a 
difference)? 
a. Public complaint reporting system (via online form and phone calls) 
b. Partnership with Crimestoppers 
c. Information-sharing agreements with LEAs in the UK and overseas 
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d. FACT is a member of the National Anti-Fraud Network (NAFN) 
e. FACT works with the Intellectual Property Office 
f. FACT members 
g. Industry contacts 
h. Scanning systems to detect member content online 
Q4. As regards the seasonality in the levels of IPR infringement, if there is any, 
what are your observations? 
There are only three main periods in the year when FACT witnesses any seasonality 
in IPR infringement: 
 
i.August/September – High levels of intelligence at the start of the football season 
every year as new illegal live-streaming websites emerge online. In addition to 
this, FACT witnesses an increase in complaints, at this time of the year, regard-
ing public houses that are showing live sports to their customers via an illegiti-
mate means (domestic subscription, foreign satellite service, IPTV device or con-
trol word-sharing network). 
 
ii.December – High level of complaints regarding the sale of counterfeit DVDs online 
leading up to Christmas. 
 
iii.December/January –There is high release group activity leading up to the movie 
awards season (the Oscars and BAFTAs are both held in February). The film in-
dustry sends out advance copies of recent movies to critics and awards voters. 
Often in DVD format (but now also in Blu-ray), these high-quality releases are 
much sought after online and as a result are subjected to intense security by the 
studios sending them out. Despite all the precautions, leaks can happen. Every 
year copies of DVD screeners (identified by the term DVDSCR) turn up on torrent 
sites and are downloaded in huge numbers. 
 
Q5. Please describe the scale and impact of infringement of your IPR on your 
established goods, your newly launched goods and your brand in general. 
IPR infringement has a huge impact on all FACT members’ content. Television and 
film content will only be produced if studios can make a return on their investment. 
The average Hollywood movie costs $60–100 million to produce. The revenue gener-
ated back from movie sales will not only cover the cost of making the film but also the 
cost of investing in future projects. Studios look to gain a return on their investment 
via the box office, the subsequent DVD, Blu-ray and download sales and the distribu-
tion of the broadcast rights to television and online streaming services (e.g. Sky Mov-
ies and Netflix). All these areas are threatened by IPR infringement. 
Sports broadcasters are affected in a similar fashion. Earlier this year, Sky and BT 
Sport (FACT members) agreed to pay a record £5.14 billion for the live Premier 
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League TV rights over three seasons from 2016–17. This represents a 70% increase 
on Sky and BT’s current £3 billion deal. This is just one of several leagues/sports that 
these members have invested in for the viewing pleasure of their customers. This is 
only financially viable if they make a return via their domestic and commercial sub-
scriptions. Therefore, individuals who offer these broadcasts illegitimately for their 
own financial gain threaten this investment. 
Q6. What procedure do you apply towards IPR infringement on the platforms of 
online services, e.g. do you contact them directly and if so, how? Is there a 
specific procedure in place for social media platforms? 
 
FACT has procedures in place to deal with copyright infringement on the following 
websites: 
i. eBay – FACT is part of eBay’s VeRO Programme to remove any infringing auction 
listings via an online form. 
ii. Twitter – FACT frequently uses Twitter’s online copyright infringement reporting 
tool to remove tweets and Twitter accounts. 
iii. Facebook – Facebook provides an online reporting facility (shown below) for 
rights holders and members of the public to report violations that include copy-
right and trademark issues. In December 2012, FACT incorporated this proce-
dure into its ‘alternative to prosecution’ strategy. FACT has had some success 
in using this reporting tool. Often, Facebook will remove specific posts rather 
than the whole profile or community page. On occasion they will remove entire 
groups if repeat infringement is shown. 
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Reporting tool case study – On 17 September 2013, FACT reported a page called 
Fast Filmsfast (www.facebook.com/knockoff.nigel.790) via the Facebook reporting 
tool.The page was illegitimately selling the latest DVDs for sale (see below). 
 
 
 
 
On the same day, Facebook disabled the account and the following notification was 
displayed: 
 
 
 
 
Since 2013, FACT has used the Facebook reporting facility to remove 177 Facebook 
pages on the grounds of copyright infringement (see bar chart below). 
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The figure for 2015 may seem relatively low, but it was expected to rise significantly 
by the end of the year, as the months leading up to Christmas usually involve high 
levels of intelligence regarding infringing activity on Facebook. In addition to this, 
FACT was due to participate in a multi-agency initiative over a two-week period in 
November 2015, which aimed to address IP crime on Facebook. 
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Q7. In your experience, how significant are social media platforms in facilitat-
ing online infringement of your IPR? 
Social media has an influence on almost every type of copyright infringement that 
FACT investigates: 
i. Source piracy (film/TV) – Release group, Facebook profiles/fan pages and 
Twitter accounts 
ii. Copyright-infringing websites (film/TV/live sports) – Facebook profiles/fan 
pages and Twitter accounts with the latest available torrents, streams, down-
loads and website news 
iii. Copyright-infringing apps (film/TV/live sports) 
iv. Hard goods DVD sales (film/TV) – Facebook profiles advertising all the latest 
film and television content for sale on DVD 
v. Premium TV broadcast interception (live sports/TV) – Facebook profiles ad-
vertising card-sharing services and IPTV boxes for sale 
Source piracy 
 
Release groups are organised groups of individuals 
dedicated to providing pirated versions of the latest 
content, such as films or television episodes. Re-
lease groups will frequently have an associated Fa-
cebook account where multiple hyperlinks advertise 
the online locations of their latest copyright-infring-
ing content. An example of this is shown below in a 
screenshot, which displays a Facebook page for 
Heaven Killers Release Group. The screenshot 
shows that this page has accumulated 18,150 likes. 
On the right is a post from the group advertising 
seven websites where their illegal release of the 
Paramount Pictures film title Noah was available. 
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Copyright-infringing websites 
 
Social networking sites are used in a variety of ways by copyright-infringing websites, 
their owners, admins and users alike. 
 
A large number of ‘pirate’ websites will have an associated Facebook or Twitter ac-
count, with Google Plus and YouTube accounts also seen on a regular basis. These 
are very often open groups, as they want to attract as many online users as possible. 
 
Social networking accounts are often used to promote and advertise these websites 
and are usually linked to the website itself. 
 
They are often used to promote new content that has been added to a website, and 
they regularly link directly to downloadable files, torrent files or pages on their web-
site where content can be viewed. 
 
From experience, if a link on Facebook/Twitter takes users directly to copyright-in-
fringing content, the social networks will, upon receiving a DMCA notification, remove 
the specific posts. On occasion they will remove entire groups if repeat infringement 
is shown. 
 
For example, the screenshot below shows a Facebook page for YIFY Torrents. The 
website yify-torrents.com is a popular torrent site which provides access to TV and 
film content via torrent files. This Facebook page has accrued 198,134 ‘likes’ from 
users and it can be seen that it displays the URL for the torrent website as well as 
regular links to newly available content. The Sony Pictures film title Paul Blart: Mall 
Cop 2 is shown in the second screenshot below (this movie was still airing in cine-
mas at the time and hadn’t yet been released on DVD or Blu-ray). 
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In light of the UK website blocking orders in re-
cent years, it has also been observed that users 
of ‘pirate’ websites are making use of the Face-
book platform to discuss ways around the block, 
making suggestions for circumvention. 
 
For example, the popular illegal website Project-
free.tv was blocked by ISPs in the UK in Novem-
ber 2013. The top right image shows users of 
the Project Free TV Facebook page openly dis-
cussing the blocking of the site by BT. Another user, in response, provides a link to a 
proxy for the website that allows UK users to freely access the site. 
 
Four days later, users then started to discuss 
that Sky had also now blocked access to Pro-
jectfree.tv and a user is requesting ways to cir-
cumvent the block. “Any suggestions to get 
around the block?” (Right). 
 
As shown, another user soon after makes a sug-
gestion for a free proxy and a VPN service, both 
of which would allow the UK users to access the 
blocked site and view copyright-infringing con-
tent. 
 
Twitter is also used in a similar manner, as users tweet and share links to content 
that is newly available on copyright-infringing websites. For example, a popular copy-
right-infringing website, Flixanity.com, was brought to FACT’s attention in 2014. The 
site had an associated Facebook page and a Twitter account, which were used to 
provide followers with direct links to movie and TV content as it became available on 
the website, in just a single click. The Twitter page is displayed below: 
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Copyright-infringing apps 
 
Using Facebook to distribute copyright-infringing apps is also now a popular use of 
the social network. For example, the app ShowBox is not available on any of the le-
gitimate app stores like Google Play or Apple but the APK file (Android application 
package) can be downloaded directly from the link published on its associated Face-
book group page. This app will run on any Android device. 
 
The screenshot below shows a link that has been posted on the Facebook page for 
the APK file to be downloaded directly. 
 
 
 
Social networking sites are also used to advertise sports streaming websites and 
regularly provide a way to share direct live streams that can be accessed by users in 
a variety of ways. The first example below advertises a private sports streaming web-
site, offsidestreams.com, which requires a paid subscription in order to view the con-
tent. As shown in the displayed post, the group is directing potential new customers 
to a secondary domain to gain new registrations and ultimately additional revenue for 
paid subscriptions. 
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The second example, below, shows a Facebook group that posts links to watch the 
Sky Sports 1 and Sky Sports 2 channels online without a legitimate subscription to 
Sky services. 
 
 
 
 
Hard goods DVD sales 
 
In recent years, we have observed a decline in counterfeit DVDs being sold in person 
(by street sellers or at markets and car boot sales). Conversely, during this time we 
have seen a surge in the number of Facebook pages dedicated to selling the latest 
films and television series on DVD. Facebook provides a certain amount of anonymity 
for these individuals, which makes any kind of law-enforcement activity particularly 
difficult to address. The screenshot below shows a Facebook page for Mike’s Movies 
(www.facebook.com/mikesmovies4u), a profile set up solely for the purpose of adver-
tising and selling counterfeit DVDs at £2 each or six for £10. Although Facebook does 
not process payments, clearly this page has been set up as a store. Orders and pay-
ments are usually dealt with via private message. A clear benefit to the operator of this 
page is the visible endorsements from its customers (pictured below) regarding the 
quality of the counterfeit products on offer. 
 
 
 
Premium TV broadcast interception 
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The illegal broadcast of premium television content, including live sports events such 
as Premier League football games, predominantly occurs via three different methods: 
1. streaming and indexing websites (discussed earlier) 
2. TV control word-sharing (CWS) networks – also known as card-sharing net-
works 
3. illegally preconfigured IPTV boxes. 
 
Facebook is frequently used to advertise the sale of infringing broadcast access 
through illicit set-top boxes (STBs) and IPTV devices. The STBs that are set up on a 
CWS network are usually offered on a subscription service, whereas the preconfig-
ured IPTV boxes can be sold for a one-off payment. These services are sold to both 
domestic and commercial customers. 
 
An example of the use of Facebook is 
shown in the screenshots (right), whereby 
the user Mark Xbmc Kodi Schofield was 
identified as selling IPTV boxes for £80, 
providing users with illegitimate access to 
Sky television services. 
 
The sale of these so-called ‘free’ Sky ser-
vices can be extremely lucrative. As 
shown in the supplier’s Facebook mes-
sage, he received 446 messages in three 
hours relating to the illicit service he was 
advertising. 
 
The user for this service provides cus-
tomer service via Facebook, interacting 
with his customer base to resolve issues, as well as organising times to visit his cli-
ents directly (below). Facebook has been found to be both a promotional tool as well 
as providing on-going customer support. Users of the systems will frequently com-
ment on the systems and provide reviews of the services. 
 
 
A second example can be seen below whereby the Facebook profile Skyman Sky-
man is advertising illegal satellite access to BT Sport packages for £7 per week, with 
an installation fee of £60. 
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Q8. What, in your experience, are the scale and the characteristics of infringe-
ment of your IPR on social media? 
Social media plays a crucial role in assisting intellectual property infringement in the 
vast majority of FACT’s investigations. The use of social media by individuals and 
groups infringing FACT members’ content is continually rising. Social media is usu-
ally adopted to enhance existing illegal services (hosted on third-party infringing web-
sites) by keeping users updated with new content and news. However, in some in-
stances, as with DVD sales, social media can provide the platform for the entire ille-
gal operation. 
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Over the past five years, we have observed a significant increase in FACT intelli-
gence reports on copyright infringement that also mention specific social media pro-
files (see graph below). 
 
 
 
Q9. Have you seen a rise in the infringement of your IPR over the past five 
years and to what do you attribute this, e.g. improved delivery mechanisms or 
new ‘platforms’? 
It is incredibly hard to quantify the level of infringement at any given time, so unfortu-
nately we cannot accurately comment on any potential fluctuations. 
 
Q10. In your experience, are social media platforms used to offer physical 
goods infringing your IPR? If so, please list them. 
 
Please see answer to question 8. 
 
Q11. What, if any, economic impact do you consider social media to have on 
your IPR, both in terms of infringement and enforcement of your IPR? 
 
IPR infringement negatively impacts the creative industries, which currently employ 
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1.8 million people across the UK.98 The value of the services exported by the creative 
industries in 2013 was £17.9 billion. In total, exports of services from the creative in-
dustries accounted for 8.7% of total exports of services for the UK in 2013.99 
Social networking websites are now an integral part of modern life. Globally, there 
are currently over 1.49 billion active users on Facebook and 316 million active Twitter 
accounts. This provides the perfect opportunity for criminals to: 
• direct the public to infringing content hosted on other websites 
• advertise and sell infringing products 
• provide on-going customer support for their illegitimate services 
 
Conversely, social media websites such as Facebook and Twitter are rich in open-
source data, which FACT has repeatedly found to be invaluable intelligence sources 
during online investigations. 
Q12. What problems do you encounter in practice when trying to enforce your 
IP rights? 
 
Fake/hidden website registration details – Website registration details are often 
fake or hidden, which provides no further links to the person controlling the domain 
and its illegal activities. 
 
Overseas servers – Investigating servers located offshore cause some specific 
problems for FACT’s law-enforcement partners. In order to complete a full investiga-
tion into an offshore server, a law-enforcement agency must liaise with its counter-
part in the country where the server is located. The difficulties of obtaining evidence 
from other countries are well known. 
 
Torrent websites and DMCA compliance – Some torrent website operators who 
maintain a high DMCA compliance rate will often use this to try to appease the law, 
while continuing to provide infringing links. 
 
                                            
98 ‘Creative Industries: Focus on Employment (2015) by the Department for Culture Media & Sport’. 
99 ‘Creative Industries: Focus on Exports (2015) by the Department for Culture Media & Sport’. 
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Current legislation too vague to remove infringing live sports streams – Current 
legislation is insufficient to effectively tackle the issue of websites illegally offering 
coverage of live sports events. Section 512 (c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) states that: upon notification of claimed infringement, the service provider 
should “respond expeditiously” to remove or disable access to the copyright-infring-
ing material. Most live sports events are under two hours long, so such non-specific 
timeframes for required action are inadequate. The law needs to reflect this narrow 
timeframe with a specified required response period for websites offering such live 
feeds. 
 
Camming content directly from cinema screen to the cloud – Recent advance-
ments in technology have made this a viable option to ‘cammers’ to avoid detection. 
Attempts to curtail and delete illicitly recorded film footage may become increasingly 
difficult with the emergence of streaming apps that automatically upload recorded 
video to cloud services. While enforcing officers may delete the footage held on the 
device, the footage has potentially already been stored remotely on a cloud system. 
 
Domain hopping and proxy websites – ISP-implemented website blockings are 
becoming increasingly commonplace in the UK. The targeted websites have begun 
to circumvent the blocking process by using proxy websites and moving to alternative 
domains outside those indicated in the court orders. Web browsers that use Tor to 
circumvent the UK blockings are also now freely available to download. 
 
Virtual currencies – There is great potential in virtual currencies for money launder-
ers and illicit traders. Government and law enforcement have raised concerns on 
how virtual currencies can be sent anonymously, leaving little or no trail for regulators 
or law-enforcement agencies. 
 
Usability and appeal of the latest infringing streaming websites – New copy-
right-infringing BitTorrent websites are attempting to alter their image with slicker, 
more professional, user-friendly website designs. Websites such as Popcorn Time 
mimic the design and ease-of-use provided by legitimate services such as Netflix. 
Consequently, more people will inadvertently use illegal streaming services in the be-
lief that they are accessing content legally. The improved simplicity of these illegal 
streaming services is likely to prove a significant factor for many users engaging with 
the website regardless of the legality, especially for users who do not have the tech-
nical capabilities that many of the BitTorrent sites require to obtain similar content. 
 
77 
 
 
 
8.1.2 Anti-Counterfeiting Group (ACG) members’ survey responses 
At the suggestion of the ACG, we set up the questionnaire as an online survey and 
received up to six responses. We have anonymised these and show the verbatim re-
sponses under each question to highlight differences and similarities. 
 
Q1. How do you enforce your intellectual property rights (IPR) online and of-
fline? 
a) We monitor marketplaces, domains and social media online. We then enforce 
against any sellers/sites that are selling counterfeit versions of our products or 
using our imagery (taken directly from our website). We use MarkMonitor to en-
force through to these platforms. In terms of offline enforcement, we use an in-
vestigation team to conduct TPs, etc. 
b) Online we use external agents to coordinate the removal of suspicious listings. 
Offline we use local agents to authorise the destruction of seized goods and pros-
ecution of sellers, as well as investigating the supply chain. 
c) For trademark violations, we use in-house warning letters and external attorneys. 
Domain name violations: through UDRP (Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolu-
tion Policy). Social media: direct contact with site (Facebook, Twitter, etc.). 
d) Using manual searches, and lodging complaints manually with social media com-
panies. We also use partners to search and enforce. Have own network of private 
investigators (PIs) and law firms across the world that assist with enforcement. 
e) In the majority of cases we conduct enforcement through online monitoring. 
f) We use a mix of methods: in-house reporting outsourced through MarkMonitor 
and via BrandStrike. We use tools such as MarkMonitor and IP Curator, as well 
as eBay and Amazon reporting tools. We also use Facebook and other social 
media reporting tools. We do not find much offline but we generally use PIs to 
find these and enforce our seizures at ports. 
g) How long is a bit of string? We use all options open to us to enforce online and 
offline. 
Q2. Are your strategies for online and offline commerce interlinked, e.g. do you 
treat the Internet as a shop window for physical goods? 
a) Yes – we actively monitor the internet to identify potential infringers. 
b) Yes, the online sales of counterfeit goods occur in areas with higher levels of of-
fline sales and therefore appear to be linked. 
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c) Yes, they are interlinked. We treat the internet as a window to our products and 
services 
d) To some degree. Scale and procedure implemented following detection differ. 
e) Yes we do. 
f) Yes. The sale of fakes at cheap prices damages our brand and our price struc-
ture. 
g) Strategies are linked. 
 
 
 
Q3. How do you collect data on infringement of your IPR for your internal pur-
poses? 
a) We manually collect data from online listings and request information from mar-
ketplaces such as eBay for our records. 
b) Through our external agents. 
c) Various internet tools like MarkMonitor and HootSuite. All data is presented to re-
lated persons and policy makers on a quarterly basis. 
d) Record: jurisdiction, the right that is infringed and what product is being infringed. 
This is presented to policy makers to form strategies on how resources can be 
best used to tackle threats. 
e) Before engaging the services of an online monitoring company I used to collect 
and report data manually, then place it on spreadsheets and report takedown val-
ues, volumes, regions etc. including from lost opportunities. 
f) We use MarkMonitor. There is not much point in sending stuff to policy makers; 
they have lost the momentum. This is a battle we take on ourselves. However, 
we do supply ACG with data for policy. 
g) Yes. Some info is confidential. 
Q4. As regards the seasonality in the levels of IPR infringement, if there is any, 
what are your observations? 
a) We tend to see a rise in counterfeit activity around September every year and 
then it peaks just before Christmas. 
b) December and January have seen the highest levels of seizures. 
c) Basically the same level year-round. 
d) N/A. appears to be constant. 
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e) There does not appear to be a trend in the size of volume counterfeit sales and 
the relationship with the seasons. Some of our parts are low-value stock items 
£14.99 etc. they sell for £7.00. 
f) Q4 and Q1 are bad for us (we are a fitness company) but it is pretty bad all year. 
g) As we are seen mainly as a winter brand most infringements happen between 
Sep–March. 
Q5. Please describe the scale and impact of infringement of your IPR on your 
established goods, your newly launched goods and your brand in general. 
a) Established goods – we tend to see more counterfeit activity surrounding old 
products. Newly launched goods – counterfeit activity involving new product 
launches is seen less often. Brand in general – we are very active in IPR enforce-
ment and the scale of infringement is isolated to specific locations. 
b) The level of infringement on established goods is reasonably low. The levels, 
while low, are consistent and it is costly for the brand to continue to pursue coun-
terfeiters and deal with seizures. 
c) Since a majority of infringement involves our consumables business, infringement 
usually commences two to six months after a new model’s introduction and 
moves through stages of knockoff/counterfeit to compatible and remanufactured. 
d) Established goods: medium threat. There are a few older products that are con-
tinually infringed and appear to be infringed repeatedly. New: low. Brand: low. 
Main trade is clothing. Little clothing is copied; mainly accessories. 
e) The scale of fake goods on our current brand is high in relation to cables, and car 
charges; newly launched product is not too much of an issue as we have now en-
gaged the services of an online monitoring company. The brand was damaged 
through Amazon and eBay with bad customer reviews relating to bad experi-
ences with our brand (albeit with fake goods). 
f) Established brands suffer – we take down hundreds of listings a day. New 
launches are less of an issue for the first month and then it is bad, especially 
when we have heavy ad campaigns for a launch. That drives factories to make 
fakes quicker. The brand is well known and people seek cheap products, but 
generally delude themselves because it is easier to believe that it is a cheap deal, 
not a fake. 
g) Huge, huge and huge. 
Q6. What procedure do you apply towards IPR infringement on the platforms of 
online services, e.g. do you contact them directly and if so, how? Is there a 
specific procedure in place for social media platforms? 
a) There are some online platforms that we contact directly and hold strong relation-
ships with; others we contact using MarkMonitor. For social media platforms we 
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use the relevant enforcement forms for each site. 
b) We use our external agents for all online infringement, e.g. test purchases and 
taking down listings. 
c) For social media we sometimes contact the page owner directly and ask them to 
remove the infringing material or we usually contact the site owner like Facebook 
or Twitter (through their complaint form) to take action. 
d) We contact them directly. Social media is dealt with through their prescribed 
forms that are available online. Bidding platforms are dealt with through email 
communications. 
e) Until recently I used to deal with the platforms directly. eBay was better than Am-
azon to deal with. 
f) We use multiple tools, including MarkMonitor and the websites’ own takedown 
services. For social media we use the Facebook reporting tool, which is painful 
but effective. The issue with social media such as Facebook is that the main 
sales happen in closed groups, which cannot be scanned easily. I developed a 
tool to scan these groups but it is time-consuming and Facebook are not helpful 
or supportive against a backdrop of major criminality on their platform from sexual 
predators, terrorism and many other larger issues. Most of the platforms are out 
of their depth. 
g) Yes, we contact them directly and have procedures in place. 
Q7. What problems do you encounter in practice when trying to enforce your 
IP rights? 
a) In general we find that the majority of the Chinese business-to-business sites can 
be difficult to communicate with. In terms of social media we have had difficulty 
locating infringing content in the first place because of the restrictions on Face-
book searching. 
b) Difficulty in investigating the supply chain and determining the source of the 
counterfeits. 
c) I have a strong feeling that the site owner’s legal departments are woefully igno-
rant of IPR law. 
d) Resistance from social media platforms. Establishing supply chains. Communica-
tion with the wider public. 
e) Unless test purchases are made we are reliant on the images the seller has used 
to list the fake goods. 
f) Time-consuming is the main issue. The length of time to find, report and await 
takedown. 
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g) Online, then, criminals are light years ahead of law enforcement and the law in 
general, making it easier than ever to commit crime. Other barriers to enforce-
ment are the high costs of maintaining and enforcing rights. Lack of cooperation 
from online platforms. 
Q8. In your experience, how significant are social media platforms in facilitat-
ing online infringement of your IPR? 
a) Social media platforms act as a shop window for counterfeit activity. Facebook in 
particular proves to be a favourite for counterfeit sellers. We often find infringing 
content coupled with other brands on Facebook. 
b) They have a low impact. 
c) It seems like anything goes with these social media platforms. I have discovered 
porno sites using our TM that had been active for months. 
d) Increasingly significant. Forms around a fifth of all infringement. 
e) Not too sure how to answer this question. 
f) The social media platforms are awful. A cynic may say that it is deliberately awk-
ward. 
g) Five out of ten. 
 
Q9. In your experience, are social media platforms used to offer physical 
goods infringing your IPR? If so, please list them. 
a) Yes – Facebook is used to sell counterfeit products in local selling groups etc. 
b) No. 
c) Yes: Instagram, Facebook. 
d) Do you mean sites like Facebook? In the main the damage in the UK is carried 
out using Amazon and eBay. 
e) Yes, Facebook in particular is used. It has taken over from eBay and Gumtree as 
the major area of concern. Selling pages and closed groups are a problem. Insta-
gram is a problem, but less so. 
f) Yes, footwear, accessories, clothing. 
Q10. What, if any, economic impact do you consider social media to have on 
your IPR, both in terms of infringement and enforcement of your IPR? 
a) Hard to tell at this point. 
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b) There is a light impact on the economics of our business. 
c) There was not a budget for this issue two years ago. We have had to invest a sig-
nificant amount of $$ into combating this issue at a company global level. 
d) Hard to quantify as the level of scanning we can do on social media is very small 
and with no support from Facebook or other social networks and a general push 
back on the issues of IPR, it seems like the problem may be huge, but not calcu-
lable! 
e) Four out of ten. 
Q11. What in your experience are the scale and the characteristics of infringe-
ment of your IPR on social media? 
a) Instagram and Twitter do not pose too much of a threat, however, as mentioned 
Facebook is used as a platform to sell on counterfeit goods. It is often difficult to 
locate this content because it appears in closed selling groups or hidden profiles, 
unavailable to the average user. 
b) Mainly, social media users are ignorant of copyright and trademark law. 
c) Increasingly prolific in the Far East. Problem is largely contained in Europe. 
d) Don’t understand the question. 
e) Sales of fake products and pirated copyrighted material are rife but in closed sell-
ing groups. Posts are made all the time selling, using fake accounts or pages, 
which are moved and changed regularly. It is like whack-a-mole. Hard to catch 
the criminals without a lot of time and resources to investigate or even track down 
the criminals. 
f) Six. (out of ten) Quite big and poor-quality goods. 
Q12. Have you seen a rise in the infringement of your IPR over the past five 
years and to what do you attribute this, e.g. improved delivery mechanisms or 
new ‘platforms’? 
a) Infringement has slightly shifted in terms of where we find it. Mobile selling apps 
and social media are now hotbeds for counterfeit activity, whereas a couple of 
years ago marketplaces such as eBay were our target. 
b) Yes, with the proliferation of SNS, auction and large selling sites (like Amazon) 
the IPR knowledge level of users is low and most do not read the site posting pol-
icies beforehand. 
c) Impossible to tell. No data to inform comparison. 
d) Yes, we have seen a very big rise on fake goods of our brand. Supply chain 
routes using social media and modern international delivery systems have in-
creased the demand for counterfeit goods. Also, the economic downturn in Eu-
rope has placed pressure of staff cuts at customs borders and counterfeiting is 
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now no #11 on their priority list. 
e) It is about the same, just shifting platforms. 
f) Yes there has been a rise. Reasons – lack of enforcement by police and Trading 
Standards. Lack of appropriate sentencing in courts. Ease of ordering online and 
through social media, unemployment. 
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8.2. Appendix 3: Enforcement Agency Survey Responses 
 
8.2.1 IPO Intelligence Hub survey response 
 
Q1. Current government enforcement activities and any changes in the last five 
years 
 
The establishment and funding of the National Trading Standards Board (NTSB) in 
2012 by BIS was supposed to create a network of intelligence analysts and a na-
tional intelligence hub, but it has not been effective. There are increased opportuni-
ties for raising awareness of the use of intellectual property rights interventions in dis-
rupting organised crime groups (OCGs). The PIPCU funding from the IPO is seen by 
some in the Trading Standards (TS) world as misplaced and has led to resentment 
and disrupted partnership working. The current economic climate has resulted in a 
number of partnerships of necessity because of the cuts to services in many local au-
thorities and police forces. 
 
Q2. Differences in enforcing IPR in digital and physical goods 
 
The IPO Intelligence Hub supports enforcement by gathering, analysing, developing 
and sharing intelligence. All intelligence is worked on, with no distinction made for 
physical versus digital goods. 
 
Q3. Data collection on IPR infringements and differentiation on social media 
 
Intelligence is received from the UK Border Force, Europol and Interpol, industry and 
brands, as well as the more traditional enforcement agencies such as Trading Stand-
ards and the police. There are regional differences in the level of intelligence submis-
sions from Trading Standards. Crimestoppers is a very good source of IPR intelli-
gence. 
 
Q4. Work with other government agencies 
 
There is little coordinated work undertaken in respect of social media as a result of 
the stance taken by the NTSB. 
 
Q5. Scale and characteristics of IPR infringement on social media 
 
Complaints are frequently made by rights holders and members of Trading Stand-
ards about the frequency of sales of counterfeit goods on social media sites. Be-
cause of the way the groups such as ‘closed groups’ are constructed, the viewing of 
goods by law enforcement or government staff requires a surveillance authority un-
der the Regulation of Investigative Powers Act 2000. It is a relatively safe way for 
members of the public to trade. 
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Q6. Impact of social media on IPR infringement 
 
The majority of the public in the UK see counterfeit goods as socially acceptable. 
There are sectors of society where this can and does translate beyond tolerance into 
actively seeking out counterfeit goods which have the appearance of luxury goods at 
a much more affordable price. Little thought is given to where the funds are going. In 
addition, social media governs many people’s lives, so the use of platforms to trade 
is merely an extension of their routine social engagement. 
 
Q7. Economic impact of social media on IP rights holders 
 
The public tolerance of counterfeits, the ease of ordering via the internet and the rel-
ative security of anonymous online entities has created a safe haven for people to 
trade in counterfeit goods. This in turn has allowed an increase in trade. The counter-
argument, however, is that those buying counterfeit luxury brands are unlikely to pur-
chase the genuine article, so are not undermining the sales of genuine goods. 
 
8.2.2. Trading Standards’ eCrime unit 
 
Interview 
Trading Standards’ (TS) eCrime unit, with a staff of just 12, acknowledges the prob-
lem of accurately measuring online commerce and illicit activity. They also recognise 
significant under-reporting of illicit activity, which means anecdotal evidence still 
dominates. We pointed out that our priority is to capture the trend in any data sets we 
are analysing, regardless of methodology, given how disparate the approaches 
adopted by the various agencies involved in enforcement are. 
 
They mentioned that Citizens Advice (CA) handle complaints on ‘scams’ involving 
counterfeit goods and pass on the IPR-relevant cases to TS. The current data show 
an increase in IPR infringement on social media and the data are available in head-
line form. However, CA do not analyse the data in more depth and detail. There is an 
evident recent increase in online scams and this is prevalent on social media. 
 
The EU are starting to work on online traffic and social media but it is clear that there 
is very little, if any, relevant data available, meaning our study could be the first to at-
tempt to assess it. We explained the tripartite approach we are adopting using indus-
try, government and consumer data to form a picture of what is going on. 
They mentioned that the main tech firms expect to see claims made about the impact 
and losses supported by data, and acknowledged that Facebook’s (FB) initial reac-
tion was to ask for evidence. This is made all the more difficult as there is massive 
under-reporting of online crime, with a general observation that the amount of online 
crime is between five to ten times greater than what is actually officially reported. 
 
They mentioned significant on-going challenges to getting and sharing data and that 
TS need to follow up on consumers’ complaints. They work closely with the IPO’s in-
telligence team and are involved in broader operations, such as the recent Operation 
Jasper. There is a belief that TS meets cynicism from consumers (when it comes to 
their justifying their purchases of counterfeit goods), but TS noted increased levels of 
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what are described as ‘innocent’ purchases, such as cosmetics and toiletries. 
 
Trading Standards survey response 
 
Q1. Current government enforcement activities and any changes in the last five 
years 
 
Until relatively recently, the TS response to IPR infringement on social media plat-
forms has been quite patchy across the UK. Good practice and active enforcement 
work have been on a fairly limited scale. Issues include difficulty in identifying the 
‘owner’ of a social media profile and social media platform operators providing very 
little (if any) information to enable successful identification and location of offenders. 
There has been recent coordinated action in relation to the sale of infringing goods 
on Facebook (Operation Jasper), led and coordinated by the National Trading Stand-
ards (NTS) eCrime Team. TS now have a procedure to refer infringing content to Fa-
cebook, that they feel can be removed, subject to meeting criteria. This is an oppor-
tunity to develop more powerful responses to a growing problem. 
 
Q2. Differences between enforcing IPR in digital and in physical goods 
 
TS’s wider remit of tackling all forms of online consumer scams makes it impossible 
to accurately quantify the time spent investigating digital and physical IPR infringe-
ment. But it is clear that a far greater proportion of time is spent investigating physical 
IPR rather than digital infringement. TS’s finite level of resources requires a focus on 
where the greatest consumer harm is occurring. Physical products are often associ-
ated with product safety issues; furthermore, all current intelligence and consumer 
complaints suggest that the sale of physical products significantly outweighs the sale 
of digital products, with clothing, fashion accessories and DVDs easily the biggest 
categories. 
 
Q3. Data collection on IPR infringements and differentiation on social media 
 
The TS data in relation to IPR infringement come from a variety of sources but the 
primary sources are consumer reports, through Citizens Advice and intelligence re-
ports, by way of the IPO and either of the two Trading Standards intelligence sys-
tems (Memex and IDB). There is no current straightforward mechanism to differenti-
ate infringement on social media from other forms of online infringement, so they 
have to conduct keyword searches against various intelligence/data sources to cap-
ture the social media-specific data. 
 
Q4. Procedure applied towards IPR infringement on online services platforms 
 
TS now have a formal procedure in place with Facebook, agreed after extensive con-
sultation between the NTS eCrime Team and Facebook. This allows any TS officer 
to identify potentially infringing content. The content and profile details are docu-
mented on a standard form, then passed to the NTS eCrime team, as the single point 
of contact (SPoC) between TS and Facebook. The request is then sent directly to 
Facebook, assessed and the content removed and/or profile closed, as appropriate. 
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TS are working towards a similar procedure for Instagram, as intelligence suggests 
that this platform is now used to ‘advertise’ IPR-infringing products. 
 
Q5. Work with other government agencies 
 
TS work extensively with other government agencies and industry bodies in efforts to 
tackle IPR infringement on social media. The recent Operation Jasper saw them 
work closely with the IPO, the Anti-Counterfeiting Group (ACG), the Federation 
Against Copyright Theft (FACT), the British Phonographic Industry and various brand 
representatives. They are members of the National Crime Agency (NCA)-led IP Op-
erational Group. This group includes representatives from the National Police Chiefs 
Council (NPCC), the IPO, Border Force, customs and others. TS are also examining 
ways in which they can exploit the expertise developed by the police’s IP Crime Unit 
(PIPCU) in terms of disruptive activities, such as the removal of merchant payment 
services and website takedowns. 
 
Q6. Scale and characteristics of IPR infringement on social media 
 
TS argue that it is difficult to accurately quantify the scale of IPR infringement on so-
cial media. This is for a variety of reasons – disparate recording of data and intelli-
gence and low reporting levels being two of the primary reasons. In their experience, 
the types of online crime they investigate have reporting levels of somewhere be-
tween 5% and 10%. Factor in that IPR infringement generally has a lower reporting 
rate in any case and this makes it extremely difficult to fully understand the true na-
ture of the problem. 
 
However, the intelligence and data available do suggest that the sale of physical 
goods is the dominant factor. Taking a small sample of data in relation to Facebook 
specifically, clothing, fashion accessories and DVDs are the largest three categories, 
accounting for approximately 60%. The remaining 40% is made up of a mixture of 
footwear, electrical products, toys, toiletries and computer software. There is also ev-
idence to suggest a strong link between the sale of IPR-infringing goods and the sale 
of illicit tobacco and alcohol. 
 
Q7. Impact on social media of IPR infringement 
 
The greatest impact (beyond the economic one) is that of consumer safety. Many of 
the products that were seized following Operation Jasper posed a significant risk to 
consumers. 
 
Q8. Measuring increase in IPR infringement on social media 
 
Using consumer complaints as one measure, Trading Standards has seen a marked 
increase in the scale of infringement on social media, which, since 2010, has shown 
a 400% increase in complaints attributed to Facebook, from around 1,300 complaints 
in 2010 to over 5,000 complaints in 2014. There has also been a corresponding in-
crease in intelligence submissions onto either of the two Trading Standards intelli-
gence systems. A sample of over 200 intelligence submissions from the northwest 
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region showed that submissions on social media IPR infringements far exceed those 
on the sale of infringing products on eBay. 
 
Q9. Economic impact of social media on IP rights holders 
 
Given the significant (and on-going) increase in the use of social media to commit 
IPR infringement, there is little doubt that this is having a significant impact on IP 
rights holders, but TS are unable to properly quantify the impact. Social media is an 
attractive platform to use when ‘advertising’ IPR-infringing products, as there are no 
fees or costs but users are still able to find buyers/sellers in the local area. These 
combine to make social media an attractive proposition when compared to some of 
the more traditional marketplaces such as eBay, Amazon and Gumtree. Facebook is 
now second only to eBay in consumer complaints to Citizens Advice, with trends 
suggesting that Facebook will soon overtake eBay. Clearly this has an impact on le-
gitimate traders, particularly at a local level. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that independent retailers and smaller stallholders are directly affected by the ability 
of social media sellers to identify buyers on a local level. 
 
 
Appendix 8.3 Technology Firms’ Survey Responses 
 
8.3.1 Google 
 
The response to our questionnaire from Google, as of the end of August 2015, was 
to point us in the direction of their established code of practice in relation to online pi-
racy. We informed them that this code only dealt with digital goods and responded by 
asking for their comments about the recent announcement that Bing had taken steps 
to alert consumers to the dangers of purchasing medicines online, and the likelihood 
that these could be both fake and dangerous. They subsequently sent us an official 
document that covered counterfeiting. Highlights are: 
 
How Google fights the advertisement of counterfeit goods and Google’s AdWords 
trademark policies 
Over 1 million advertisers across 190 countries use AdWords – the majority of which 
are SMBs (small to medium-sized businesses). We allow trademarks to be used as 
keyword triggers in AdWords – for example, BMW running ads when someone 
searches- for ‘Ford’ – because people searching on Google benefit from being able 
to choose from a variety of competing advertisers. It is completely normal for a su-
permarket to stock different brands of cereal on the same shelf or for a magazine to 
run BMW ads opposite an article about Ford, so it does not make sense to limit com-
petition online by restricting the number of choices available to users. If a user is 
searching for information about a particular car, he or she will want more than just 
that car’s website. They might be looking for different dealers that sell that car, for 
those who sell it second-hand, or for reviews about the car, or they may be looking 
for information about other cars in the same category. Providing users on Google 
with more than one option when they search for a brand name or other trademark 
helps them to find the best product at the lowest price. 
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We are not in a position to arbitrate trademark disputes all over the world and deter-
mining what is infringement is complex as it is a job for a judge, not us. Trademarks 
are territorial, apply only to certain goods or services, and often can be common 
words and phrases. That said, as a courtesy to brand holders, we do investigate rea-
sonable claims about trademark violations in ads and we have found that this coop-
eration works well. They refer us to their specific region/country for their specific poli-
cies,100 as well as easy-to-use complaint forms for trademark holders.101 
And when it comes to advertising counterfeit goods, which is a very different situa-
tion, we have a zero-tolerance policy. As far as we can tell, people, generally, are not 
confused by seeing ads on searches for trademarked terms. If you look at the 
Google search results page, the ads are very clearly delineated as ‘sponsored links’, 
and ads that are actually deceptive would violate our Terms of Service (ToS). Using 
Google Insights for Search, it is clear that when people search for a trademarked 
term like ‘Nike’ or ‘coke’, they often also search for competitors either before or after, 
which suggests that they want to see information from more than one advertiser on 
these terms. 
Thanks to the internet, it has never been easier to start a business and reach a huge 
audience. E-commerce services like eBay, Amazon and PriceMinister, advertising 
platforms like Google’s AdWords and other online services help companies large and 
small operate at an incredible scale and empower consumers with more choices in 
the market. In the US alone, the ads-supported internet contributed $530 billion to 
the economy last year and 5.1 million jobs. 
Unfortunately, a small percentage of bad actors misuse legitimate online services to 
try to sell counterfeit goods. For our part, we received legitimate complaints from a 
small fraction of 1% of advertisers in the last year. 
Counterfeiting is not a new problem, of course. Just as with any new technology, the 
internet creates new complexities and many stakeholders have a role to play in re-
solving this issue. It is critical for brand owners and law enforcement to tackle coun-
terfeiting at its source. Online services and other stakeholders can help, too. Alt-
hough, it is important to remember that online services are in no position to deter-
mine the authenticity of the millions of advertised goods, as they never even take 
possession of them and fraudsters are always coming up with more sophisticated 
ways to play the system. 
Clear policies and enforcement 
We have clear policies against using AdWords to promote counterfeit goods. When 
abuse is brought to our attention, we act expeditiously on it, and we terminate ac-
counts in appropriate circumstances. 
 
Automated abuse detection 
Ads that violate our policies can be tough to detect, as bad guys come up with new 
ways to cloak their behaviour all the time. To combat this, we look at thousands of 
                                            
100 Google Ad Words Policy’ [Online]: https://support.google.com/adwordspolicy/answer/6118?hl=en&rd=2 
101 Google Trade Mark Complaint’ [Online]: https://services.google.com/inquiry/aw_tmcomplaint 
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data signals to automatically analyse every AdWords ad and account, and determine 
whether it is likely to violate our policies. Our systems are designed to examine a 
number of factors, including ad text, keywords and account characteristics (e.g. we 
might see if the current location matches the billing address). Depending on this ex-
amination, the ad and account will be subject to further manual review, or blocked 
entirely. No system is perfect, but we are constantly working to develop our ad-
vanced risk-modelling systems in order to address new threats. The system is de-
signed to ‘learn’ from past instances of fraud and abuse – the more data the system 
has about past activity, the better it is about predicting abuse in the future. 
 
Counterfeit reporting tools 
The cooperation of brand owners is absolutely essential to our efforts. Even though 
our tools are state of the art, it is not always easy to spot a fraudster selling fakes. 
That is why we also rely on businesses to report feedback on advertisements them-
selves. If a counterfeit version of a product is being advertised via AdWords, a brand 
owner can notify us through a simple form and any users can report sites that violate 
our policies. 
 
Law enforcement 
To address illegal activity at its source, we support the enforcement of laws against 
counterfeiting and respond to appropriate legal process received from enforcement 
entities. Google regularly reports to a wide array of law-enforcement authorities, in-
cluding working with officials to combat counterfeiting. 
 
Collaborating with industry 
Counterfeiting is an industry-wide issue, and we work with and support a number of 
industry groups that work together on enforcement strategy, knowledge sharing, 
training and networking, including the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition and 
the International Trademark Association. 
 
Taking on counterfeits beyond ads 
Along with our significant investment in preventing the advertisement of counterfeits, 
we take this issue seriously across our products and have clear policies in place. Our 
enforcement practices include: 
• Responding to valid complaints regarding bad actors attempting to directly 
make money from counterfeit goods using AdSense, as well as commerce 
platforms like Offers, Shopping, Trusted Stores and Wallet. 
• Responding to valid complaints about the sale or promotion of counterfeit 
goods through content that users host with us, including on Blogger, Google+, 
Sites and YouTube. 
• Removing sites from Web Search based on valid court orders. Where a com-
plainant has a court order adjudicating content on a particular page as unlaw-
ful, they can submit that through a simple form, and it is our policy to then re-
move that page. 
8.3.2 Facebook 
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The information below represents a summary of comments made by Vick Baines 
(VB) to the IP Crime Group. VB is Facebook’s Trust and Safety Manager, formerly in 
law enforcement, where she started as an Analyst in Surrey, subsequently working 
with Europol. She covers all crime across 127 countries and admits that collaboration 
between the technology industry and law enforcement is a sensitive subject. 
 
Facebook’s approach to IP crime 
a) UK stakeholders have different approaches and these cover different crimes. Fa-
cebook’s priorities are child exploitation, where they are “able to join the dots” 
when law enforcement is looking for evidence of criminality. 
b) They have a real-name policy, which means users have to use their full legal 
name. Facebook is about trustbut VB noted that they are aware that law-enforce-
ment agencies have set up fake accounts. They can and will close down these 
fake accounts. 
c) Facebook prioritises whatever affects the safety of consumers, which means a 
focus on counter-exploitation and counter-terrorism. There is a diverse range of 
crimes that impact public safety and any criminal activity is against their Terms of 
Service. 
d) Priorities are to all rights holders, but Facebook has to accommodate all the dif-
ferent laws and this requires individual notice procedure. They cannot assess 
bulk processing, although they can whitelist a trade body reporting for members 
and distinguish between © and TM infringements. VB claimed to have a turna-
round response time of within two hours of receipt. 
 
Law enforcement in the UK 
a) VB usually deals with Trading Standards and does not encounter many involved 
stakeholders. The UK situation is complicated. Facebook reacts to allegations of 
infringement by producing a standard set of questions; sometimes they can have 
multiple requests, given the presence of multi-brand counterfeiters. There are is-
sues regarding the proceeds of crime and on-going criminal investigations. Their 
existing takedown requests involve duplicates from rights holders and Trading 
Standards (with test purchases), and they do allow for reporting of an album of 
photos. 
b) Facebook is primarily a communication platform and is not about transactions, so 
there is a clear need to establish the exact nature of the alleged infringement. 
c) Data requests are controlled, meaning only accredited agencies can secure data. 
Facebook has agreements with the Home Office and the ICO to supply basic 
subscriber info, which has to come from their Dublin office. They approve 75% of 
communication data requests. 
d) Facebook is a US firm and thus subject to US laws as far as divulging data is 
concerned. This means it takes six months to get the content of subscriber ac-
counts, even though they can volunteer subscriber info. They need justification 
before providing data and pointed to the dedicated online data request form for 
sending details of crimes. 
e) Facebook can provide the same information for Instagram, where they can see 
certain levels of infringement. 
 
Questions/comments from IP Crime Group 
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a) Graham Moog from the ACG argued that the majority of users do not follow Fa-
cebook’s terms and conditions. VB responded that these can be reported as fake 
accounts but the big issue is their refusal to accept bulk requests. 
b) Dave Lowe from the IPO asked whether it is possible to adopt a more stream-
lined and coordinated approach. VB’s response was that their IP lawyers are risk 
averse and cannot understand the fragmented approach to enforcement. They 
are keen to avoid independent regulators and, while it is clear that streamlining 
enforcement would improve processes, Facebook insists on proof. 
c) John Alty from the IPO suggested reviewing international comparisons for good 
practices. It is clear that the diversity of stakeholders makes it harder for Face-
book to manage and in other jurisdictions it is usually simpler, as in the case of 
alcohol in Sweden, which is more clearly regulated by the state. 
 
Immediately subsequent to the IP Crime Group meeting, we contacted Facebook, 
and almost three months after sending a questionnaire relating to the use of social 
media platforms to sell counterfeit goods, we received the answer below. Essentially, 
it directed us to Facebook’s existing published policies and public positions. 
 
“I fully appreciate that we may be far too late in sending you a response, but we’d like 
to contribute all the same. A number of colleagues worked on the following which, 
while not answering the questions exactly as you posed them, should go a fair way to 
provide you with the information you seek on our policies and procedures in relation 
to IP infringement. Facebook respects the intellectual property rights of others and is 
committed to helping third parties protect their rights. Our Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities prohibits users from posting content that violates another party’s in-
tellectual property rights.102 Our Help Center provides further information about intel-
lectual property.103 
“We offer tools for reporting infringing content that may be posted by users on our 
service. This includes Facebook’s online reporting tool.104 This tool can be used to 
report both copyright and trademark infringements. Upon receipt of a valid report of 
intellectual property infringement, we remove or block access to the reported content. 
In addition, in appropriate circumstances, we take further action against the accounts 
of repeat infringers, including removal of those accounts. The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation issued a report in 2014 describing aspects of our procedures.105 Law-en-
forcement agencies may request data relating to a criminal investigation. Facebook 
discloses account records solely in accordance with its Terms of Service and appli-
cable law. For more information, please see our law-enforcement guidelines106 and 
                                            
102 Facebook (2015) ‘Statement of Rights and Responsibilities’ [Online]: https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms 
103 Facebook (2016) ‘About Intellectual Property’ [Online]: https://www.facebook.com/help/intellectual_property 
104 Facebook ‘Reporting a Violation or Infringement of Your Rights’ [Online]: https://www.facebook.com/help/con-
tact/208282075858952 
105 Electronic Frontier Foundation (2014) [Online]: https://www.eff.org/pages/who-has-your-back-copyright-trade-
mark-2014 
106 Facebook (2016) ‘Information for Law Enforcement Authorities’ [Online]: https://www.face-
book.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines/ 
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Facebook’s Data Policy.107 Statistics on government requests for data and content re-
moval are published every six months in Facebook’s Government Requests Re-
port.”108 
8.3.3 Twitter 
Given the openly critical views expressed about online surveillance by Twitter’s Nick 
Pickles (former head of Big Brother Watch), we were pleasantly surprised to receive 
a speedy and full response to the questionnaire where he said: 
 
“Twitter will respond to reports of alleged copyright infringement, such as allegations 
concerning the unauthorized use of a copyrighted image as a profile photo, header 
photo or background, allegations concerning the unauthorized use of a copyrighted 
video or image uploaded through our media hosting services, or tweets containing 
links to allegedly infringing materials. Note that not all unauthorized uses of copy-
righted materials are infringements (see our Fair Use page for more information). 
 
“Twitter’s response to notices of alleged copyright infringement may include the re-
moval or restriction of access to allegedly infringing material. If we remove or restrict 
access to user content in response to a notice of alleged infringement, Twitter will 
make a good-faith effort to contact the affected account holder with information con-
cerning the removal or restriction of access, including a copy of the takedown notice, 
along with instructions for filing a counter-notification. In an effort to be as transparent 
as possible regarding the removal or restriction of access to user-posted content, we 
clearly mark withheld tweets and media to indicate to viewers when content has been 
withheld. We also send a copy of each DMCA notification and counter-notice that we 
process to Chilling Effects, where they are posted to a public-facing website (with 
personal information removed).” 
Twitter has a specific policy relating to trademark infringement: 
• Using a company or business name, logo, or other trademark-protected materials 
in a manner that may mislead or confuse others with regard to its brand or busi-
ness affiliation may be considered a trademark policy violation. 
• When we receive reports of trademark policy violations from holders of federal or 
international trademark registrations, we review the account and may take the fol-
lowing actions: 
• When there is a clear intent to mislead others through the unauthorized use of a 
trademark, Twitter will suspend the account and notify the account holder. When 
we determine that an account appears to be confusing users but is not purpose-
fully passing itself off as the trademarked good or service, we give the account 
holder an opportunity to clear up any potential confusion. We may also release a 
username for the trademark holder’s active use. 
                                            
107 Facebook (2016) ‘Data Policy’ [Online]: https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/other 
108 Facebook (2016) ‘UK Government Requests for Data’ [Online]: https://govtrequests.facebook.com/coun-
try/United%20Kingdom/ 
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• Twitter’s counterfeit goods policy prohibits, but is not limited to, the following: 
products described as faux, replicas or imitations, etc., when referring to a brand 
name in an attempt to pass themselves off as products of the brand owner/other 
non-genuine products that attempt to pass themselves off as genuine products of 
the brand owner. 
• Violations can be reported through our help centre. There are specific forms for 
copyright, trademark and counterfeit goods. 
• Where content that violates our rules is brought to our attention, we will take ap-
propriate action. As is standard industry practice, we do not proactively monitor 
the content user’s post to Twitter. 
The Twitter Transparency Report detailed the number of requests received by Twit-
ter, both with regard to information requests from government agencies and copy-
right notices received. We noted that Twitter’s ‘Transparency Reports’ on trademark 
notices for the six months ending 30 June 2015109 and December 2015110 both indi-
cated that a relatively low number (6–11%) of accounts were affected by alleged 
trademark violations. Twitter noted in the most recent report that the number of trade-
mark notices received for Twitter and Vine had declined by 33% (8,588 versus 
12,911 in the previous January–June 2015 report). 
Twitter stated that affected accounts were those “Twitter and Vine accounts where 
the account has been suspended in response to a valid trademark notice” and that 
each user was able to “remove or edit violating content after appealing account sus-
pension”. They also provided a number of reasons why they did not comply with 
every request, including: 
• trademark notices filed by representatives who have not been authorised 
by the trademark owner; 
• trademark notices that fail to provide sufficient information for us to locate 
accounts or material on Twitter and Vine; 
• the large number of misfiled, non-trademark complaints through our web 
form; 
• users may have challenged the notices after we have suspended them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                            
109Twitter (2015) ‘Trademark Transparency Report’. June 2015 [Online]: https://transparency.twitter.com/trademark-
notices/2015/jan-jun 
110 Twitter (2016) ‘Trademark Transparency Report’. December 2015 [Online]: https://transparency.twitter.com/trade-
mark-notices/2015/jul-dec 
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Appendix 4: Consumer Survey and Tracker Results and Analysis 
 
Appendix 4.1: Definition of key terms used 
The following are explanations of certain key terms used within the findings in the 
main report. 
1. Gini curve. These charts are used to identify how distorted the distribution of any 
particular behaviour is across a population. Its most common application is in 
demonstrating that income is highly distorted towards a particular affluent seg-
ment of the population. The display on the vertical axis usually shows the dis-
torted behaviour, e.g. the proportion of income, while the horizontal axis shows 
the proportion of the overall population. Thus, for income, the charts can display 
that the richest 10% have 31% of the income, the second richest segment have a 
further 15% of income, while the poorest deciles have 4% and 1.3% of the in-
come respectively. We used the charts to illustrate how concentrated the promo-
tion of suspect behaviour was, revealing that a small proportion of individuals, 
unique users, were responsible for a sizeable proportion of activity. For example, 
in Fig. A6.8b we can see that the top 20% of all eBay queries generated 10.8% of 
suspect results and 87.6% of branded results. 
2. Sankey charts. These charts are used to visually represent the distribution of a 
multiple set of variables. The width of the lines connecting neighbouring bars rep-
resents the proportion of the population that share the two connected properties. 
By looking at Fig. A6.13a, we can see from the chart that a high proportion >50% 
of complicit purchases took place in branded online locations and over 70% of all 
their purchases were complicit in nature. A high proportion of these were driven 
by previous experience. 
3. Suspect behaviour. This is a visual judgement of the nature of the material that a 
social media link refers to. The most common characteristic that distinguished 
these sites was the offer of a purchase at a substantial discount, at least 10% be-
low the normal market price. In addition, some locations were explicit about these 
purchases being via alternative ‘grey’ channels, thus indicating that duty was be-
ing avoided. As can be seen, many of the locations provide a level of branding 
that infringed the trademark of the brand owner, as well as indicating the fraudu-
lent behaviour of the purchase. Typically, the look and feel of these locations 
were somewhat amateurish and opportunistic and, in all likelihood, only the naïve 
would not notice the difference between these locations and the more sophisti-
cated presentations used by authentic brand owners. However, this does not in-
clude fraudulent offerings that are virtually indistinguishable from branded sites. 
Such goods would require mystery shopping to identify the nature of the goods 
supplied. 
4. Website endpoints. Digital communication is characterised by the prevalence of 
many different links between different messages. Materials are re-tweeted, affili-
ates recommend and followers are encouraged to click through. It is by its very 
nature a digital ‘web’ and this characteristic is particularly prevalent within social 
media communications. In contrast to these inter-connections, endpoints are 
those sites that facilitate actual transactions, rather than routing people else-
where. They take orders, accept payments and execute instructions that will 
hopefully result in a delivery. Our study isolates these by looking at the route part 
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of the URL internet address, e.g. www.ebay.com or www.facebook.com. It turned 
out that suspect activity was concentrated in a relatively small number of these 
endpoints distributed across the web. 
5. Communications. In contrast to the endpoints, communications are typically short 
messages that advertise, promote or, in some other way, recommend following a 
link to other locations. Some of these links are shortened and re-routed via a host, 
having URLs like t.co/… or bit.ly/…. Sometimes, these just create links to other, 
typically longer, pages with information and blogs, but they also reach endpoints 
where transactions can take place. 
 
Appendix 4.2: Gini curves of the distribution of exposure for the different 
search engines 
 
The charts used (Figures A1 to A4) display the Gini curves for different types of be-
haviour. A Gini curve displays the proportion of an activity compared to the propor-
tion of the population of initiators. 
 
 
Figure  A1 Gini curve of the distribution of the exposure of Google items by the propor-
tion of initiators 
 
The Google platform (Figure A1) kept the suspect behaviour distinct and diffuse from 
the other types of behaviour. This was illustrated by looking at the penetration of ac-
tivities as the proportion of initiators grew. At the point of 20% of initiators, 11.8% of 
communications were ‘suspect’, in contrast to 39.4% of communications being ‘genu-
ine’. 
 
The eBay platform (Figure A2) also demonstrated an even more diffuse distribution 
of suspect behaviour, at 20% of suspect initiators, 10.8% and 87.6% of communica-
tions were ‘suspect’ and ‘branded’ respectively. 
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Figure A2 Gini curve of the distribution of the exposure of eBay items by the propor-
tion of initiators 
 
In contrast, the social media platforms (Figures A3 and A4) had highly concentrated 
suspect behaviour – within only 5% of initiators, 91.3% and 95.8% of communica-
tions were suspect and branded respectively. 
 
  
Figure A3 Gini curve of the distribution of the exposure of Twitter items by the propor-
tion of initiators 
 
Similarly, the behaviour within both types of group in Facebook was 72.1% and 
84.3% of suspect behaviour within the first 20% of initiators for open and closed 
groups respectively. 
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Figure A4 Gini curve of the distribution of the exposure of Facebook items by group 
type and proportion of initiators 
 
One potential hangover from previous penetration of suspect behaviour arises within 
the footwear sector, where behaviour was found to be distinctly different from other 
broadcasts within eBay (see Figure A5 and Table A1). If we examine the distribution 
of eBay behaviours, suspect behaviour is mixed in with other types, with 20% of initi-
ators driving 56.0% and 59.7% of suspect and genuine behaviours respectively. 
 
 
Figure A5 Gini curve of the distribution of the exposure of eBay items, for footwear 
brands alone, by the proportion of initiators 
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This contrasted with fewer outstanding differences for suspect behaviour within the 
other platforms as shown in Table A1. 
 
Table A1 The proportion of exposure within each online platform by content type, for 
footwear brands alone, from the most prolific 10% of initiators 
 
Appendix 4.3: Consumer Survey Methodology  
 
To capture the experience of consumers and how social media is used to make 
online purchases we designed a questionnaire which was conducted in July 2015. In 
conducting this survey, we first have to address three challenges: online sampling 
selection, verification of suspect online personas, and handling the highly skewed na-
ture of typical digital behaviour. 
 
Behavioural weighting 
First, given our focus on the digital experience using social media or otherwise, 
online surveys were an ideal medium as they clearly and directly addressed the area 
of interest. However, it is well understood that online surveys are distributed among 
panels of people who have volunteered to participate. This self-selection presents a 
statistical challenge when endeavouring to use surveys to make general estimates of 
scale across the full range. On-going research by the British Population Survey 
(BPS) and others has demonstrated systematic differences between survey partici-
pants and those who merely transact online. These behavioural differences persist 
even after the demographic weighting that is normally applied as an online research 
correction is done. So, for example, panel participants are significantly more com-
mercially and socially engaged, even if they are within the same age band and social 
grade as non-participants. The on-going offline tracking of research panel partici-
pants resulted in the calibration of a method of behavioural weighting. A series of 
questions, Q1 to Q4 were defined within the questionnaire that tested for the general 
levels of commercial behaviour and digital engagement to generate a weight to com-
pensate for the typical over-engagement of research panel participants. This behav-
ioural weighting was applied to all the results presented. 
 
Categories of behaviour 
Second, the study sought to explore the potential for consumers to participate in non-
compliant behaviour. It was important to identify question wording that minimised the 
chance of steering or prejudicing any question response. To reduce the risk of 
sounding pejorative, we adopted the phrase ‘copied’ products. This particular word 
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choice had the benefit of having been previously used,111 as well as removing the 
sense that we were asking respondents to implicate themselves in anything deemed 
to be immoral and/or illegal. 
 
The question used to define the different types of individuals is therefore worded as 
follows: “While making the purchase, did you consider the possibility that the prod-
ucts may be copies of products instead of genuine brands?” The potential responses 
offered were as follows: 
 
Yes – but I purchased them anyway (a) 
Yes – so I found another location (b) 
No – but on receipt, I found that they did not appear genuine (c) 
No – and on receipt they appear genuine (d) 
 
 
 
We used response (a) to identify behaviour we labelled ‘complicit’ – those who know-
ingly participated in the market for copied products. We used response (b) to identify 
those we labelled ‘compliant’, and response (c) for those we labelled ‘deceived’. For 
completeness, we labelled response (d) ‘unexposed’. Based upon the classification 
of up to six different purchases, we segmented each consumer as follows: 
 
(a)‘complicit’ when at least one copied product was found and was still pur-
chased – option (a), but no option (c); 
(b)‘compliant’ when once the copied product was found the purchase was made 
elsewhere – option (b), but no (a) or (c); 
(c)‘deceived’ when, at least once, products arrived that initially looked genuine 
but turned out to be suspect – any option (c); 
(d)‘unexposed’ when all purchases were themselves ‘unexposed’. 
That said, we were looking to identify behaviour that knowledgeable consumers 
would be aware was of marginal character. The nature of the subject may well have 
encouraged less straightforward participation. Online surveys may, in some contexts, 
benefit from being completed while the respondent is alone; if in company, respond-
ents may well be less steered towards providing responses that they think any re-
search worker would prefer. However, the very anonymity provides some opportunity 
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for respondents to mask their true nature and in particular generate multiple per-
sonas. It can be seen as a cat and mouse game, as online technical skills can de-
velop; for example, panels will restrict responses from particular internet protocol ad-
dresses, but services like The Onion Router (TOR)112 enable these identifiers to be 
masked. 
 
Within the data captured, there appeared to be a risk that this occurred at least once; 
a batch of 41 near-identical questionnaire responses occurred within a short space of 
time. These records were also in a section that was on the extreme end of online be-
haviour. To reduce the risk of these responses being over interpreted, the group of 
suspect duplicate responses was suppressed via a bootstrapping technique that 
weighted the responses, so that the suspect group was treated as a single response. 
Other responses from within the same demographic cell were re-sampled multiple 
times to form an alternative set of responses that were weighted to preserve the vol-
ume of the initial sample. 
 
Structure and timing 
Third, the study wanted to assess the distribution of behaviour online, and balance 
both the accuracy of specific responses with the opportunity to scale the behaviour. 
This led us to restrict exploration of purchases of specific products, instead address-
ing the last time a product was purchased. This kept the study synchronised with the 
online tracking study. Good questionnaire design is about focusing on specific inci-
dents rather than asking consumers to make general assessments of typical behav-
iour. The structure of the questionnaire focused particularly on the last purchase 
within each sector and then asked how often this was done previously. The analysis 
was weighted on the assumption that each of the previous purchases had been con-
ducted in the same manner as the purchase recorded. While this is unlikely to be 
strictly true for each individual, it is felt that this gives a reasonable sense of the scale 
of each type of behaviour that was prevalent. 
 
The questionnaire was conducted during July 2015, the middle period of the online 
tracking study. The initial behavioural-weighting questions were asked of all partici-
pants and the survey was then filtered, based upon whether participants had made a 
transaction online within the specific sectors that are included in the study. The sur-
vey was concluded once 2,999 respondents had completed the study, with partici-
pants selected to match UK population demographic distribution (see Table A2). This 
selection demonstrated that the sectors we chose for the study had a slight gender 
bias (22% to 26% non-purchase for females to males respectively), and a larger age 
bias with age bands below 34 with a non-purchase rate of 15%, whereas the over 
60s had a non-purchase rate in excess of 32%. 
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Table A2 Comparison of the unweighted demographic distribution of respondents who 
had and had not purchased within the tracked consumer sectors 
 
Characteristics of the study 
With behavioural weights applied, it can be seen that the gender and age product bi-
ases were still clear. Detailed examination of the application of behavioural weights 
indicated that the highest weights were applied to those records with the lowest 
transaction frequencies. Overall, there was a 1.6% uplift compared to the higher fre-
quencies. This was consistent with the general experience suggesting that online 
survey participants are more commercially engaged. 
 
The average frequency was calculated for each individual by applying midpoint 
weights for each cell. 
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Numerical frequency weights shown in brackets 
 
Table A3 Comparison of the behavioural weighted demographic distribution of the 
claimed frequency of purchases within the tracked consumer sectors 
 
Table A3, showed more frequent purchases online for the sectors visited by females, 
the highest volume of activity being within the age band 30–34, but the highest fre-
quency of purchase being within the age band 35–39. There was also a preponder-
ance of activity within the London region, marked by both higher volumes and higher 
frequency of purchase. It was also not surprising that those respondents within social 
grade AB (upper middle class/middle class) had a high capacity and frequency of 
purchase. 
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Table A4 Distribution of claimed purchase frequency by consumer sector 
 
As can be seen above (Table A4), the responses to the questionnaire indicated that 
purchases within the cigarettes sector were far more frequent than those within the 
watches sector, with 7.10 and 2.12 online purchases made per annum respectively. 
However, many more individuals made online purchases of clothing within the last 
year compared to cigarettes (2,344 to 315 respectively). 
 
 
 
Table A5 Comparison of the distribution of claimed frequency by explicitly named sec-
tor-leading brands or other unnamed brands 
 
The named brands within each consumer sector were based upon a comparison of 
the popularity of Google search terms. Consistent with this selection of the brands 
within each sector, the table above (Table A5) demonstrates the selected brands that 
were purchased at a level in excess of 13% above the unnamed brands (4.26 com-
pared to 3.74 per annum). 
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Table A6 Distribution of claimed purchase frequency by source of pre-purchase infor-
mation 
 
A comparison of the different sources of pre-purchase information (see Table A6) 
showed that while social media was the least common source of information for pur-
chases, 676 (compared with 3,629) instances were decisions guided by previous ex-
periences, and this was associated with the highest frequency of purchase (4.95). 
 
 
Table A7 Distribution of claimed purchase frequency by social media platforms used 
 
Where social media was used (see Table A7), it was evident that the average fre-
quency of purchase increased in the opposite direction to the levels of use of a plat-
form. Facebook had the highest level of use (537), but the lowest associated fre-
quency (5.30), followed incrementally by Pinterest, with the lowest level of use (236) 
but the highest frequency (7.69). It became apparent that this divergence of fre-
quency of purchase from frequency of use of a platform was a symptom of wider ex-
perience being associated with a wider repertoire of platforms used. 
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Table A8 Distribution of claimed purchase frequency by ultimate location of purchase 
 
While the study focused on online purchases, a substantial proportion (26.5%) still 
ended up with a purchase in a physical location, particularly a high-street retail store 
(see Table A8). It should also be noted that higher frequencies were associated with 
purchases knowingly connected with unbranded sites probably hosted abroad. 
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Table A9 Distribution of claimed purchase frequency by attitude to provenance of 
products found 
The vast majority of purchases made online, over 75%, appeared to be genuine (see 
Table A9). This proportion clearly may have included a proportion of undetected 
fraud but this was outside the scope of this study. It is also worth noting that, when 
considering financial harm, we did not recognise consequential activities: in particu-
lar, a purchase might be made on a suspect site but the product received turn out to 
be fine. However, accessing these sites might cause any device to be infected with 
detrimental software that can corrupt the device, detect subsequent activity, and/or 
capture financial and other sensitive information. 
 
 
Table A10 Distribution of claimed frequency of purchase by motivation for purchasing 
copied items 
 
Again, the most common responses were associated with the least frequent pur-
chases (see Table A10). “They are much cheaper” had 457 responses (the largest), 
and an average frequency of 5.27 (the least). Looking at the response “Other family 
members wanted them”, which had the highest average frequency (6.73), indicated 
that there were hints of small-scale diffuse distribution networks within these com-
plicit purchases. 
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Table A11 Distribution of claimed frequency of purchase by deterrent to purchasing 
copied items 
 
Perhaps the most surprising finding drawn from the reasons not to purchase copied 
items was that there is a low level of perception of the risk of harm in these consider-
ations; rather, the decisions to be compliant were more commonly selected as prefer-
ences (see Table A11). 
 
After examination of the characteristics of different levels of exposure and responses 
to recent online purchases, it was worth breaking down the behaviour into the char-
acteristics driven by the individuals concerned. To do this, we split the respondents 
into four segments in line with our overall definitions, as previously specified: ‘de-
ceived’ individuals were those who acknowledged receiving any defective product via 
a past purchase from the selected sectors; ‘complicit’ individuals were those who 
were not surprised to receive a suspect product; ‘compliant’ individuals were those 
who only deferred when copied products were identified and only received good 
products; ‘unexposed’ had not acknowledged any copied product locations and only 
received good products from suppliers. 
 
We can initially examine the demographic make-up of these different groups (see Ta-
ble A12): 
 
109 
Table A12 Demographic distribution of consumer segments based upon attitude to the 
provenance of products found online for purchase 
 
Overall, just over 71% of respondents were ‘unexposed’ to the suspect locations or 
products, but this differs between different demographic groups (see Table A13). The 
highest proportions of ‘complicit’ behaviour occur within males, the age band 30–34, 
and social grades AB. There was also a suggestion that complicit behaviour is geo-
graphically concentrated within London. 
 
As well as the differences in demographic, it was useful to differentiate behaviours: 
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Table A13 Demographic distribution of consumer segments based upon attitude to the 
provenance of products found online for purchase 
 
The strongest difference in locations (see Table A4.3l) was identified as the activity 
that takes place on unbranded sites probably hosted abroad. These sites presented 
clear risks for tracking, and also the complicit evasion of excise duty. 
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Table A14 Distribution of consumer attitudinal segments by number of social media 
platforms used 
 
The connection between social media engagement and ‘complicit’ behaviour is 
clearly shown in the table above (see Table A14). For individuals who did not use so-
cial media at all, the ‘complicit’ segment made up only 13.9% and the ‘unexposed’ 
were 77.8%. However, when all the suggested channels were acknowledged, the 
proportions were reversed, with 74.5% within the ‘complicit’ segment and 9.1% within 
the ‘unexposed’ segment. 
 
This demonstrated that ‘complicit’ behaviour is symptomatic of high levels of digital 
engagement, as shown below (see Table A15), when the volume of purchasing is 
segmented. 
 
 
Table A15 Distribution of consumer attitudinal segments by est. total annual transac-
tions within the tracked consumer sectors 
 
If a respondent only acknowledged a low level of digital activity, they were much less 
likely to participate in complicit behaviour (13.1%), with over 75% within the unex-
posed segment, and the highest proportion of the compliant segment too. By con-
trast, when high levels of repeated purchases were conducted, the unexposed seg-
ment dropped to 50%, while the ‘deceived’ segment grew to 7.0% and the complicit 
segment reached 38%. This suggests that high levels of engagement with digital pur-
chases are ‘educating’ individuals into more complicit behaviour, by teaching them 
the ‘tricks of the trade’ and potentially to source more material than is likely to be for 
their own consumption. It also looked like this exposure left them more susceptible to 
being deceived, probably because of the nature of the locations that are used. 
The current study setup was unable to directly gain questionnaire responses from 
usernames identified within social media tracking. This would be an ideal extension 
of the study to invite questionnaire responses, particularly from those usernames that 
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were doing high volumes of promotion. However, it was likely that completion rates 
would be low if an open invitation to participate were issued. At this stage, it was only 
possible to notice the similarities in behaviour from the different perspectives. This 
group of individuals, who participated frequently and were highly engaged with social 
media platforms, might overlap with those individuals that are generating the high 
volumes of outbound posts identified within the online tracking study. To demon-
strate, we compared the distribution of behaviour across the different segments’ esti-
mated level of annual transaction activity (see Figure A6). 
 
 
Figure A6 Net uplift in frequency of tracked purchasing activity by depth of population 
penetration, and by consumer attitude segment 
 
The behavioural impact of social media 
 
To investigate the characteristics of the segments visually across multiple axes, we 
used Sankey diagrams to visually display the weights of interaction between different 
variables. By comparing the width of the bands attached to each of the segment 
stages, we picked out the significant contribution to the complicit segment that arises 
from the opposite ends of the social grade groupings, AB and DE respectively (see 
Figure A7). In addition, high proportions arose within the younger age bands (18 to 
29 and 30 to 39). By comparison, the deceived segment mostly consisted of those 
from the youngest age band and the lowest social grade alone. 
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Figure A7 Sankey chart of the consumer attitude segments by key demographics, age 
band and social grade 
 
The following two charts demonstrate the differences in behaviour between the com-
plicit segment and others. 
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Figure A8 Sankey chart of the complicit segment by key online behaviours 
 
Figure A9 Sankey chart of the non-complicit segments by key online behaviours 
 
The above two charts (Figure 8 and Figure 9) demonstrate the distinctive differences 
in behaviour. Complicit behaviour was easily discriminated and social media was the 
most common source of information, whereas for non-complicit behaviour previous 
experience was the strongest factor, with social media relegated to the least used in-
formation source. In addition, unbranded, possibly foreign, purchase locations were 
much more significant parts of the purchase journey for the complicit segment but 
were virtually absent from other segments. Another interesting difference was that 
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complicit behaviour was much more associated with sourcing popular brands, as in-
dicated by the high proportion of connections with select brands within the research 
(rather than other un-referenced brands). 
 
The final couple of charts focus explicitly on the contribution of social media, which 
lies at the heart of this study (see Figure 10 and Figure 11). 
 
 
Figure A10 Sankey chart of the key online behaviours when mediated by social media 
 
 
Figure A11 Sankey chart of the key online behaviours when no use of social media is 
acknowledged 
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When no social media was used, it appeared to be connected with dramatically dif-
ferent experiences. Firstly, the unexposed segment was by far the largest group, and 
unexposed individual actions were even more dominant. By contrast, when social 
media was used the complicit segment was most prevalent, as well as the individual 
actions. Social media communications were much more closely associated with the 
promotion of unbranded, possibly foreign, hosts. Again, it was clear that the popular 
well-known brands were more associated with social media promotion. This sug-
gested that complicit activity could be associated with further distribution, as the com-
plicit behaviour was focused on popular brands that were sourced on the under-
standing that they were easier to pass on further. 
 
In conclusion, from a variety of perspectives we see that the deliberate purchase of 
copied products formed a significant proportion (15.4%) of overall activity, at least 
within the sectors examined. Only 2.1% of purchases were estimated to be made as 
the result of deception. Social media had a significant contribution to this complicit 
behaviour, with 46.1% of complicit purchases involving social media, whereas only 
4.1% of unexposed purchases involved social media. 
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Appendix 5 Other Economic Models and Approaches to measure the 
harm from counterfeiting  
 
Alongside the GAO, Hopkins, OECD and BASCAP approaches covered in the main 
report we also considered other approaches to assessing social media’s impact on 
modern consumer behaviour, including a review of behavioural economic literature 
and two models used to estimate deceived and complicit consumer behaviours. 
 
Insights from behavioural economics approach 
Recent books, like Richard Thaler’s 2015 Misbehaving,113 analyse consumer deci-
sion-making, noting underlying trends in consumer behaviour such as obsessions 
with discounts and “addiction to frequent sales”. Thaler argues that there is an “en-
dowment effect that all economic decisions are made through the lens of opportunity 
costs”. Thaler describes his formulation of decision-making as involving acquisition 
utility (equivalent to consumer surplus) and transaction utility. The latter can be de-
fined as “the difference between the price actually paid for the object and the price 
one would normally expect to pay”, meaning it is about the quality of the deal. 
 
Jordan Kasteler, writing114 on social media’s influences on behaviour, noted social 
media’s influence on our shopping, relationships and education but raised the ques-
tion of the role social media networking plays in the rest of our lives. He cited re-
search suggesting that most social networks mainly support pre-existing social rela-
tions, suggesting that platforms like Facebook are used to maintain or strengthen ex-
isting offline relationships, as opposed to being used to meet new people. Social net-
works are often designed to be widely accessible but many attract homogeneous 
populations initially, making it easy to find groups using sites that are easily seg-
mented. Citing Christakis and Fowler’s Connected: The Surprising Power of Our So-
cial Networks and How They Shape Our Lives,115 he explains the relationship be-
tween individuals and their networks of people, which either directly or indirectly influ-
ence their lives. Apparently, social networks can help spread contagions, create ‘epi-
demics’, disseminate fads and markets, alter voting patterns and more. He also de-
scribes social networks’ ability to “harbor a flow of generally undesirable things such 
as anger and sadness, unhappiness, but good things also flow like happiness, love, 
altruism, and valuable information”. He concludes that: “our own behavior, actions, 
and habits are likely to be largely more influenced and impacted by social media than 
we ever could have imagined”. 
Christakis and Fowler also develop some useful concepts about the nature of 
groups, including group effects, self-organising groups and criminal behaviour, de-
scribing116 how more connections within groups (known as a concentrated network) 
can reinforce behaviour in the groups, but more connections between groups (known 
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as an integrated network) can open up a group to new behaviours and to behavioural 
change, for better or worse.117 They also note that118 in self-organising groups there 
are different outcomes between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ schools in terms of shaping atti-
tudes. The changes in behaviour between the two beg the question of whether we 
can see appreciable differences between open and closed groups on social media 
platforms. 
In relation to criminal behaviour,119 they argue that even though “social networks are 
a valuable shared resource […] not all are in the best position to capture these bene-
fits – [this] raises fundamental questions of justice and public policy”. Even as social 
networks can be a “shared resource or public good”,120 they can function as “by-prod-
ucts of the actions of individuals acting with some self-interest”. They have some rel-
evant views on the way social networks function, not just for good but also as con-
duits for panic, and how they can be exploited for bad ends. They argue that “the in-
terpersonal spread of criminal behaviour is an illuminating example of a bad network 
outcome” and claim that there is evidence suggesting that, partly because of social 
interactions, criminal actions in a given place and time will increase the likelihood that 
others will commit crimes, leading to more crimes occurring than would have been 
expected. And the groups over which these effects can extend can number in the 
hundreds.121 
Estimates of economic impact of social media on sectoral revenue lost 
This and the subsequent section use models to estimate the impact of social media 
on revenues generated in certain sectors and the drivers for complicit behaviour. 
The first model used is based on ‘Calculating the Effects of Counterfeiting Sales on 
Output, Total Revenue, and Profits of Legitimate Producers’, which is cited without 
attribution in ‘A review of the economic impact of counterfeiting’.122 Their model as-
sumes that counterfeiting reduces demand by competing with authentic legal offer-
ings and that counterfeits are a perfect substitute for legitimate goods, meaning they 
are deceptive; as such, this implies that the model cannot be used for non-deceptive 
purchases. Given the argument from industry, as well as government and private en-
forcement agencies, that deception is made easier online because of counterfeiters’ 
ability to employ authentic images and price items close to the genuine article, there 
is a clear sense that deceived purchases form a significant part of online trade. As 
such, the main impact of social media and other online platforms may well be an in-
crease in the volume of deceived purchases and, accordingly, the model may still be 
useful in estimating the economic impact of such platforms on legal offerings. 
In order to relate the new results to the existing literature, we begin with the estimate 
of losses due to counterfeiting: 
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As mentioned several times elsewhere, the current examined research is inappropri-
ate for making global estimates of the overall value of sales, but we can make some 
credible estimates of the relative effects of counterfeiting, particularly those from so-
cial media. As a result, rather than engaging in a detailed review of the applicability 
of this equation’s assumptions when applied to the overall levels of equilibrium, we 
focus on the nature of the perturbations around an assumed equilibrium, wherever 
that equilibrium might finally land, once the deceptiveness (or otherwise) of counter-
feits has been accommodated. 
 
By concentrating on the relative effects, we can define a rate of change in counter-
feit-based sales driven by changes in the level of social media, , where, formally, 
S relates to the level of social media activity. 
 
We can derive a relative impact of counterfeit losses of:  
Currently, we lack detailed knowledge of the current profit margins within the respec-
tive markets we have studied, but the dependence on profit is maximal, 
 therefore, it is straightforward to define an upper boundary on the  
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relative affects, while the research information provides us with independent esti-
mates of the rates of counterfeiting relative to overall sales and the difference in 
counterfeiting rates relative to the absence of social media communications. 
 
Applying this approach to the data captured within the online survey generates the 
estimates shown below (Table A16): 
 
 
Table A16 Sector estimates of the impact of social media on revenue loss due to coun-
terfeit behaviour 
 
Estimates of the drivers for complicit consumer behaviour 
 
Once we have estimated the contribution from social media, we can also seek to un-
derstand the factors that lead to the generation of the complicit consumer behaviour 
we have seen in the existing research results. In this estimate, we sought to develop 
the conceptual model advocated by Chaudhry et al. The model is shown figuratively 
below (Figure A12): 
 
 
Fig A12 Conceptual model of consumer complicity – following Chaudhry and Stumpf 
(2007) 
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Source: Economics of Counterfeit Trade 
 
The estimates were made using a stepwise linear regression across the research 
data, with the outcome variable, the consumer acknowledgement of complicity, as-
signed a unit score, +1. To help balance the model, those consumers who were un-
exposed to a counterfeit experience were assigned a score of -1 – those exposed but 
not complicit were scored 0. Within the available predictor variables, data were ini-
tially summarised using a factor analysis to isolate out orthogonal variables to sum-
marise the characteristics of different aspects of the schematic model. The model 
was split between extrinsic attributes, which are part of each individual’s external en-
vironment, and intrinsic attributes, which relate to the individual’s personal perspec-
tive. 
 
Firstly, we need to define the extrinsic variables present within the captured research 
data as follows. 
 
1. Product attributes were modelled by a linear combination of sector experience, 
the most discriminating variable, product difference (PD), which is orthogonal to 
the overall volume of activity. This is shown as: 
  
 
Where SP is the presence of online perfume purchases, SC is the presence of 
online clothing purchases, SA is the presence of online alcohol purchases, and 
SG is the presence of online cigarette purchases. 
 
2. Shopping experience was modelled based upon previous purchase experience, 
PE, the type of location of the final purchase, LC, plus a discriminating variable, 
SE, shown in the equation below of those relevant attributes that relate to experi-
ence within the purchase process that influences whether an individual is likely to 
make a purchase: 
  
 
Where PE relates to the influence of previous experience, SD relates to sales dis-
counts, PA relates to advice from professionals and FR relates to recommenda-
tions from famous people. 
 
3. Communications experience was modelled using the combination of use of so-
cial media, SM, in online decisions and in addition the discrimination of the use of 
the internet, IS, claimed by each respondent: 
  
 
Where IE is the use of internet for emails, IN is the use of the internet for non-gro-
cery purchases, IO is the use of the internet for online dating and ID is the use of 
the internet to download movies. 
 
The intrinsic variables have some straightforward elements: 
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1. The demographics present within the research included age, gender and esti-
mated social grade (grouped into four levels: AB, C1, C2 and DE), which was es-
timated from declared occupation. 
2. Cultural values, CV, were estimated from the influence of family and peers on 
purchase choices: 
  
 
Where CF is the influence of friends and family, CC is the influence of reviews by 
other customers, CP is the influence of competitions, and CO is the influence of 
offers and vouchers delivered to home. 
3. Attitudes were estimated from each respondent’s current financial outlook, plus 
a discriminatory variable describing the purchases of discretionary products or 
otherwise, PD, of respondents: 
 
 
Where PL is the intention to purchase clothing, PN is the intention to purchase 
entertainment electronics, PC is the intention to purchase credit card services, 
and PS is the intention to purchase financial savings products. Along with these 
defined variables, a number of others were included, particularly those other 
sources of information at the point of online purchase. These variables were then 
added into an exploratory stepwise linear regression. The optimal result is shown 
in Table A17 below. 
 
1. Mode
l 
Unstandardised Coeffi-
cients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
2. t Sig. 
3. B Std. Error 4. Beta 
 
(Constant) 5. 0.
8
8
6 
6. 0
.
0
1
5 
7.   8. 6
0
.
4
9
5 
9. 0
.
0
0
0 
10. S
M 
11. -
0.0
97 
12. 0
.
0
1
7 
13. -
0.11
7 
14. -
5
.
6
0
5 
15. 0
.
0
0
0 
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16. P
E 
17. 0.
0
4
8 
18. 0
.
0
1
1 
19. 0.08
7 
20. 4
.
3
4
9 
21. 0
.
0
0
0 
22. I
S 
23. 0.
0
2
5 
24. 0
.
0
0
7 
25. 0.07
5 
26. 3
.
5
9
7 
27. 0
.
0
0
0 
28. S
E 
29. 0.
0
1
5 
30. 0
.
0
0
6 
31. 0.05
1 
32. 2
.
5
0
4 
33. 0
.
0
1
2 
 
 
 
 
Table A17 Optimum stepwise regression model for complicit behaviour 
 
Within the terms of the schematic model framework, the results suggest the domi-
nance of extrinsic factors on the generation of complicit behaviour. These are the 
factors that show significant effects, as demonstrated by the Analysis of Variance 
ANOVA table shown in Table A18, and explain 21.5% of the variation. By comparing 
the mean square, it can be seen how influential social media experience is, with the 
impact of it more than three times greater than other effects. The social media (SM) 
mean square is 41.3 in comparison to 12.8 and 12.3 for the next-greatest influences, 
which are previous product experience (PE) and internet use (IS) respectively. 
 
 
Table A18 ANOVA result for the optimum stepwise regression model 
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The summary effects of social media on counterfeiting using this model are shown 
below in Figures A13 ( contribution to complicit behaviour) and A14 ( impact on sec-
toral losses): 
 
Figure A13: Relative significant contributions to the schematic model of complicit be-
haviour 
 
 
 
Figure A14: Sector-specific relative contribution of social media to the economic im-
pact of counterfeiting 
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